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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States’ National Security Strategy (“NSS”), issued in May 2010,
articulates an expansion in U.S. interests that stems from the end of the Cold War.
Departing from a policy of industrial growth and military containment in response
to geopolitical threats, U.S. national security is now defined in terms of a wide
range of potential risks that the country faces.
The NSS, for instance, ties the economy, education, immigration, infrastructure,
science and innovation, alternative forms of energy, health care, and reductions in
the federal deficit to U.S. national security.1 It calls for a “seamless coordination
among Federal, state, and local governments to prevent, protect against, and
respond to threats and natural disasters.”2 A “whole of government approach” will
integrate the skills and capabilities of the country’s military and civilian institu-
tions, including, inter alia, merging the staffs of the National Security Council
1. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 2, 29–30 (2010) [hereinafter OBAMA NSS],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (discussing immigration
as a component of human capital); see also id. at 9–10 (calling for the integration of homeland security and
national security staff).
2. Id. at 2.
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(“NSC”) and Homeland Security Council.3 In addition to foreign policy and
international military concerns, the NSC will now also focus on trade, travel,
organized crime, domestic intelligence gathering and dissemination, terrorism,
public health, and natural disasters.4
The NSS is not alone in its rather expansive view of U.S. national security.5 The
Quadrennial Defense Review (“QDR”), for example, issued in February 2010,
cites threats related to the global commons, cybersecurity, climate change, and
energy.6 The Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (“QICR”), issued in
January 2009, proclaims the dawn of a new era, requiring a “fundamental
transformation of the national security establishment.”7 It identifies seven key
variables underlying the unique threats now faced by the United States: political
and military, social and cultural, demographic and health, domestic environment,
innovation and technology, energy and environment, and economic and financial.8
What these and other articulations share in common is a significantly expanded
view of what constitutes U.S. national security—one which differs not just from
3. Id. at 14.
4. Id.
5. Critics of the NSS as a meaningful document may correctly argue that its immediate object is policy, not
law, and even then that it is subject to significant limitations (such as failing to establish priorities, consider fiscal
limits, assign duties to agencies, or synchronize related documents). But such claims would overlook the
importance of the NSS. For one, it derives from a legislative mandate. See 50 U.S.C. § 404a (2006). Via
amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, Congress has required the President to submit an annual report,
coincident with the budget, detailing the country’s approach to national security. Id. The statute requires that the
President address: (1) worldwide interests, goals, and objectives vital to U.S. national security; (2) foreign policy,
worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities necessary to deter aggression and implement U.S.
national security; (3) proposed short- and long-term uses of U.S. political, economic, and military power; (4) the
adequacy of U.S. capabilities to carry out the NSS; and (5) additional information that may be necessary to keep
Congress informed of matters related to U.S. national security. Id. In a constitutional sense, the report thus lies at
the intersection of executive and legislative authorities: the former in an executive and foreign affairs capacity,
and the latter in providing for the common defense and general welfare of the country.
As a practical matter, moreover, the NSS accomplishes a number of important aims. As noted by the
Congressional Research Service (“CRS”), by articulating a strategy, the NSS informs domestic and foreign
audiences of the country’s strategic intent. See CATHERINE DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34505, NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY: LEGISLATIVE MANDATES, EXECUTION TO DATE, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2
(2008) [hereinafter DALE, NSS], http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL34505_
07282008.pdf. By linking the country’s goals and the approaches designed to meet them, it helps to justify the
executive’s requests for authorization and appropriations from Congress and, in turn, Congress’s decision to grant
executive requests. By offering prioritized objectives, moreover, the NSS provides guidance to departments and
agencies to use in their internal processes for budgeting, planning, and operations, as well as organizing, training,
and equipping their personnel. Id. The NSS anchors the most important policy documents in the field—the
QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW (“QDR”), the NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY (“NDS”), the NATIONAL MILITARY
STRATEGY (“NMS”), QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REVIEW (“QICR”), and the QUADRENNIAL DIPLO-
MACY AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW (“QDDR”).
6. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW 5 (2010),
http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010usdprolloutbrief.pdf.
7. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, QUADRENNIAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REVIEW: SCENARIOS:
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES THE IC COULD FACE 4 (2009) [hereinafter QICR], http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/qicr.pdf.
8. Id. at 5–6.
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that which dominated during the Cold War, but also from any point in U.S. history.
This is not the first shift in how the country has looked at its security interests. It is,
however, by far the most expansive. And it is beginning to find root in the law, with
significant constitutional implications.
This Article argues that the current expansion represents the fourth and most
troubling epoch in the evolution of the country’s approach to national security, one
that raises concern about the distribution of power within the U.S. constitutional
structure. It suggests that each epoch resulted in alterations to the domestic and
foreign affairs structures of the federal government—components generally consid-
ered to lie in different realms, but, in fact, equally important in conceptions of U.S.
national security.
The Article begins by considering what, exactly, is meant by “national security.”
It posits a Hamiltonian definition—the laws and policies directed at protecting the
national government in its efforts to aid in the common defense, preserve public
peace, repel external attacks, regulate commerce, and engage in foreign relations.9
National security is thus rooted in concepts directly related to national sovereignty.
The Article then returns to the Founding and suggests that the first epoch, which
extended from 1776 to 1898, was marked, primarily, by the drive to Union and,
secondarily, by the goals of establishing international independence and building
the country’s economic strength. The Civil War represented a reversion to Union
as the core of American national security, with recourse to international indepen-
dence and economic growth following the defeat of the Confederate States.
The Spanish-American War brought the first epoch to a close, leading to the
second era, from approximately 1898 to 1930, in which U.S. national security
expanded to include a formative agenda in the global environment. The United
States would no longer be content to react to foreign developments; it would seek
to shape the international arena. Domestically, the government sought to limit the
growing strength of private sources of power. Tensions between the goals of the
first age (international independence and economic growth) and those of the
second (engagement and dominance over potential rivals for domestic authority)
resulted in power struggles between the federal branches of government.
During the third epoch, which reached from the 1930s to 1989, national security
became the United States’ overriding interest, rendering all other concerns subser-
vient. The economy, education, housing, health care, civil rights—all these became
seen through a new lens, gaining for national security a privileged position within
the domestic discourse. Glimmers of this epoch first appeared with the country’s
near-simultaneous entry into World War I and the domestic introduction of
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The principal purposes to be answered by union are
these—the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against internal
convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the
superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.”), available at http://www.
constitution.org/fed/federa23.htm.
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measures meant to counter the threat of totalitarianism. It was during this rise of
totalitarianism in the 1930s, however, that the age took hold. World War II and the
advent of the Cold War narrowed the focus to one form of threat. Containment of
communism—particularly with respect to the Soviet Union and its expansionist
designs—became the overriding goal. As a matter of foreign policy, the country
emphasized military engagement and development aid, while focusing at a
domestic level on fostering closer relationships among industry, science, and
political institutions. Strides in the domestic civil rights arena also became an
important response to Soviet allegations of democratic injustice.
The fourth and most recent epoch in the evolution of U.S. national security
emerged in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. National security dominates the
domestic discourse as it did during the third epoch, making it the United States’
most powerful institutional engine. Risks, broadly defined, have become folded
into the national security framework. Emphasis is now placed on the effects that
may result should any of the anticipated risks become manifest. The intent of bad
actors, either state or non-state actors, matters only within the context of respond-
ing to the specific threat. As a practical matter, this means that actor-less threats,
such as pandemic disease, are now treated as matters of national security. Under
the approach of the fourth epoch, global security—the security interests of other
countries and regions—has become intertwined with U.S. national security. The
line between foreign and domestic has begun to fade. Moreover, areas outside the
traditional national security framework, such as climate change, public health,
drugs, and criminal law, have been drawn into the national security infrastructure.
Perhaps most significantly, executive branch authorities have rapidly expanded,
raising a number of constitutional concerns.
II. DEFINING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
The first question in any historical exposition of the United States’ approach to
national security is: What, exactly, is meant by “national security”?
One approach might be to begin by exploring usage of the term itself. As a
historical matter, some scholars argue that such a course may be inadvisable—not
least because the term is primarily a creature of the twentieth century.10 This is the
position taken by Professor Ernest May.11 According to this view, the National
Security Act of 1947 signals the beginning of a new age.12 Professor Harold Koh
largely agrees, anchoring modern usage of the term in the National Security Act of
1947.13 Thus, he similarly dates the use of the term to the mid-twentieth century
10. See, e.g., Ernest R. May, National Security in American History, in RETHINKING AMERICA’S SECURITY:
BEYOND COLD WAR TO NEW WORLD ORDER 95 (Graham Allison & Gregory F. Treverton eds., 1991).
11. See id.
12. See National Security Act of 1947, ch. 15, 61 Stat. 496.
13. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN
CONTRA AFFAIR, 67 (1990); National Security Act of 1947, ch. 15, 61 Stat. 496. For thoughtful treatment of the
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and, specifically, to the start of the Cold War.14
These claims, however, overlook earlier usage. During the Constitutional
Convention, according to James Madison’s notes, Oliver Ellsworth remarked that
a national government would help to secure national security.15 This function lay at
the core of the new structure of government under the Constitution: the national
government could only embrace such objects of a more general nature than those
pursued by the states.16 The very purpose of the Convention was to address the
shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation, foremost amongst which was its
failure to produce security against foreign invasion.17
Mark Shulman, who provides a thoughtful analysis of the origins of the National
Security League, similarly suggests that the positions etched out by May and Koh
fall short. He points to debates held at Yale in the 1790s, where Yale undergradu-
ates considered whether “National Security depend[s] on fostering Domestic
Industries?”18 Indeed, throughout the remainder of the eighteenth century and into
the nineteenth century, similar discussions marked the contours of America’s
national interests.19 By 1853, Franklin Pierce in his Inaugural Address discussed
national security in the light of the Compromise of 1850.20 One year later, in
response to information received that citizens were preparing to send a military
expedition to invade Cuba, the President issued a proclamation, warning that the
decision to invade would undermine U.S. national security.21 Shortly thereafter,
reflecting on the French Revolution, articles appearing in the newspapers tied the
impact of the National Security Act of 1947 and the evolution of associated authorites, see DOUGLAS T. STUART,
CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A HISTORY OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA (2008) and AMY
ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC (1999).
14. See KOH, supra note 13, at 67.
15. JAMES MADISON, Saturday, June 30, in NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1787),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/0630.html (transcribing remarks of Mr.
Oliver Ellsworth).
16. Id.
17. JAMES MADISON, Monday, May 14th, 1787 and Friday 25 of May, in NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 15, available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/debates/
0514.html (transcribing remarks of Mr. Edmund J. Randolph).
18. W. W. ROSTOW, HOW IT ALL BEGAN: ORIGINS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY 191 (1975); Mark R. Shulman, The
Progressive Era Origins of the National Security Act, 104 DICK. L. REV. 289, 291 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Victor S. Clark, The Influence of Manufactures Upon Political Sentiment in the United States
from 1820–1860, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 58, 58, 63 (1916) (explaining how political leaders, such as Thomas Jefferson
and John C. Calhoun, framed debates about protecting domestic manufactures in national security terms).
20. See President Franklin Pierce, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1853), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 115, 122 (Bicentennial ed. 1989) [hereinafter INAUGURAL ADDRESSES]
(highlighting the threat to “national security” presented by the conflict over slavery and suggesting, “We have
been carried in safety through a perilous crisis. Wise counsels, like those which gave us the Constitution,
prevailed to uphold it. Let the period be remembered as an admonition, and not as an encouragement, in any
section of the Union, to make experiments where experiments are fraught with such fearful hazard.”).
21. See Invasion of Cuba—The President’s Proclamation, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, June 1, 1854, at 1 (stating the
government claims a right and duty to interfere with the proposed invasion to protect the “honor of its flag, the
rights of its citizens, the national security and the preservation of the public tranquility”).
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concept of national security to national fraternity.22 During the Civil War, the term
“national security” was bandied about in justification for each side’s position—
with slavery and the dangerous influences of wealth cited in the North, and
northern invasion highlighted by the South, as undermining national security.23
“National security” is thus not a creature of the twentieth century.24 Despite its
appearance throughout history and its use in relation to statutory authorities,
however, “national security” is rarely defined. The National Security Act of 1947,
for instance, refers to “national security” more than 100 times; yet nowhere does it
define the term.25 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 similarly
refers to “national security” nearly a dozen times in a manner of some conse-
quence.26 It uses the term, for example, in relation to placing matters within the
purview of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), determining who
can certify an application to FISC, and authorizing in camera and ex parte
proceedings.27 Attorney General determination of a national security threat allows
officials to secretly search and seize property—effectively waiving notice other-
wise required under the Fourth Amendment.28 Despite the work being done by this
concept, however, no definition is provided. Nor does the omnibus 2001 USA
PATRIOT Act define the term—despite more than two dozen references to it and
the significant expansion of executive power premised upon matters falling within
its purview.29 Myriad other statutory examples present themselves.30
22. See L. Kossuth, Letters from L. Kossuth: American Interference in European Affairs—Prospects of
Revolution The Peace Question, &c., N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Jan. 21, 1856, at 4 (“[T]he principle of national fraternity
is more than a philanthropic emotion . . . it is the only true basis of national security . . . .”).
23. See, e.g., The Republican Party and Our Relations with Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1860, at 2; Sympathy
with the South, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1859, at 4; The Am. Abolition Soc’y, The Anniversaries, N.Y. DAILY TIMES,
May 15, 1857, at 1; Ex-Secretary Guthrie’s Return to Louisville—His Address, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Mar. 27, 1857,
at 2.
24. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
25. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
26. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1846).
27. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1803(e) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (“[T]he court . . . shall adopt and, consistent with the
protection of national security, publish procedures for the review of petitions . . . .”); 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6) (2006
& Supp. 2010) (“a certification [by] an executive branch official or officials designated by the President from
among those executive officers employed in the area of national security or defense . . . ”); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)
(2006 & Supp. 2008) (“[T]he United States district court in the same district as the authority, shall,
notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an
adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the
application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary . . . .”); see also
50 U.S.C. § 1845(f) (2006) (similar to 1806(f)).
28. 50 U.S.C. § 1825(b) (2006 & Supp. 2008).
29. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 350–52 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Of particular note is section 505: Miscellaneous National Security Authorities, which
significantly expands “National Security Letters” to include a broader range of information and organizations
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On the rare occasion statutory definitions appear, the term is understood
broadly.31 According to the current Classified Information Procedures Act, for
instance, national security involves matters related to the “national defense and
foreign relations of the United States”—an amorphous description, open to wide
interpretation.32 Where statutes provide definitions of the term linked to other
activities, those definitions prove similarly broad. In the amended National
Security Act, for instance, the term “intelligence related to national security” refers
to
all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including
information gathered within or outside the United States, that—
(A) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the
President, to more than one United States Government agency; and
(B) that involves—
(i) threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests;
(ii) the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruc-
tion; or
(iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland
security.33
from which information can be obtained via administrative subpoena absent prior judicial approval. See id. at
§ 505.
30. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226a (2006) (giving the Attorney General the authority to detain an alien where the
Attorney General has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien “is engaged in any . . . activity that endangers
the national security of the United States,” without defining what constitutes “national security”); American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (referring to items related to the
national security interests of the United States, as well as the authority to exclude posting contractual or other
information when necessary to protect national security, without specifying what precisely is meant by the term);
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (allocating funding for “activities related
to national security” without specifying the meaning of the term); Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (giving the Secretary of State the authority to waive certain limitations
where the Secretary determines and certifies “that it is in the national security interests of the United States to do
so,” without defining the term); Department of the Interior—Appropriation, Pub. L. No. 111-88, 123 Stat. 2904
(2009) (requiring “An assessment of any risk to the national security of the United States or its citizens,” without
specifying what is meant by national security); Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-212, 124 Stat.
2302 (2010) (authorizing the President to access additional funding for assistance to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan, where he finds and certifies “that exercising the authority of this section is necessary to protect the
national security interests of the United States” but not defining the term); National Aeronautics and Space Act
Pub. L. No. 111-314, 124 Stat. 3328 (2010) (“The Administrator shall establish such security requirements,
restrictions, and safeguards as the Administrator deems necessary in the interest of the national security,” without
defining the term).
31. See generally JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES
(2007) (discussing the Classified Information Procedures Act, the Department of Defense’s definition of national
security, and NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1).
32. Classified Information Procedures Act § 1(b), 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2006). This approach reflects the U.S.
Department of Defense’s DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, which similarly defines “national
security” as: “A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States.”
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND
ASSOCIATED TERMS 232 (2010), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
33. 50 U.S.C.A. § 401a(5) (2012) (emphasis added).
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In similar manner, the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002,
which provides government-wide rules for information security, defines “national
security system” as any system:
(i) the function, operation, or use of which—
(I) involves intelligence activities;
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national security;
(III) involves command and control of military forces;
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons
system; or
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct fulfillment of
military or intelligence missions; or
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have
been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order or
an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or
foreign policy.34
The effect is rather circular: material is classified because it is interpreted by
officials as being related to national security, even as national security data is
defined as material that has been classified.
Executive branch articulations prove equally broad. Consider the George W.
Bush Administration’s directive governing the design of the National Security
Council: “National security,” the document stated, “includes the defense of the
United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government,
and the advancement of United States interests around the globe.”35 Exactly what
constituted national defense was nowhere explained, nor were limits proposed for
the U.S. interests in question.
Precise meaning of the term, if anything, has become even more elusive.
President George W. Bush’s five-page National Security Presidential Directive 1
referred to “national security” thirty-three times without offering any definition.36
The Obama Administration overwrote Bush’s national security presidential direc-
tives, replacing them with presidential policy directives.37 Presidential Policy
Directive 1 (“PPD-1”), which addresses the National Security Council, refers to
34. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-347, § 201, 116 Stat. 2947 (2002)
(codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3542(b)(2)(A)).
35. GEORGE W. BUSH, NSPD-1, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 1: ORGANIZATION OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM (2001). In 2003, Executive Order 13,292 expanded the concept of “national
security” established in Executive Order 12,958 to include “information relating to defense against transnational
terrorism.” Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 28, 2003), available at http://www.archives.gov/
isoo/policy-documents/eo-12958-amendment.html (amending Executive Order 12,958).
36. See id.
37. See generally BARACK OBAMA, PPD-1, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 1: ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM 5 (2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf (“This document is the first in
a series of Presidential Policy Directives that, along with Presidential Study Directives, shall replace National
Security Presidential Directives as instruments for communicating presidential decisions about national security
policies of the United States.”).
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“national security” thirty-three times but nowhere defines it.38 The Obama Admin-
istration’s first Presidential Study Directive similarly stopped short of defining the
phrase, although it did state that the concept should be thought of coincident with
“homeland security.”39 The logic stemmed from a broad concept of risk: both
“national security” and “homeland security” reflect policies “designed to keep our
country secure and our citizens safe.”40
The Supreme Court, for its part, has recognized national security as a compel-
ling interest, and one with regard to which, in certain settings, deference should be
given to the political branches.41 In Korematsu v. United States, for instance, the
Court, applying strict scrutiny for the first time, upheld the detention of American
citizens: national security proved a compelling government interest.42 In Haig v.
Agee, the Court echoed its earlier decision, stating that it was “‘obvious and
unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of
the Nation.”43 It lay at the core of federal responsibilities—it was the very purpose
of the federal government.44 In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court
again deferred to the executive branch.45 The political and highly variable nature
of the interest at stake often underlies such decisions.46 This is the consideration at
38. See id.
39. See BARACK OBAMA, PSD-1, PRESIDENTIAL STUDY DIRECTIVE 1: ORGANIZING FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
AND COUNTERTERRORISM 1–2 (2009), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/psd/psd-1.pdf (“[C]onceptually and function-
ally, [national security and homeland security] should be thought of together rather than separately.”).
40. Id. at 2.
41. Even as he denied President Truman the authority to seize steel mills on U.S. soil, for instance, Justice
Jackson wrote in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, “I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to
sustain [the President’s] exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned
against the outside world for the security of our society.” 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952).
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (“[Korematsu was excluded from the Military
Area] . . . because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security measures . . . .” ); cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 114 (1943)
(“[Citizens of a particular racial group] . . . though subject to requirements of national security and military
necessity, should at all times be accorded the fullest consideration and respect. When the danger is past, the
restrictions imposed on them should be promptly removed and their freedom of action fully restored.” (Douglas,
J., concurring)); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213
(1991) (discussing Korematsu and the origins of strict scrutiny). Although these cases are almost universally
condemned, they demonstrate the seriousness with which the judiciary views matters of national security.
43. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
44. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding the President’s grant of authority
is extensive precisely because of the ultimate responsibility to protect the security of the nation).
45. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
46. See, e.g., id. at 2711 (“[R]espect for the Government’s factual conclusions is appropriate in light of the
courts’ lack of expertise with respect to national security and foreign affairs, and the reality that efforts to confront
terrorist threats occur in an area where information can be difficult to obtain, the impact of certain conduct can be
difficult to assess, and conclusions must often be based on informed judgment rather than concrete evidence.”);
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2011) (“The consequences of that deterrence must counsel caution by
the Judicial Branch, particularly in the area of national security.”); Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 18 (2008) (according deference to the President after explicitly finding: “The President determined that
continuation of the exercises as limited by the Navy was ‘essential to national security.’”); Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 802 (2008) (“All that today’s opinion has done is shift responsibility for those sensitive foreign
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the heart of the state secrets privilege.47
Even as it has overtly noted the compelling interest involved in national security
matters, the Court has acknowledged that the term is frustratingly broad, giving
rise to important constitutional concerns. In New York Times Co. v. United States,
for example, the Court determined that the government had failed to show that
publication of the Pentagon Papers would irreparably harm U.S. national secu-
rity.48 Justice White wrote that the government conceived of “national security” as
giving the President the authority to prevent anything that threatens “grave and
irreparable” injury to the public interest.49 For him, such powers were too
sweeping.50 Justice Black similarly objected: “The word ‘security’ is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamen-
tal law embodied in the First Amendment.”51 Black continued, “The guarding of
military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative govern-
ment provides no real security for our Republic.”52
Justice Black’s words echo those of other jurists. In Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Jackson noted that the President’s power, at least when
turned inward, “is not such an absolute as might be implied from that office in a
militaristic system but is subject to limitations consistent with a constitutional
Republic . . . .”53 Chief Justice Hughes in De Jonge v. Oregon in 1937, a case that
questioned whether Oregon’s criminal syndicalism statute fell afoul of Fourteenth
policy and national security decisions from the elected branches to the Federal Judiciary.”) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 679 (2006) (“As I explained in Hamdi v. Rums-
feld . . . the structural advantages attendant to the Executive Branch—namely, the decisiveness, ‘activity, secrecy,
and dispatch’ that flow from the Executive’s ‘unity,’ . . . led the Founders to conclude that the ‘President has
primary responsibility—along with the necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the
Nation’s foreign relations.’”) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (“[C]ourts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in
military and national security affairs.”).
47. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1905 (2011) (“We have recognized the
sometimes-compelling necessity of governmental secrecy by acknowledging a Government privilege against
court-ordered disclosure of state and military secrets.”); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 77 (2010) [hereinafter Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets].
48. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). The Government had argued in its brief
that, despite the First Amendment, “[t]he authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against
publication of information whose disclosure would endanger the national security stems from two interrelated
sources: the constitutional power of the President over the conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as
Commander-in-Chief.” Brief for the United States at 13–14, N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (Nos. 1873, 1885).
49. See N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 732 (White, J., concurring) (“The Government’s position is simply
stated: . . . the President is entitled to an injunction against publication of a newspaper story whenever he can
convince a court that the information to be revealed threatens ‘grave and irreparable’ injury to the public
interest . . . .”).
50. See id. (“At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I
am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize
remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press.”).
51. Id. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
52. Id.
53. 343 U.S. 579, 645 (1952).
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Amendment due process, similarly wrote:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to
the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is
the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press
and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political
discussion . . . . Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation
of constitutional government.54
Justice O’Connor expressed similar unease in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.55 At issue was
whether the executive could indefinitely detain a U.S. citizen absent basic due
process.56 Justice O’Connor wrote: “We recognize that the national security
underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ although crucially important, are broad and
malleable.”57
Examining the use of the term, then, while illuminating, fails to reach a more
important question: How, over time, has the United States conceived of its national
security interests? It matters how one thinks about national security, not least
because of the tautological risk, which is that if national security is conceived of as
primarily economic, political, or military in nature, then one would look at the
political, economic, and military laws and policies of the national government in
response and find that conceptions of national security depended on the same.
With this caution in mind, I propose to examine the evolution of U.S. national
security as understood by the interests that national security is intended to serve.
That is, I do not adopt a definition based on a specific subject matter, such as
foreign relations. Instead, to understand what we mean by “national security” I
look to the object that is to be secured and the reason for its preservation—the
purpose for which such object exists.
The former, the object that is to be secured, is the political structure of
government. As James E. Baker, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, has argued, the reason most definitions center on defense and
foreign affairs is precisely because such concepts form the central functions of the
State.58 At issue is the legitimacy of the governing institutions as intimately linked
to their ability to protect the people, preserve the republic, and ensure their own
existence—all functions integral to our constitutional design.
But the concept of national security does not end there, for the federal
government arises from an underlying purpose. One of the strongest articulations
comes from Alexander Hamilton, who conceived the purpose of the Union as for
“the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well
54. 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
55. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 520.
58. See BAKER, supra note 31, at 19.
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against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with
other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse,
political and commercial with foreign countries.”59 If this is the purpose for which
our political structures were formed, a fundamental national interest must be to
protect the State so that it may pursue these aims.
Hamilton underscored the importance of military capabilities to the common
defense, but he was careful to explain that a broader range of threats may arise:
The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to
build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct
their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist
without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and
variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them.60
For Hamilton, whether there ought to be a central government entrusted with
acting in the common defense may be an open question.61 Once answered in the
affirmative, however, the central government must be given the powers “requisite
to complete execution of its trust.”62 In this understanding, it would make little
sense to establish a government without providing it with the authority necessary
to act on the purposes for which it was created.
For the present discussion, I thus understand national security to be the
preservation of the political and constitutional structures in light of the purpose for
which they were created. This conception is broader than that historically adopted
in international relations or foreign relations, as it extends beyond the exercise of
international power.63 It is part of my argument that U.S. national security cannot
be understood solely in light of its external components. It must be considered in
relation to the political institution of government itself, as influenced by both
domestic and international concerns, that allows the institution to protect its ability
to act in accordance with the purpose for which it has been created.
This understanding, however, still leaves unanswered where, precisely, one
should look in order to determine how the United States has conceived of its
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton), available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa23.htm.
60. Id. (emphasis in original).
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the international relations field did not spend an inordinate amount of time
debating what was meant by national security. Instead, the emphasis was almost entirely on military force, with
minimal work being done by the term itself. David A. Baldwin, The Concept of Security, REV. INT’L STUD. 5, 9, 23
(1997), http://tau.ac.il/!daniel/pdf/37.pdf. This led to a rather weak conceptualization of what was meant by
national security. See generally BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: AN AGENDA FOR INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY STUDIES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (2nd ed. 1991). Until the end of the Cold War, articles that looked
more carefully at the term itself proved few and far apart. See, e.g., Arnold Wolfers, “National Security” as an
Ambiguous Symbol, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 483 (1952); Baldwin, supra, at 5–10.
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national security interests over time.64 For purposes of this Article, I look to the
executive branch as a whole, including, inter alia, the different institutional
arrangements within the executive branch designed to address U.S. national
security. I also look to congressional grants of authority, appropriations, and
oversight devices as a way to understand how the country has approached the
concept of national security over time.65
In this framing, executive articulations of U.S. interests take on a central role.
The contours of what the executive can do in this area derive from the right of
political institutions to defend themselves and the duties these institutions bear to
the sovereign who created them—duties that range from protecting the lives and
property of citizens, to ensuring the survival of the Constitution. They also reflect
the strong role played by the executive branch with regard to the external affairs of
the country.66
64. It makes little sense to look broadly at the individuals making up the country to ascertain the approach;
there would be as many opinions and variations as there are people. So one is forced to consider the
collective—this is inherent in our concept of the people as sovereign. Representative institutions (both state and
federal) and the constitutional design thus become the manifestation of U.S. national security interests. Here, the
Constitution divides the authorities that constitute the purpose of national government among the federal
branches. It is not always clear where the demarcations lie. This was precisely the intent of the Founders.
According to Hamilton, the executive branch had a particular role to play in regard to some of the areas central to
how I have defined national security—such as in defense of the nation, preserving public peace, repelling external
attacks, and engaging in foreign relations. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). The concept of an
energetic executive is taken to an extreme by proponents of what Professors Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein
refer to as a strong version of a unitary executive. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the
Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994); Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1992). This concept of the executive branch is
not without its critics. See, e.g., Karl Manheim & Allan Ides, The Unitary Executive, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2006, at
24. Professors David Barron and Martin Lederman, for instance, acknowledge that there may be a compelling
case to be made for a unitary and energetic executive in the realm of the armed forces—an area central to common
defense and national security. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008). But even
here, the original understanding of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief did not preclude other
branches from playing a role in war making. Id. at 696. As an empirical matter, the legislature has often assumed
an active role in setting the terms of battle, as well as the conduct and organization of the armed forces. David J.
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 941, 947 (2008) (“Throughout its history, Congress has in effect rejected the idea that ‘[w]ar is too
difficult to plan for with fixed, antecedent legislative rules,’ and has even tried to manage the conduct of particular
wars once they were under way by enacting statutes that were, in effect, attempts to second-guess or pretermit the
President’s judgments. If anything, the congressional willingness to enact such laws has only increased during the
very period in which the abdication paradigm has taken hold.”).
65. For the legislative branch, statutory instruments and legislative resolutions offer at least a majoritarian
perspective.
66. As a constitutional matter, the President is granted considerable foreign affairs authorities in U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1 (executive power); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (commander-in-chief authorities); and U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 3 (power to recognize foreign governments). The President’s strong role with regard to foreign affairs has
been further recognized by the other branches. See, e.g., 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (“The President is the
sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs
in origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the
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Thus conceived, national security becomes an articulation of U.S. interests, the
object of which is the protection of the American political entity, which is itself
ordered by the Constitution. Its aims are thus essentially political in nature. The
military may be required for the survival of the state as broadly conceived, but it is
only one (albeit important) means to the ends.67 In a constitutional democracy,
there are limits on the form such provisions can take without fundamentally
altering the constitutional structure and protection of rights within the state.68
III. THE FOUR EPOCHS
The guiding principle that I adopt in looking at the evolution of U.S. national
security is to consider the laws and policies directed at protecting the national
government in its efforts to aid in the common defense, to preserve public peace, to
repel internal and external attacks, to regulate commerce, and to engage in foreign
relations. With this framing, four major epochs in U.S. history emerge.69 They can
be thought of in terms of concentric circles, each building on the basic tenets of the
previous age.70
The first age takes Union itself, (i.e., the establishment of the political institution
of the national government), as a necessary condition of the country’s existence.
To speak of national security at that time was to assume the continuation of the
political entity. The Union thus represented the primary and most basic national
security interest, upon which further national objectives might be built. To shore
power is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties
with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”); id. (“The President is the constitutional representative of
the United States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with foreign nations, and must
necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with
the greatest prospect of success. The committee consider this responsibility the surest pledge for the faithful
discharge of his duty. They think the interference of the Senate in the direction of foreign negotiations calculated
to diminish that responsibility, and thereby to impair the best security for the national safety. The nature of
transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently
depends on secrecy and dispatch.”) (internal citations omitted). In addition to being granted the power to raise
funds to “provide for the common Defense and general welfare,” Congress’s role with regard to defense and
foreign affairs can be found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10–16, as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause in U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
67. This articulation helps to explain why there is a pull towards a Machiavellian conception of national
security, in which raison d’e´tat may be invoked in justification for a wide range of measures.
68. I recognize that such an understanding embraces constitutionalism, opening the door to arguments that
national security ought not to depend on constitutional framing.
69. Whilst any survey of U.S. history runs the risk of gross oversimplification, I nevertheless here attempt to
sketch out the dominant shifts that mark the evolution of U.S. national security from the Founding to the present
day. The purpose is to attempt to convey a sense of the evolution of history as informed by the country’s national
security interests.
70. Although exceptions to the linear progression of U.S. interests can be found, there does appear to be a
general trajectory towards further expanding what might be considered the United States’ core national security
interests.
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up the strength of the Union, a secondary aim—that of international independence
and economic growth—could then be adopted.
In his Farewell Address, President George Washington laid out the guiding
principles for this secondary aim, which endured for more than a century.71 Thus,
from a very early date, the national government proved willing to act in support of
its commercial interests with whatever diplomatic, legal, and military power it
could muster.72 But when the integrity of the Union was threatened during the
Civil War, retreat to the primary aim—preservation of the Union—occurred.
Following the war, having settled the most serious challenge to the Union,
attention returned to establishing international independence and economic growth.
The first epoch thus spanned from the establishment of the Union through the end
of the Civil War and Restoration.
The 1898 Spanish-American War proved pivotal, as did industrialization, in
ushering in the second epoch. The United States began promoting its interests
through formative political, military, and economic engagement in the interna-
tional arena. This epoch can be seen in evolutionary terms because it rested on the
security of having attained the primary and secondary interests of the first epoch:
first, Union, and second, international independence and economic growth. Thus,
where the primary and secondary interests appeared threatened, the country’s
domestic and international response was to act in defense of such interests.
Tension arose during the second epoch in two key areas: First, U.S. international
independence was undermined by the degree to which the United States assumed a
more energetic role in the international environment—in defense of its commercial
interests. Second, the national government’s power was challenged by growth of
powerful domestic entities. As a result of these tensions, domestic power struggles
ensued.
The third epoch emerged in the 1930s in response to the growth of totalitarian-
ism.73 It witnessed the rapid promotion of national security as the overriding
national issue, forcing other concerns into a subservient role. The attack on Pearl
Harbor solidified this shift, with the Second World War further focusing American
designs. No longer would the nation embrace merely a formative approach
internationally, but as a political, economic, and military matter, it would assume
71. See President George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796),
reprinted in S. Doc. No. 106-21, at 6 (2d Sess. 2000) [hereinafter Washington, Farewell Address], http://www.
access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/farewell/sd106-21.pdf.
72. For a catalog of every military intervention in support of U.S. commercial interests, see WILLIAM
APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, EMPIRE AS A WAY OF LIFE: AN ESSAY ON THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF AMERICA’S PRESENT
PREDICAMENT ALONG WITH A FEW THOUGHTS ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE (1st ed. 1980).
73. I reject 1941 as the start of this new era. Part of my argument is that such a demarcation fails to give
sufficient weight to the impact of the growth of totalitarianism, and rather too much to the impact of the attack on
Pearl Harbor. While it is certainly true that Pearl Harbor further solidified the preeminence of the national security
dialogue, it was part of a much broader sweep, the momentum of which stemmed from a response to totalitarian
ideology.
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global dominance vis-a`-vis the communist threat. This required, as a domestic
matter, industrial-scientific-political integration and, as a foreign matter, military
containment of the U.S.S.R.74 Notably, this period also witnessed burgeoning de-
velopment aid to countries needing fortification in their resistance to communism.
We currently find ourselves in the fourth epoch. It arrived with the end of the
Cold War and has transformed U.S. national security interests from simply limiting
the spread of communism and the influence of the former U.S.S.R. (already a
broad reading of U.S. global responsibilities), to balancing competing risks;
climate change, pandemic disease, drugs, and organized crime thus find them-
selves in the same domain as economic vitality, energy, nuclear proliferation,
biological weapons, and terrorism. National security persists in its position of
dominance, constantly expanding to envelop other issues. The attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001 acted, much like Pearl Harbor, in vindicating a shift that had already
occurred.
The current approach sidelines the importance of intent, emphasizing instead
the potential impact of the threat on the country’s ability to protect its national
institutions. Two effects follow. First, actor-less threats have crept into a domain
previously reserved for geopolitical concerns. Second, the relative likelihood
entailed by the risks thus considered proves less important in earning them a place
in the national security infrastructure, than whether such threats (should they
become manifest) have the ability to cause major disruptions in the instrument of
government. This age is further characterized by the globalization of American
interests in a broad range of areas. These disparate risks are serving to significantly
strengthen the federal government, and the executive branch in particular, at great
constitutional risk.
A. Protecting the Union: 1776–1898
It would be difficult to find a clearer example of a threat to U.S. national security
than the Revolutionary War, which marked the Founding and the United States’
immediate efforts to secure its place among nations. The war turned on the
question of whether the states would be united as an independent political entity.
Once the Union was secured from immediate peril, President Washington charted a
course that would enable the country to maintain international independence and
to focus on economic growth. These twin secondary aims—international indepen-
dence and economic growth—became the defining feature of the first epoch, in
which the existence of the Union was understood to be a necessary precondition to
74. In dividing history into these epochs, I depart from the traditional International Relations model, which
equates foreign policy with national security and thus focuses on three periods: non-intervention through World
War I, followed by the rise of the country to a position of hegemony in the course of World War II, and merging
into the Cold War. GEORGE C. HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: US FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1776, at
6–7 (2008). The central debates stem from the realist school in opposition to the legacies of Wilsonian
progressivism.
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any other national interest. The twin aims translated abroad into diplomatic
outreach, efforts to expand U.S. trade, and the development of military strength to
withstand foreign aggression. At home, consideration turned to repaying war
debts, strengthening the economy, and enlarging U.S. territory.
American colonists, of course, had been well aware of the importance of
diplomacy and foreign relations in the context of military engagements. Benjamin
Franklin had himself attempted to prevent war through secret negotiations with the
British in 1774.75 Unsuccessful, it quickly became clear that only through
obtaining the support of France and Spain would the New World be able to defeat
Great Britain.76 In November 1775, the Continental Congress thus created the
Committee of Secret Correspondence.77 From this Committee emerged the Model
Treaty, which arranged for the colonists to receive weapons and foreign assistance
in return for favorable commercial terms.78 Less than eighteen months after its
creation, the Continental Congress renamed the Committee as the Committee for
Foreign Affairs.79 Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States’ interests
abroad became integrated into the Department of Foreign Affairs, with the first
Secretary for Foreign Affairs taking office in August 1781.80
Following the Founding, national security concerns did not abate. The Articles
of Confederation failed in significant part because the national government lacked
the authorities and resources to protect the Union. The country’s failure to earn the
respect of other nations could hardly be ignored: Hamilton lamented, “We may
indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the last stage of national
humiliation.”81 Foreign and domestic debt “contracted in a time of imminent peril
for the preservation of our political existence” went unpaid.82 Foreign powers
neglected to surrender American territories.83 As Hamilton commented, the
country could ill protect its national interests: “We have neither troops, nor
treasury, nor government.”84 Absent military might, diplomatic stature, and
75. Office of the Historian, A Short History of the Department of State, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ST., http://
history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/foundations (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Short
History].
76. Id.
77. Office of the Historian, Secret Committee of Correspondence/Committee for Foreign Affairs, 1775–1777,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/SecretCommittee (last visited Mar. 14,
2012) [hereinafter Secret Committee]. Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Johnson, John Dickinson,
and John Jay served on the Committee, with Robert Morris joining soon thereafter. Id.
78. Office of the Historian, The Model Treaty, 1776, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/
1776–1783/ModelTreaty (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
79. See Secret Committee, supra note 77.
80. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (authorizing the establishment of “such other
committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States”); Short
History, supra note 75.
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commercial success, the country would cease to exist.85
The Constitutional Convention thus considered creating a national government
with the authority necessary to secure the country against foreign aggression and
internal dissolution.86 The 1787 Constitution strengthened the national govern-
ment’s control over the military and foreign affairs, as well as over taxation and
commerce, thus allowing the government to squarely address its national security
interests.87 As scholars have long recognized, the great protection against the
accretion of too much authority consisted of an intricate structure of separation of
powers, checks and balances, federalism, and elections.88
Debt threatened the existence of the new nation and undermined the possibility
of economic growth. President Washington thus wasted little time in calling on
federal troops to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion.89 Opposition to paying taxes
became synonymous with treason.90 The executive branch expanded, with Presi-
dent Washington and Vice President John Adams joined by a Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, and an Attorney General91—offices
85. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton).
86. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 (John Jay).
87. See id. Foreign affairs divided between the President and the legislature, with the former granted the
executive power, the authority to make treaties (with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate), the
power to appoint ambassadors and other ministers, and the authority to receive ambassadors. U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 1 (Vesting Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Treaty Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments
Clause); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3 (Receiving foreign representatives).The President was also apportioned the
authorities of Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and of the militia, “when called into the actual Service
of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Congress, in contrast, obtained the power to lay and collect
taxes to pay off the national debt and to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the country—an
authority central to perceptions of U.S. national security. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In a similar fashion, the
legislature obtained the authority to borrow money and regulate commerce with both foreign nations and among
the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It was given broad authority over the
production of money. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. The authority to define and punish piracies and offenses was
accompanied by the authority to declare war, grant letters of marquee and reprisal, and make rules concerning
captures on land and water. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (piracy and offences against the laws of nations); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (power to declare war). Congress could raise and support the army in two-year
increments, it could provide and maintain a navy, and it could make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (raise and support armies); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13
(provide and maintain a navy); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (rules for government and regulation of the land and
naval forces). Congress could also call forth the militia in the event of insurrection or foreign invasion. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (calling forth the militia); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (organizing, arming, and
disciplining the militia). The Constitution further delegated to the legislature the authority “To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
88. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
89. THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 212
(1986).
90. Richard A. Ifft, Treason in the Early Republic: The Federal Courts, Popular Protest, and Federalism
During the Whiskey Insurrection, in THE WHISKEY REBELLION: PAST AND PRESENT PERSPECTIVES 172 (Steven R.
Boyd ed., 1985).
91. George Washington Presidential $1 Coin—First President, 1789–1797, U.S. MINT, http://www.usmint.gov/
mint_programs/$1coin/index.cfm?action"washington (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (“In 1791, President Washing-
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that emphasized the purpose for which the Union had been sought: foreign
relations, economic growth, military strength, and the rule of law.92
In the international arena, President Washington sought to establish American
independence.93 When war broke out in 1793 between Britain and France,
Washington declared neutrality and warned that any citizen aiding or abetting
hostilities against any of the powers involved would be refused U.S. protection.94
British troops, in turn, would be required to withdraw from the United States.95
Nonetheless, the door to international trade stood open. John Jay, despite the
Jeffersonians’ misgivings, secured American trade with British colonies in the
West Indies.96 Soon afterwards, Thomas Pickney’s treaty with Spain opened
navigation on the Mississippi River.97
By the time Washington published his Farewell Address in the Philadelphia
Daily American Advertiser in September 1796, the centrality of the Union in
maintaining security was firmly established. “The unity of government,” Washing-
ton wrote, “which constitutes you one people is . . . now dear to you.”98 He
continued, “It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real
independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your
safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize.”99
Although challenges to the Union would undoubtedly arise, and factions threaten,
the Union must be maintained.
Washington urged that in its dealings with foreign nations, the United States be
independent, avoiding “permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular na-
tions, and passionate attachments for others.”100 The United States’ energies
should point towards strengthening the U.S. economy:
[T]he great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending
our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as
possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none; or a
ton presided over the Nation’s first recorded Cabinet meeting, which included Alexander Hamilton as the United
States’ first Secretary of the Treasury and Thomas Jefferson as the first Secretary of State.”).
92. For a full list of cabinet officers who served during the Washington Administration, see George
Washington, PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S. (POTUS), http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/gwashington.html (last visited Mar.
4, 2012).
93. Washington, Farewell Address, supra note 71 (“Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure
you to believe me, fellow citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and
experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government.”).
94. President George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), available at http://odur.let.rug.nl/
usa/D/1776-1800/foreignpolicy/neutr.htm.
95. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. II, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116.
96. Id. at art. XII.
97. Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sp1795.asp.
98. Washington, Farewell Address, supra note 71.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 23.
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very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the
causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it
must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary
vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her
friendships or enmities.101
By remaining unified and detached from the internecine warfare marking Euro-
pean relations, the time would come “when belligerent nations, under the impossi-
bility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice,
shall counsel.”102 “E Pluribus Unum,” added to U.S. coins about the same time as
Washington’s Farewell Address,103 captured an important element of U.S. national
security: the Union itself (“out of many, one”) resting on the economic strength of
the country.
1. International Independence and Economic Growth
Washington’s approach to national security, supported by congressional ratifica-
tion of treaties and the establishment of key executive-branch departments,
continued in successive administrations. Central to maintaining American indepen-
dence was the ability to protect U.S. commerce and to withstand foreign aggres-
sion. Towards this end, in 1798, President John Adams appointed Benjamin
Stoddert the first Secretary of the Navy, adding another critical post to the federal
institutional design.104
The challenges faced by Stoddert’s new department were substantial: The
Continental Navy had been disbanded after the Revolutionary War.105 Article II of
the Constitution, though, authorized Congress to provide and maintain naval
forces,106 leading to the reconstitution of the Navy in 1794,107—a time in which
Barbary Coast corsairs threatened U.S. commerce in the Mediterranean.108 Respond-
101. Id. at 26.
102. Id. at 27.
103. Coins & Medals, FAQs, U.S. MINT, http://www.usmint.gov/faqs/circulating_coins/#anchor16 (last visited
Mar. 4, 2012) (“The motto ‘E Pluribus Unum’ was first used on our coinage in 1795, when the reverse of the
half-eagle ($5 gold) coin presented the main features of the Great Seal of the United States on the scroll of which
this inscription belongs.”).
104. See John Adams, PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S. (POTUS), http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/jadams.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012).
105. Michael A. Palmer, The Navy: The Continental Period, 1775–1890, NAVAL HIST. CENTER, http://www.
history.navy.mil/history/history2.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13; Naval Act of 1794, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 350.
107. See HOWARD H. PECKHAM, THE WAR FOR INDEPENDENCE, A MILITARY HISTORY (1958); Palmer, supra note
105.
108. See Naval Hist’l Ctr., The Reestablishment of the Navy, 1787–1801: Historical Overview and Select
Bibliography, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm (last visited
Mar. 4, 2012) (“The clear necessity of defending the nation’s seaborne commerce finally moved Congress to
create a naval force in the spring of 1794. . . . [A] source of genuine danger to American commerce came from
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ing to the failure of U.S.-French negotiations in the so-called “Quasi-War” against
the corsairs,109 Congress expanded the Navy’s role by passing a series of bills to
enlarge the fleet, culminating in a 1798 statute that established the Department of
the Navy.110 Any ambition to build a U.S. battle fleet, however, seemed doomed by
the 1800 election of President Thomas Jefferson, who came to office determined to
reduce federal expenses.111 Jefferson’s expected efforts to limit naval power
faltered, however, in the face of growing tension with the corsairs and a crisis with
Tripoli.112 Because the United States’ international stature was at stake, Jefferson
directed the Navy to assume a more aggressive posture, blockading and bombard-
ing Tripoli and supporting the march of land forces intent on forcing the dey of
Tripoli from his throne.113 The Federalist Adams Administration and the Republi-
can Jefferson Administration thus adopted an approach commensurate with
Washington’s course regarding U.S. national security: use of force abroad in
defense of U.S. commercial interests—not in support of allied countries embroiled
in conflict. The aim was to obtain international independence.
As a domestic matter, Adams’s Federalists, amidst heightened tensions with
France, became increasingly alarmed that domestic sympathies for the French
revolutionaries could potentially destroy the Union.114 Accordingly, in 1798,
Congress passed four bills that came to be known as the Alien and Sedition Acts.115
The Alien Act authorized the President to deport any noncitizen considered
“dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”116 The Sedition Act took
it one step further, seeing in factionalism and malcontent the seeds of disaster.117
Professor Geoffrey Stone carefully discusses this legislation as a historical matter
and in relation to the First Amendment.118 To the extent that the legislation was
more than just a political tool to undermine the Democratic-Republican Party, it
corsairs of North Africa’s Barbary Coast.”); Palmer, supra note 105 (“Two years after the end of the war, the
money-poor Congress sold off the last ship of the Continental navy, the frigate Alliance.”). The first forty-four-
gun frigates to be built, the largest ships in the U.S. fleet, were to be called the Constitution, the United States, and
the President—apropos of the United States’ underlying national security concerns. Palmer, supra note 105.
109. The failure of the French negotiations rested in part on the so-called “XYZ Affair,” in which three
unnamed agents demanded $10 million from the Americans before the French government would negotiate. See
Palmer, supra note 105.
110. Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, 1 Stat. 553 (repealed 1947).
111. Palmer, supra note 105 (“Stoddert’s hopes of building a U.S. battle fleet were doomed by the election of
President Thomas Jefferson in 1800 . . . .”).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., GEOFFREY STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 28–29 (2004).
115. Naturalization Act of 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566; An Act Concerning Aliens (Alien Act), ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570
(1798); An Act Respecting Alien Enemies (Alien Enemies Act), ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798); Sedition Act of 1798,
ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
116. Alien Act, § 1.
117. See Sedition Act, § 2 (criminalizing the publication of any “false, scandalous, and malicious writing”
against Congress or the President).
118. See STONE, supra note 114, at 31.
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also can be considered a response to a deep, underlying national security concern:
the potential threat that the French experiment presented to the bonds of the
Union.119
Throughout this time, establishing control over the physical territory of the
United States proved equally central to protecting the political institution of
government. A strong foreign presence at the nation’s borders presented a threat:
France (and Spain, for that matter) had the power to block U.S. trade at the port of
New Orleans, which would have crippled commercial intercourse west of the
Appalachians.120 Napoleon’s decision to secure New Orleans in 1801 raised
further concern, not just about attack, but about the potential for abolitionists to
free slaves in the territory, thus prompting rebellion across the southern United
States.121 President Jefferson responded by forcing through the Louisiana Pur-
chase, despite his own constitutional misgivings and strong domestic opposi-
tion.122 National security was the overriding interest.
Battles along the frontier continued.123 Britain could ill afford further encroach-
ment into its North American trade.124 It thus allied with a number of Native
American tribes to resist American expansionism.125 But the United States had
different designs: William Henry Harrison, serving as Governor of the Indiana
Territory under Jefferson’s direction, sought to take title to Native American
lands.126 He executed numerous treaties, in the process of which he secured
119. See, e.g., id. at 26.
120. In 1763, France had ceded New Orleans and land west of the Mississippi to Spain. HERRING, supra note
74, at 102. In 1800, Spain secretly transferred New Orleans back to the French, retaining Spanish rule until power
formally transferred. Preliminary and Secret Treaty between the French Republic and His Catholic Majesty the
King of Spain, Concerning the Aggrandizement of His Royal Highness the Infant Duke of Parma in Italy and the
Retrocession of Louisiana, Fr.-Spain, art. 4, Oct. 1, 1800, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/
ildefens.asp.
121. HERRING, supra note 74, at 100.
122. Treaty between the United States of America and the French Republic, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 2 Stat.
245, available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Louisiana.html. For more exposition of the histori-
cal context, see HERRING, supra note 74, at 100; WALTER NUGENT, HABITS OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
EXPANSIONISM 65–68 (2009); Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to John C. Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803),
available at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/P/tj3/writings/brf/jefl159.htm (discussing possibility of Louisiana Pur-
chase).
123. SAMUEL JONES BURR, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON 78–79 (1840) (“The British
traders carried on an extensive and profitable business with the Indians, and jealous of the increasing population
of the new country, pains were taken to prejudice the minds of the savages against our government. The traders
were stimulated to this proceeding by their home government, for England could not even yet reconcile the idea of




126. Id. at 80 (“Mr. Jefferson appointed Governor Harrison, sole commissioner for treating with the Indians.
Here his time was wholly occupied and he and the disbursement of large sums of money, appropriated by
Congress for annuities to the tribes and for purchasing lands. He conducted this trust with great discreetness, and
acquired an uncommon influence over the Indians.”).
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millions of acres for the United States.127
In concert with its support for Native American tribes, Britain began impressing
American sailors into service on the high seas128—an action at once disdainful and
harmful to the United States’ international standing.129 Great Britain also pros-
ecuted its war with France, in part, by placing restrictions on U.S. commercial
vessels.130 The standoff regarding the British orders in council, which declared
U.S. trade with France to be an act of war, pushed the United States towards active
combat.131
Driven by establishing the country’s international independence and developing
its economic strength, the decision to go to war was commensurate with the
nation’s primary and secondary national security interests.132 Those pressing for a
military response came mostly from the West and South—which were expansion-
ist in design, committed to the country’s economic interests, and already con-
127. Id. (“His administration is declared to have been nearly a succession of treaties, by one of which he
secured to the United States fifty one millions of acres of the richest country in the west, and the most valuable
mineral region in the Union.”). His actions met with resistance. See id. at 149–67, 237–39 (describing the
so-called “Indian Wars”); see also Ctr. of Mil. History, U.S. Army Campaigns: Indian Wars, U.S. ARMY,
http://www.history.army.mil/html/reference/army_flag/iw.html (last updated Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Indian
Wars]. In 1811, for instance, he fought a confederation of British-backed tribes at Tippecanoe, near Indianapolis.
See BURR, supra note 123, at 149–67, 237–39; see also Indian Wars, supra. British support for the tribes did not
stop with the Shawnee—who had been attempting to build a confederacy in the Northwest. See Indian Wars,
supra (“In 1804[,] Tecumseh, a Shawnee, and his medicine man brother, the Prophet, with British backing, began
serious efforts to form a new Indian confederacy in the Northwest.”). They allied, for instance, with the Upper
Creeks in another campaign that centered on the question of American expansion. See id. (“[The Tippecanoe]
victory did not solve the Indian problems in the Northwest. The tribes of the area were to make common cause
with the British in the War of 1812.”). Note that Britain later supported the Seminole during the First Seminole
War. Id.
128. See Palmer, supra note 105 (“American sailors . . . some as the result of the efforts of British press gangs,
served in the men-of-war of the Royal Navy.”); 2 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 529–31 (1986).
129. This fact was not lost on the British. See ADAMS, supra note 128, at 963–64. The British newspaper, The
Morning Post, for instance, opined, “though the British Government . . . may, however irritated by her conduct,
display magnanimous forbearance toward so insignificant a Power as America, they will not . . . suffer our proud
sovereignty of the ocean to be mutilated by any invasion of its just rights and prerogatives. . . . [T]he sovereignty
of the seas in the hands of Great Britain is an established, legitimate sovereignty.” Id. The paper also wrote, “A
few short months of war would convince these desperate politicians of the folly of measuring the strength of a
rising, but still infant and puny, nation with the colossal power of the British empire.” Id. at 964.
130. Cf. SIR ROBERT PHILLIMORE, 3 COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (2d ed. 1857) (opining that
the British restrictions on U.S. trade violated international law: “In [the order to engage in retaliatory measures
against French allies or any state that had submitted to Napoleon’s restrictions] the British Government, in their
turn, enunciated a proposition false in fact, and bad in law. It may be some palliation that the measure was
retaliatory, but it is not, according to the rules of eternal right and justice, a defence [sic]. The truth is, that France
was the first wrong-doer—Great Britain the second.”).
131. For a discussion of the British orders in council, see Tom Holmberg, The Acts, Orders in Council, &c. of
Great Britain [on Trade], 1793–1812, RES. SUBJECTS: GOV’T & POL., http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/
government/british/decrees/c_britdecrees1.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
132. Note that the so-called “neutral rights” violations were actually lifted before the war started, but word of
the reprieve did not reach American shores before a formal declaration of war.
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cerned about the alliances between Britain and the Native Americans.133 Despite
opposition, the declaration of war against England passed both the House and the
Senate.134 While the Treaty of Ghent, which brought the conflict to a close in
December 1814, meant agreement on status quo ante bellum,135 Jackson’s defeat
of the British at the Battle of New Orleans and the fact that the United States had
proven willing to militarily protect its commercial interests went some way to-
wards establishing the United States as a force in the international environment.136
Commensurate with this experience and the country’s twin national security
aims, President James Madison’s Second Inaugural Address reflected on the
importance of being able to protect U.S. citizens abroad:
On the issue of the war are staked our national sovereignty on the high seas and
the security of an important class of citizens, whose occupations give the
proper value to those of every other class. Not to contend for such a stake is to
surrender our equality with other powers on the element common to all and to
violate the sacred title which every member of the society has to its protection.
I need not call into view the unlawfulness of the practice by which our
mariners are forced at the will of every cruising officer from their own vessels
into foreign ones, nor paint the outrages inseparable from it.137
133. 12TH CONG., H.R. JOURNAL (1812) (recounting votes of those opposed as representing regions in the
South and West).
134. 24 ANNALS OF CONG. 755 (1812) (Declaration of War between Great Britain and the United States).
135. See Treaty of Peace and Amity Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, U.S.-Gr.
Brit, Dec. 24, 1814, 8 Stat. 218 (1814), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ghent.asp (returning
territories near Lakes Superior and Michigan, in Maine, and on the Pacific Coast to the United States in exchange
for the return of American-held areas of upper Canada to Britain).
136. See AN EXPOSITION OF THE CAUSES AND CHARACTER OF THE WAR, 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1416 (1814),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId"llac&fileName"028/llac028.db&recNum"705.
137. President James Madison, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1813), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 30. In articulating the basic precepts of U.S. national security over time, I draw, inter alia, from the
inaugural addresses of successive Presidents. These statements often reflect the prevailing threats of the times as
well as each administration’s intended course of action. As President Rutherford B. Hayes acknowledged in his
own address, the purpose of the speech is “to announce some of the leading principles, on the subjects that now
chiefly engage the public attention, by which it is my desire to be guided in the discharge of those duties.”
President Rutherford B. Hayes, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1877), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at
153–59. Hayes spoke specifically to “the motives which should animate us, and to suggest certain important ends
to be attained in accordance with our institutions and essential to the welfare of our country.” Id. As President
William Taft explained, “The office of an inaugural address is to give a summary outline of the main policies of
the new administration, so far as they can be anticipated.” President William Taft, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4,
1909), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 213–26. As President Herbert Hoover expressed, the inaugural
provides the President with the opportunity to “express simply and directly the opinions [held] concerning some
of the matters of present importance.” President Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1929), in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 257–68. National security routinely figures largely in the inaugural addresses—not
least, perhaps, because the speech follows upon the public taking of an oath, signifying a mutual and public
covenant to protect the country and the Constitution. President Benjamin Harrison explained:
The officer covenants to serve the whole body of the people by a faithful execution of the laws, so
that they may be the unfailing defense and security of those who respect and observe them, and
that neither wealth, station, nor the power of combinations shall be able to evade their just
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According to Madison, England had failed to abide by the laws of war.138 The
United States, however, had acted in accordance with the precepts of international
law, reflecting its status as a “civilized nation.”139
By cementing a stronger centralized government, procuring more money for the
military, and securing a stronger role for the federal government in developing the
nation’s infrastructure, the war was a victory for the Federalists. Nevertheless, it
helped to destroy the Federalist Party. Democratic-Republican President James
Monroe came to office in a landslide election, defeating Rufus King by an electoral
college vote of 183 to 34 in 1816, and securing a second term by defeating John
Quincy Adams by a vote of 231 to 1 in 1820.140
During his First Inaugural Address, national security concerns were uppermost
in Monroe’s mind.141 Mere distance from Europe had proven insufficient to
establish American independence; U.S. trade required protection.142 To do this,
Monroe concluded that a strong military must be maintained:
To secure us against these dangers our coast and inland frontiers should be
fortified, our Army and Navy, regulated upon just principles as to the force of
each, be kept in perfect order, and our militia be placed on the best practicable
footing. To put our extensive coast in such a state of defense as to secure our
penalties or to wrest them from a beneficent public purpose to serve the ends of cruelty or
selfishness.
President Benjamin Harrison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1889), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at
79–98. Thus, while the addresses are by no means exclusive, they are at least probative of the central issues being
faced and the manner in which each successive administration seeks to respond. I thus use them in concert with
other historical documents, to chart the evolution of the United States’ approach to its national security.
138. See Madison, supra note 137, at 30.
139. Id. at 29–31 (“As the war was just in its origin and necessary and noble in its objects, we can reflect with a
proud satisfaction that in carrying it on no principle of justice or honor, no usage of civilized nations, no precept of
courtesy or humanity, have been infringed. The war has been waged on our part with scrupulous regard to all these
obligations, and in a spirit of liberality which was never surpassed. How little has been the effect of this example
on the conduct of the enemy! They have retained as prisoners of war citizens of the United States not liable to be
so considered under the usages of war. They have refused to consider as prisoners of war, and threatened to punish
as traitors and deserters, persons emigrating without restraint to the United States . . . .”).
140. James Monroe, PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S. (POTUS), http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/jmonroe.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012).
141. See President James Monroe, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1817) [hereinafter Monroe, First Inaugural
Address], in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 33–41 (“Dangers from abroad are not less deserving of
attention. Experiencing the fortune of other nations, the United States may be again involved in war, and it may in
that event be the object of the adverse party to overset our Government, to break our Union, and demolish us as a
nation. Our distance from Europe and the just, moderate, and pacific policy of our Government may form some
security against these dangers, but they ought to be anticipated and guarded against. Many of our citizens are
engaged in commerce and navigation, and all of them are in a certain degree dependent on their prosperous state.
Many are engaged in the fisheries. These interests are exposed to invasion in the wars between other powers, and
we should disregard the faithful admonition of experience if we did not expect it. We must support our rights or
lose our character, and with it, perhaps, our liberties. A people who fail to do it can scarcely be said to hold a place
among independent nations. National honor is national property of the highest value. The sentiment in the mind of
every citizen is national strength. It ought therefore to be cherished.”).
142. See id.
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cities and interior from invasion will be attended with expense, but the work
when finished will be permanent, and it is fair to presume that a single
campaign of invasion by a naval force superior to our own, aided by a few
thousand land troops, would expose us to greater expense, without taking into
the estimate the loss of property and distress of our citizens, than would be
sufficient for this great work. Our land and naval forces should be moderate,
but adequate to the necessary purposes—the former to garrison and preserve
our fortifications and to meet the first invasions of a foreign foe, and, while
constituting the elements of a greater force, to preserve the science as well as
all the necessary implements of war in a state to be brought into activity in the
event of war; the latter, retained within the limits proper in a state of peace,
might aid in maintaining the neutrality of the United States with dignity in the
wars of other powers and in saving the property of their citizens from
spoliation. In time of war, with the enlargement of which the great naval
resources of the country render it susceptible, and which should be duly
fostered in time of peace, it would contribute essentially, both as an auxiliary of
defense and as a powerful engine of annoyance, to diminish the calamities of
war and to bring the war to a speedy and honorable termination.143
The key to a strong military was the ability to expand the resources available to the
government to meet any emergency that might arise.144
Under Monroe’s guidance, the physical territory of the country expanded, in
turn enabling economic growth. In 1819, Spain ceded Florida to the United States
in return for the cancellation of $5 million in Spanish debt.145 New states came into
existence: in 1820, Maine entered statehood, followed by Missouri in 1821.146 As
the territory expanded, the question of slavery threatened to divide the Union—
triggering the fundamental security interest of the country. The Missouri Compro-
mise, forbidding slavery above 36°30’, subsequently found support both north and
south of the demarcation, carrying Monroe to an easy victory for his second
term.147
In 1823, Monroe articulated his view of U.S. international interests, pointing out
143. Id. at 37–38.
144. Id. at 39 (“The great amount of our revenue and the flourishing state of the Treasury are a full proof of the
competency of the national resources for any emergency, as they are of the willingness of our fellow-citizens to
bear the burdens which the public necessities require.”).
145. Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits Between the United States of America, and his Catholic Majesty
(Adams-Onı´s Treaty of 1819), U.S.-Spain, arts. 2–9, 11, Feb. 22, 1819, available at http://www.tamu.edu/faculty/
ccbn/dewitt/adamonis.htm.
146. Statehood Dates, 50STATES.COM (Apr. 1998), http://www.50states.com/statehood.htm.
147. Monroe received 231 electoral votes to John Quincy Adams’s 1 vote in the 1820 elections. James
Monroe, supra note 140; see generally ROBERT PIERCE FORBES, THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE AND ITS AFTERMATH:
SLAVERY AND THE MEANING OF AMERICA (2007) (describing the soberness engendered by the near loss of Union
and the consequent relief that greeted the Missouri Compromise).
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that the United States had steadfastly avoided engaging in European wars.148 The
key issue for American engagement was intensely personal and rested on self-
defense: “It is only when our rights are invaded,” Monroe stated, “or seriously
menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense.”149 Monroe
went on to suggest that the United States had a more immediate interest in the
Western Hemisphere.150 Thus, according to Monroe, the country would engage in
matters of economic importance overseas, but refuse to be drawn into the
European battles that ravaged the Continent.151 In South America, however, from
which European powers had begun to retreat, the United States would countenance
no renewed colonization.152 Here, the United States asserted a defensive right to
respond to European aggression, when it felt its national interests threatened:
We owe it . . . to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the
United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as
dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies
of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with
the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and
whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles,
acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of
oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any
European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly
disposition toward the United States.153
The Monroe Doctrine ensured that the United States could act internationally free
from European restrictions. It was a way of keeping the politics of Europe out of
the Americas and thus leaving the United States free to pursue its regional
interests.
American international independence also found root in President John Quincy
Adams’s articulation of U.S. interests. Military strength, subordinate to civil
interests, provided the key.154 In Adams’s Inaugural Address, he explained,
Our political creed is . . . that the firmest security of peace is the preparation
during peace of the defenses of war . . . that the military should be kept in strict
subordination to the civil power . . . that the policy of our country is peace and
148. See President James Monroe, Seventh Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 2, 1823), in RECORDS OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE, 1789–1990, available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc"23&page"
transcript.
149. Id.
150. Id. (“With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by




154. See John Quincy Adams, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1825), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at
53–60.
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the ark of our salvation union are articles of faith upon which we are all now
agreed.155
Washington’s policies had proven critical for U.S. national security. His admoni-
tion against entanglements abroad rung as important in 1825 as they had some
thirty years prior: “If there have been dangerous attachments to one foreign nation
and antipathies against another, they have been extinguished. Ten years of peace,
at home and abroad, have assuaged the animosities of political contention and
blended into harmony the most discordant elements of public opinion.”156
President Andrew Jackson’s tenure in office reflected a similar course. For the
first (and only) time in U.S. history, the national government was relieved of all
debt.157 The shadow of the Revolutionary War thus dissipated, attention could turn
to building the economic engine on which future growth hinged. Jackson vigor-
ously advanced the interests of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi in expanding
their agricultural base by removing the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek
tribes living in their midst.158 Congress acquiesced to this policy.159 The Indian
Removal Act of 1830 authorized the President to transfer lands west of the
Mississippi (areas in what is now Oklahoma and Arkansas) to the tribes in
exchange for lands within existing state borders.160
The importance of unity continued to thread its way through U.S. national
security concerns. The Nullification Crisis of 1828–1832 raised the specter of
Southern discontent.161 Tariffs on European goods were raised by the national
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Andrew Jackson, PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S. (POTUS), http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/ajackson.html (last
visited Mar. 4, 2012) (stating that in 1835 the United States became free of debt).
158. Jacksonian Democracy: Indian Removal, Period: 1820–1860, DIGITAL HIST., http://www.digitalhistory.
uh.edu/database/article_display.cfm?HHID"638 (last updated Mar. 15, 2012).
159. See Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
160. See id.; see also Removal of the Indians, N. AM. REV., Jan. 1830, at 62–121, available at http://
digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c"nora;cc"nora;rgn"full%20text;idno"nora0030-1;
didno"nora0030-1;view"image;seq"68;node"nora0030-1%3A1;page"root;size"50; Removal of the Indians,
N. AM. REV., Oct. 1830, at 396–442, available at http://digital.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c"nora;
cc"nora;rgn"full%20text;idno"nora0031-2;didno"nora0031-2;view"image;seq"00404;node"nora0031-
2%3A1. The Treaty of New Echota, for instance, granted the Cherokee Nation land in what is now Oklahoma, as
well as $5 million in compensation for property and relocation expenses in exchange for their lands. Treaty with
the Cherokee (Treaty of New Echota), Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND
TREATIES, TREATIES (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904), available at http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/
treaties/che0439.htm. The United States also promised respect for their political autonomy in future. Id. The
Treaty, however, which was not sanctioned by the Cherokee national government, passed the U.S. Senate by only
one vote. Id. When a number of Cherokees subsequently refused to relocate, the U.S. Army was brought in to
force them to walk what has come to be known as the Trail of Tears, during which between four and five thousand
Cherokees died. See generally TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY
AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS (2002); THE CHEROKEE REMOVAL: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS (Theda Perdue & Michael D. Green eds., 1995).
161. See Nullification Crisis of 1828 to 1834, in THE SOUTH CAROLINA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Walter Edgar ed.,
2006), available at http://sc150civilwar.palmettohistory.org/edu/crisis/Nullification1828-1834.htm.
2011] THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1601
government in a manner that made them more expensive than Northern wares—
leading to charges of extortion.162 South Carolina protested that Congress had
exceeded its constitutional authority.163 A second statute followed in 1832.164 Seen
as a case of too little, too late, in November 1832, a South Carolina state
convention declared both statutes void.165 The following month, President Jackson
responded with a proclamation, disputing South Carolina’s constitutional right to
nullify a federal law.166 Congress supported Jackson’s assertion, passing in March
1833 an Act to authorize the President to use force to uphold federal tariffs.167 As
South Carolina prepared for military confrontation, Henry Clay managed to
negotiate a compromise bill, which ended the standoff.168 The incident proved
critical in the march to Civil War, but for the moment, national unity was
preserved.
In 1837, President Martin Van Buren came to office determined to continue the
course set by Washington during the first epoch. Van Buren’s opposition to an
overly strong military found counterpoise in the need to be able to defend the
country against potential foreign aggression. Van Buren commented,
We may not possess, as we should not desire to possess, the extended and
ever-ready military organization of other nations; we may occasionally suffer
in the outset for the want of it; but among ourselves all doubt upon this great
point has ceased, while a salutary experience will prevent a contrary opinion
from inviting aggression from abroad.169
162. Tariff of 1828, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 270; see also WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1816–1836, at 142–43 (1st ed. 1965); JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C.
CALHOUN AND THE PRICE OF UNION: A BIOGRAPHY 129, 135 (1988).
163. JOHN C. CALHOUN, EXPOSITION AND PROTEST, REPORTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ON THE TARIFF, READ AND ORDERED TO BE PRINTED, DEC. 19TH 1828 (SOUTH CAROLINA
EXPOSITION AND PROTEST) (D.W. Sims 1829), http://www.teachingushistory.org/documents/expositionandprotest.
pdf.
164. Tariff of 1832, ch. 227, 4 Stat. 583.
165. SOUTH CAROLINA ORDINANCE OF NULLIFICATION (Nov. 24, 1832), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
19th_century/ordnull.asp (stating that the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 “are unauthorized by the constitution of the
United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this
State”).
166. President Andrew Jackson, Proclamation Concerning the Ordinance of South Carolina, on the Subject of
the Tariff (Dec. 10, 1832), available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId"lled&fileName"004/
lled004.db&recNum"593.
167. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632.
168. See The Compromise Act, ch. 55, 4 Stat. 629 (1833) (amending several 1832 acts that imposed duties on
imports).
169. President Martin Van Buren, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1837), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20,
at 74.
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He articulated the importance of avoiding entangling alliances while pursuing
America’s economic interests abroad.170 The legacy was clear:
Our course of foreign policy has been so uniform and intelligible as to
constitute a rule of Executive conduct which leaves little to my discretion,
unless, indeed, I were willing to run counter to the lights of experience and the
known opinions of my constituents. We sedulously cultivate the friendship of
all nations as the conditions most compatible with our welfare and the
principles of our Government. We decline alliances as adverse to our peace.
We desire commercial relations on equal terms, being ever willing to give a fair
equivalent for advantages received. We endeavor to conduct our intercourse
with openness and sincerity, promptly avowing our objects and seeking to
establish that mutual frankness which is as beneficial in the dealings of nations
as of men. We have no disposition and we disclaim all right to meddle in
disputes, whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries, regard-
ing them in their actual state as social communities, and preserving a strict
neutrality in all their controversies. Well knowing the tried valor of our people
and our exhaustless resources, we neither anticipate nor fear any designed
aggression; and in the consciousness of our own just conduct we feel a security
that we shall never be called upon to exert our determination never to permit an
invasion of our rights without punishment or redress.171
It was for the federal government to maintain a national perspective and to pursue
the country’s interests in establishing the United States as an independent player on
the world stage.172 It thus fell to state governments to protect and develop local
interests and individual welfare.173 To the extent that federal initiatives influenced
local interests, it was in the interests of the nation as a whole.174 The extension of
U.S. territory had opened up “[n]ew and inexhaustible sources of general prosper-
ity . . . .”175
Nonetheless, two areas pursued by the national government had a strong local
impact: The first was the continued removal of the Native Americans—
particularly, the Cherokee—in the process begun under Andrew Jackson. The
second was the issue of abolition. Van Buren had come to office amidst mounting
friction over the institution of slavery, which he saw as threatening both the Union




174. See id. at 74. (“While the Federal Government has successfully performed its appropriate functions in
relation to foreign affairs and concerns evidently national, that of every State has remarkably improved in
protecting and developing local interests and individual welfare; and if the vibrations of authority have
occasionally tended too much toward one or the other, it is unquestionably certain that the ultimate operation of
the entire system has been to strengthen all the existing institutions and to elevate our whole country in prosperity
and renown.”).
175. Id.
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and the Constitution.176 His successor, William Henry Harrison, subsequently
reiterated the importance of Union: “Our Confederacy, fellow-citizens, can only be
preserved by the same forbearance” that marked the Helvetic Confederacy.177
The institution of slavery carried not just domestic consequences, but interna-
tional ones as well. Accordingly, President John Tyler, assuming office within a
month of Harrison’s inauguration,178 turned the United States’ gaze outward.
Trade, once again, provided a focus.179 In response to Great Britain’s detention of
U.S. vessels in the African seas, Tyler informed Congress: “Our commercial
interests in that region have experienced considerable increase and have become
an object of much importance, and it is the duty of this Government to protect them
against all improper and vexatious interruption.”180 For Tyler, the fact that such
vessels were engaged in the trafficking of human beings, regardless of British181 or
Northern sentiments on the matter, was of little import to the question of American
independence: “However desirous the United States may be for the suppression of
the slave trade, they can not consent to interpolations into the maritime code at the
mere will and pleasure of other governments.”182 In order to protect U.S. interests,
more resources would have to flow to the Navy.183 The question was not one of
176. See, e.g., MARTIN VAN BUREN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN VAN BUREN 132–38 (noting that following
the Revolution, “The spread of slavery and the increase of slave States was a source and the only source from
which trouble was apprehended . . . ”, yet objecting to the more recent efforts of abolitionists to challenge the
South: “Disguise the matter as we may such agitation must, in light of reason and justice, be regarded as alike
offensive to the spirit and derogatory to the memories of the Revolution.”); see also EDWARD L. WIDMER, MARTIN
VAN BUREN 115–22 (providing a somewhat cynical reading of Van Buren’s refusal to take a strong stand on the
issue, tying it to political self-interest as well as the fractious nature of the issue for the Union).
177. President William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1841), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 92.
178. See John Tyler, PRESIDENTS OF THE U.S. (POTUS), http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/jtyler.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2012) (providing dates of President John Tyler’s term in office).
179. See President John Tyler, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 7, 1841), available at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid"29483#axzz1Wo2idoeG (discussing the importance of protecting U.S.
commercial interests in the African region).
180. Id.
181. In 1807, the Slave Trade Act, 47 Geo. 3, c. 36 abolished slave trade in the British Empire; in 1833, the
Slavery Abolition Act, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73 abolished slavery itself.
182. Tyler, supra note 179. Tyler continued:
American citizens prosecuting a lawful commerce in the African seas under the flag of their
country are not responsible for the abuse or unlawful use of that flag by others; nor can they
rightfully on account of any such alleged abuses be interrupted, molested, or detained while on the
ocean, and if thus molested and detained while pursuing honest voyages in the usual way and
violating no law themselves they are unquestionably entitled to indemnity . . . . This Government
will not cease to urge upon that of Great Britain full and ample remuneration for all losses, whether
arising from detention or otherwise, to which American citizens have heretofore been or may
hereafter be subjected by the exercise of rights which this Government can not recognize as
legitimate and proper.
Id.
183. Id. (“The report of the Secretary of the Navy will place you in possession of the present condition of that
important arm of the national defense. Every effort will be made to add to its efficiency, and I can not too strongly
1604 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1573
aggression against other nations; it was one of being able to defend U.S.
commercial interests:
We look to no foreign conquests, nor do we propose to enter into competition
with any other nation for supremacy on the ocean; but it is due not only to the
honor but to the security of the people of the United States that no nation
should be permitted to invade our waters at pleasure and subject our towns and
villages to conflagration or pillage.184
The request for appropriations was not lightly made; the United States needed
money to shore up its national security.185
Commercial opportunity arose not just in Europe and Africa, but also in Asia. It
was during Tyler’s tenure that the United States signed its first treaty with China,
paving the way for trade with the East.186 The Treaty of Wanghia, named after the
village in which the treaty was signed, extended most-favored nation status to the
United States, putting the country on par with the benefits granted to other major
powers, such as Great Britain.187
Domestically, the country’s expansion continued. In 1845, Tyler proved willing
to go to war with Mexico to obtain Texas.188 James Knox Polk, who became
President in March of 1845, explained that the country’s policy of expansion was
central to its national security: “As our population has expanded, the Union has
been cemented and strengthened. As our boundaries have been enlarged and our
agricultural population has been spread over a large surface, our federative system
has acquired additional strength and security.”189 The following year, the United
States settled its dispute with Britain over the Oregon Territory, expanding further
urge upon you liberal appropriations to that branch of the public service. Inducements of the weightiest character
exist for the adoption of this course of policy. Our extended and otherwise exposed maritime frontier calls for
protection, to the furnishing of which an efficient naval force is indispensable.”).
184. Id.
185. Id. (“Economy in all branches of the public service is due from all the public agents to the people, but
parsimony alone would suggest the withholding of the necessary means for the protection of our domestic
firesides from invasion and our national honor from disgrace. I would most earnestly recommend to Congress to
abstain from all appropriations for objects not absolutely necessary; but I take upon myself, without a moment of
hesitancy, all the responsibility of recommending the increase and prompt equipment of that gallant Navy which
has lighted up every sea with its victories and spread an imperishable glory over the country.”).
186. See Ping Chia Kuo, Caleb Cushing and the Treaty of Wanghia, 1844, 5 J. MODERN HIST. 34, 34–54
(1933); Richard E. Welch, Caleb Cushing’s Chinese Mission and the Treaty of Wanghia: A Review, 58 OR. HIST.
Q. 328, 342 (1957).
187. See Treaty of Peace, Amity and Commerce (Treaty of Wanghia), U.S.-China, July 3, 1844, 8 Stat. 592.
188. Office of the Historian, Milestones: 1830–1860: The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War,
and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845–1848, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ST., http://history.state.gov/milestones/
1830-1860/TexasAnnexation (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
189. President James K. Polk, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1845), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at
99–110.
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west.190 And in 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the
Mexican-American War, gave the United States control over what would become
California, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and parts of Colo-
rado.191
Polk’s position that the land at issue in the Mexican-American War belonged to
the United States, and that the war itself had broad support domestically, did not go
without controversy. Abraham Lincoln spoke at length in the House of Representa-
tives against further appropriations for the war effort on the grounds that the
controversy in question was based on a false claim, and that the House had, despite
President Polk’s statements to the contrary, divided on the issue.192 One of the
reasons the war proved divisive was that it brought two fundamental tenets of U.S.
policy into conflict: reluctance to engage offensively in international wars on one
hand, and on the other, the desire to expand and build the country’s economic
strength. The discovery of gold in California in 1848 did little to diminish the
strength of the latter interest.
President Zachary Taylor came to office in 1849 determined to continue course
set by Washington and adopted by his predecessors. “As American freemen,” he
stated, “we can not but sympathize in all efforts to extend the blessings of civil and
political liberty, but at the same time we are warned by the admonitions of history
and the voice of our own beloved Washington to abstain from entangling alliances
with foreign nations.”193 Taylor emphasized that neutrality must be maintained,
even as the United States sought to engage other countries to bolster trade and to
avoid foreign aggression:
In all disputes between conflicting governments it is our interest not less than
our duty to remain strictly neutral, while our geographical position, the genius
of our institutions and our people, the advancing spirit of civilization, and,
above all, the dictates of religion direct us to the cultivation of peaceful and
friendly relations with all other powers. It is to be hoped that no international
question can now arise which a government confident in its own strength and
resolved to protect its own just rights may not settle by wise negotiation; and it
190. Treaty with Great Britain, In Regard to Limits Westward of the Rocky Mountains (Oregon Treaty of
1846), U.S.-Gr. Brit., June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869, available at http://www.oregontrackers.com/OregonTreaty_
of_1846.html.
191. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2,
1848, 9 Stat. 922.
192. Abraham Lincoln, Speech Against Mexican War (Jan. 12, 1848), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 26–27 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1974) (“When the war began, it was my opinion that all those who, because of
knowing too little, or because of knowing too much, could not conscientiously approve the conduct of the
President, in the beginning of it, should, nevertheless, as good citizens and patriots, remain silent on that point, at
least till the war should be ended. . . . [But upon examination I formed] the impression, that taking for true, all the
President states as facts, he falls far short of proving his justification; and that the President would have gone
farther with his proof, if it had not been for the small matter, that the truth would not permit him.”).
193. President Zachary Taylor, Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1849), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at
111–14.
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eminently becomes a government like our own, founded on the morality and
intelligence of its citizens and upheld by their affections, to exhaust every
resort of honorable diplomacy before appealing to arms.194
Taylor believed it was in the interests of U.S. national security to continue this
course.195 The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, signed in 1850, ensured that future canal
access through Central America would be open to international trade.196
After President Taylor’s death partway through his term, his Vice President,
Millard Fillmore, succeeded him, centering U.S. foreign policy on the rights that
each country possessed in the international arena. To Fillmore, such rights placed a
duty on other countries.197 “Nations,” he stated, “like individuals in a state of
nature, are equal and independent, possessing certain rights and owing certain
duties to each other, arising from their necessary and unavoidable relations; which
rights and duties there is no common human authority to protect and enforce.”198
Nevertheless, such rights and duties were binding in morals, conscience, and
honor—despite the absence of an international tribunal to which an injured party
could appeal.199 For Fillmore, the right of self-government strengthened the
United States’ decision not to become embroiled in other States’ conflicts:
To maintain a strict neutrality in foreign wars, to cultivate friendly relations, to
reciprocate every noble and generous act, and to perform punctually and
scrupulously every treaty obligation—these are the duties which we owe to
other states, and by the performance of which we best entitle ourselves to like
treatment from them; or, if that, in any case, be refused, we can enforce our
own rights with justice and a clear conscience.200
Commerce would remain central to U.S. interests abroad; for this reason, the Navy
would have to obtain further resources to protect U.S. trade along the Pacific
Coast.201
Upon coming to office, President Franklin Pierce reiterated the same policies.
He proclaimed in his Inaugural Address, “Of the complicated European systems of
194. Id. at 113.
195. Id. (“In the conduct of our foreign relations I shall conform to these views, as I believe them essential to
the best interests and the true honor of the country.”).
196. Convention Between the United States of America and Her Britannic Majesty (Clayton-Bulwer Treaty),
U.S.-Gr. Brit., Apr. 19, 1850, 9 Stat. 995.





201. See id. (“I invite your attention to the view of our present naval establishment and resources presented in
the report of the Secretary of the Navy, and the suggestions therein made for its improvement, together with the
naval policy recommended for the security of our Pacific Coast and the protection and extension of our commerce
with eastern Asia. Our facilities for a larger participation in the trade of the East, by means of our recent
settlements on the shores of the Pacific, are too obvious to be overlooked or disregarded.”).
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national polity we have heretofore been independent. From their wars, their
tumults, and anxieties we have been, happily, almost entirely exempt.”202 Still,
commercial interests beckoned; Pierce continued, “But the vast interests of
commerce are common to all mankind, and the advantages of trade and interna-
tional intercourse must always present a noble field for the moral influence of a
great people.”203 Under Pierce, the United States would begin to focus on trade
with the East, and go on to sign a historical trade agreement with Japan.204 The
physical expansion of the country remained central to the United States’ economic
growth. Pierce explained:
With an experience thus suggestive and cheering, the policy of my Administra-
tion will not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion.
Indeed, it is not to be disguised that our attitude as a nation and our position on
the globe render the acquisition of certain possessions not within our jurisdic-
tion eminently important for our protection, if not in the future essential for the
preservation of the rights of commerce and the peace of the world.205
Pierce’s actions in office reflected his rhetoric. The Gadsden Purchase, for
instance, also known as the Treaty of La Mesilla, soon clarified the southern border
with Mexico, in the process adding nearly 30,000 square miles to the United States
in southern Arizona and New Mexico.206 The Caribbean similarly became subject
to efforts by the United States to extend its reach; a failed effort to purchase Cuba
from Spain was followed by the acquisition of a series of uninhabited islands:
Navassa Island in the Caribbean Sea, Baker Island in the central Pacific, and the
Johnston Atoll in the North Pacific.207 Such expansionism was essential to U.S.
national security: “Should [new possessions] be obtained,” Pierce had asserted
202. Pierce, supra note 20, at 115–24.
203. Id.
204. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, U.S.-Japan, July 29, 1858, 12 Stat. 1051 [hereinafter Harris Treaty].
205. Pierce, supra note 20.
206. Gadsden Purchase Treaty (Treaty of La Mesilla), U.S.-Mex., Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/mx1853.asp.
207. For thoughtful discussion of the failure of the United States to obtain Cuba from Spain through diplomatic
channels, see generally AMOS ASCHBACH ETTINGER, THE MISSION TO SPAIN OF PIERRE SOULE´, 1853–1855: A STUDY
IN THE CUBAN DIPLOMACY OF THE UNITED STATES (1932). Navassa Island, Baker Island, and the Johnston Atoll,
were all claimed under the terms of the Guano Islands Act, Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 119, ch. 164, § 1 (codified at 48
U.S.C. §§ 1411–19), which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever any citizen of the United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key,
not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other government, and not occupied by the citizens of any
other government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and occupies the same, such island,
rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United
States.
On November 18, 1857, an American sea captain, Peter Duncan, claimed Navassa under the Act for the United
States. David P. Billington, Jr., Note on the Legal History of Navassa Island, DAVID P. BILLINGTON.NET,
http://www.davidpbillington.net/legal.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). The Secretary of State replied on
December 8, 1859, formally recognizing Navassa Island. Id. For confirmation of the other acquisitions, see U.S.
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during his Inaugural Address, “it will be through no grasping spirit, but with a view
to obvious national interest and security, and in a manner entirely consistent with
the strictest observance of national faith.”208 In his view, no new threats would
thereby develop, as nothing in the country’s history or position would invite
aggression: “[W]e have everything to beckon us to the cultivation of relations of
peace and amity with all nations. Purposes, therefore, at once just and pacific will
be significantly marked in the conduct of our foreign affairs.”209
But even as the United States engaged in (ostensibly) peaceful expansion within
North America, Pierce suggested, the country would reject any efforts by other
powers to interfere or colonize the Americas. He reiterated the Monroe Doc-
trine.210 For these purposes, and solely for the reasons outlined, the military would
be maintained, primarily as a defensive force.211
Throughout this time, control over U.S. national security lay within the hands of
the national government.212 Any interference with that authority would not be
tolerated. Thus, in 1854, Pierce responded forcefully to efforts by U.S. citizens to
send a military force to Cuba.213 At issue was “the national security and the
preservation of the public tranquility.”214 Foreign relations lay exclusively within
the power of the national government.
Responsibilities accompanied American expansion; an effective defense must
be constructed to protect the country’s shores. Accordingly, upon assuming office
in 1854, President James Buchanan drew attention to the military importance of
building a road to the West Coast.215 As a constitutional matter, such powers fell
Territorial Acquisitions, U.S. HIST., http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1049.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2012).
The Guano Act continues to be in effect. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411–19 (2006).
208. Pierce, supra note 20, at 118 (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 119 (“The rights, security, and repose of this Confederacy reject the idea of interference or
colonization on this side of the ocean by any foreign power beyond present jurisdiction as utterly inadmissible.”).
211. Id. at 119–20 (“The opportunities of observation furnished by my brief experience as a soldier confirmed
in my own mind the opinion, entertained and acted upon by others from the formation of the Government, that the
maintenance of large standing armies in our country would be not only dangerous, but unnecessary. They also
illustrated the importance—I might well say the absolute necessity—of the military science and practical skill
furnished in such an eminent degree by the institution which has made your Army what it is, under the discipline
and instruction of officers not more distinguished for their solid attainments, gallantry, and devotion to the public
service than for unobtrusive bearing and high moral tone. The Army as organized must be the nucleus around
which in every time of need the strength of your military power, the sure bulwark of your defense—a national
militia—may be readily formed into a well-disciplined and efficient organization. And the skill and self-devotion
of the Navy assure you that you may take the performance of the past as a pledge for the future, and may
confidently expect that the flag which has waved its untarnished folds over every sea will still float in
undiminished honor.”).
212. See id.
213. President Franklin Pierce, Anticipated Invasion of Cuba—President’s Proclamation, N.Y. DAILY TIMES,
June 1, 1854, at 1.
214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. See President James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note
20, at 130.
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well within Congress’s authority to declare war, raise and support armies, provide
and maintain a navy, and call forth the militia to repel invasions.216 Such
war-making power entailed a corollary duty to protect each of the states against
invasion:
In the event of a war with a naval power much stronger than our own we should
then have no other available access to the Pacific Coast, because such a power
would instantly close the route across the isthmus of Central America. It is
impossible to conceive that whilst the Constitution has expressly required
Congress to defend all the States it should yet deny to them, by any fair
construction, the only possible means by which one of these States can be
defended. Besides, the Government, ever since its origin, has been in the
constant practice of constructing military roads.217
The ability of the national government to command the allegiance of the western
territories rested, in part, on the ability of the federal government to adequately
perform its duties.218
As for foreign relations, Buchanan would adhere to the course set by Washing-
ton during the first epoch:
In our intercourse with [the great family of nations] there are some plain
principles, approved by our own experience, from which we should never
depart. We ought to cultivate peace, commerce, and friendship with all nations,
and this not merely as the best means of promoting our own material interests,
but in a spirit of Christian benevolence toward our fellow-men, wherever their
lot may be cast. Our diplomacy should be direct and frank, neither seeking to
obtain more nor accepting less than is our due. We ought to cherish a sacred
regard for the independence of all nations, and never attempt to interfere in the
domestic concerns of any unless this shall be imperatively required by the
great law of self-preservation. To avoid entangling alliances has been a maxim
of our policy ever since the days of Washington, and its wisdom’s no one will
attempt to dispute.219
The key to U.S. national security during this time was international independence
for the United States. Constructive engagement on matters of diplomacy would
help to prevent foreign aggression, while steadfastly refusing to become drawn
into European conflicts would ensure the country’s self-preservation. Simultane-
216. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (declare war); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (raise and support armies);
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (provide and maintain a navy); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (providing for calling
forth the militia).
217. Buchanan, supra note 215, at 130.
218. Id. at 130–31 (“It might also be wise to consider whether the love for the Union which now animates our
fellow-citizens on the Pacific Coast may not be impaired by our neglect or refusal to provide for them, in their
remote and isolated condition, the only means by which the power of the States on this side of the Rocky
Mountains can reach them in sufficient time to ‘protect’ them ‘against invasion.’”).
219. Id.
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ously, physical expansion and building stronger commercial ties would help
strengthen the economic underpinnings of the country, contributing to American
power. Union was a prerequisite to all that followed.
2. Retreat to Union
Abolition continued to mount the national stage. The Union—the very purpose
for which the national government was created—came under increasing pressure.
Coming off the Compromise of 1850, the uneasy relationship between the North
and South threatened to cause a permanent split. Pierce reflected on the threat that
had been posed to “national security”:
We have been carried in safety through a perilous crisis. Wise counsels, like
those which gave us the Constitution, prevailed to uphold it. Let the period be
remembered as an admonition, and not as an encouragement, in any section of
the Union, to make experiments where experiments are fraught with such
fearful hazard.220
In parallel with the emphasis on Union, national fraternity came to be seen as of
paramount importance. Hungarian Louis Kossuth, the first foreign statesman
invited to the United States to address a joint session of Congress since the
Marquis de Lafayette, brought the matter to the fore.221 Kossuth’s upcoming
speech caused no small amount of concern, in light of domestic North-South
frictions and Kossuth’s commitment to democratic ideals.222 He subsequently
wrote in the New York Times,
[T]he best I can wish for America is, that, whatever be the ultimate issue of the
great crisis in the destinies of humanity, the shadows of which are manifestly
rising on the horizon . . . the people on the other side of the Atlantic may never
again stand in need of assistance from without.223
The context of the time was of great import:
Humanity is everywhere in critical throes. I think it clearly indicated that
everything is tending towards a speedy consummation of the truth that the
principle of national fraternity is more than a philanthropic emotion; that it is
the only true basis of national security, even for the proudest and most
220. Pierce, supra note 20, at 115–24.
221. See About Louis Kossuth, AM. HUNGARIAN FED’N, http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/
news_kossuth.htm#about (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (“Kossuth was the first foreign Statesman officially invited to
the US since the Marquis de Lafayette.”); cf. JOHN P. KAMINSKI, LAFAYETTE: THE BOY GENERAL 100 (2007)
(discussing Lafayette’s appearance before Congress). On December 11, 1784, Lafayette became the first foreigner
to address Congress. Id.
222. About Louis Kossuth, AM. HUNGARIAN FED’N, http://www.americanhungarianfederation.org/news_
kossuth.htm#about (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
223. L. Kossuth, American Interference in European Affairs—Prospects of Revolution The Peace Question,
&c., Number 25, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Jan. 8, 1856, at 4.
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powerful of nations. France, bereft of all the fruits of three successful
revolutions, is an instructive illustration of the truth that popular freedom is not
secure, even with the most powerful, without community.224
In this articulation, national fraternity intoned integration and unity of purpose and
government.
North and South appeared to agree that national fraternity stood in question.
What they seemed to disagree about was whence, precisely, the threat to such
fraternity derived. In the North, the pursuit of wealth came to be seen as part of the
threat. Upon his return to Louisville, the former Secretary of the Treasury, James
Guthrie, explained:
It has been said, in reference to individuals, that it is easier to bear the trials of
adversity than of prosperity. That which applies to individuals is no less true of
nations. . . . Our country has passed through the most trying scenes of adver-
sity; we are now called upon for the first time to withstand the dangerous
influences of wealth. It has grown into a proverb that affluence maddens
nations; and an overflowing treasury is a temptation to public plunder that
everyone may not resist. I pray and hope confidently that the noble old Ship of
State will weather the storm which threatens her and ride safely into a secure
harbor of national security.225
Abolitionists also looked to the South’s refusal to relinquish the practice of slavery,
suggesting that it was this intransigence that threatened the Union as a whole.226
The New York Times carried Reverend Beriah Greene’s references to the “institu-
tion” of slavery:
Said he, there exists among us a thing which bears the name of an ‘institution,’
in which all the objects described in the [C]onstitution are ruthlessly trampled
underfoot, and divine law utterly repudiated. This ‘institution’ has attained
such a commanding prominence as to exercise a controlling national influ-
ences [sic]. It has become the institution. It is the existence of this institution
which had called the convention together—which had occasioned wide-spread
alarm, and the deepest solicitude for our national security.227
The South’s failure to relinquish slavery posed a threat. For the abolitionist
minority, if national security required an end to slavery, then the failure of the
country to embrace abolition meant that it was placing slavery above national
security.228
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. (Former) Secretary of Treasury James Guthrie’s Return to Louisville—His Address, N.Y. DAILY TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1857, at 2 (emphasis added).
226. See The Anniversaries, The Am. Abolition Soc’y, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, May 15, 1857, at 1.
227. Id.
228. The Republican Party and Our Relations with Mexico, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at 2 (“The
Republican Party is old enough, and has in it the conditions pre-requisite for a foreign as well as domestic policy;
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Like Guthrie and Greene, Abraham Lincoln underscored the role that slavery
played in threatening the Union and in denying the country national fraternity.
Speaking in 1858, he pointed out that approximately five years earlier, a policy had
been initiated with the stated aim of ending slavery.229 “Under the operation of that
policy,” Lincoln asserted, “that agitation has not only not ceased, but has
constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease, until a crisis shall have
been reached and passed.”230 He declared,
“A house divided against itself cannot stand.” I believe this government cannot
endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be
dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be
divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other.231
Danger dwelt not only in the divisions that tore the country in two, but in the
appeals to national security. By making such appeals, the controversy involved
more than abolition and the newly acquired territories; it implicated the political
structure and the constitutional order. The New York Times thus begged on
Thanksgiving Day, 1859:
We shall be astonished to see how little in our lives we truly owe to ourselves,
to our own wit or wisdom, or shrewdness or strength, in comparison with the
enormous weight of our obligations to the society in which we have dwelt, to
the laws and the civilization which have made our efforts possible, and to that
sublime overruling Power . . . . It can do us no harm to feel these truths more
keenly than ever to-day . . . . The United States sorely need a Thanksgiving
Day, that they may measure the tremendous extent of the perils which national
success and national vanity, and the insolence of national security, have been
preparing for the Republic. Let us silence to-day, for a brief space, the angry
pulse of partisan conflict and sectional recriminations; and ask ourselves in all
seriousness what the future has in store for us if we continue to act, as for years
we have acted, on the theory that nothing can disturb our peace . . . .232
The real risk in succumbing to such partisan politics was the destruction of the
nation itself.
Southern views, unsurprisingly, departed from those of the North. They consid-
ered Northern aggression the most serious threat to U.S. national security:
and while we are sure that none would be adopted for the regulation of our intercourse with our neighbors on this
continent, which was not bottomed on the principles of humanity and justice, we are equally sure that, if that is
wanting, the opposite policy of the Democracy—that which makes commerce, national security and humanity
secondary to . . . the extension of the area of slave territory—will prevail. For that reason, if for no other, we urge
upon the Republican Senators . . . the necessity for a careful survey of Mexican affairs.”).
229. See JOHN SIMPSON PENMAN, THE IRRESISTIBLE MOVEMENT OF DEMOCRACY 125 (1923).
230. Abraham Lincoln, Address to the Illinois Republican Party Convention (House Divided Speech) (June
16, 1858), available at http://www.historyplace.com/lincoln/divided.htm.
231. Id.
232. Thanksgiving Day, N. Y. DAILY TIMES, Nov. 24, 1859, at 4 (emphasis added).
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Invaded in a moment of profound peace—startled from their dreams of
national security by the advent of a new Peter the Hermit, preaching an eternal
crusade against their domestic order and their notions of public law—the
people of the South may lawfully and reasonably demand of the North an open
repudiation of practical excesses which every sensible man must admit to be
equally incompatible with the honor of the Free States and with the peace of
the South.233
Once again, national security concerns proved paramount—namely, whether the
political differences between the North and the South would undermine the
underlying precepts of the Union: “No matter what may be the views which one or
another Northern man may entertain of Slavery in the abstract,” one Southern
supporter wrote, “the bare proposition which assumes a right on the part of any
Northern man to march with an armed following at his back from Ohio into
Kentucky, or from Pennsylvania into Virginia, on a mission of emancipation, is its
own immediate refutation.”234
Two weeks prior to Lincoln’s inauguration, Jefferson Davis became President of
the Confederacy.235 Lincoln, despite his earlier “House Divided” speech, at-
tempted to diffuse Southern concern:
I . . . consider that in the view of the Constitution and the laws the Union is
unbroken, and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution
itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully
executed in all the States . . . In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or
violence, and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national
authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess
the property and places belonging to the government and to collect the duties
and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be
no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere . . . So far
as possible the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security
which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection.236
Nevertheless, Lincoln displayed an iron fist in a velvet glove: “The course here
indicated,” he continued,
will be followed unless current events and experience shall show a modifica-
tion or change to be proper, and in every case and exigency my best discretion
will be exercised, according to circumstances actually existing and with a view
233. Sympathy with the South, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, Dec. 10, 1859, at 4 (emphasis added).
234. Id.
235. Jefferson Davis delivered his Inaugural Address for the Confederacy on Feb. 18, 1861. President
Jefferson Davis, Inaugural Address of the President of the Provisional Government (Feb. 18, 1861), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_csainau.asp. President Abraham Lincoln’s inauguration was held on
Mar. 4, 1861. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES,
supra note 20, 133–41.
236. Lincoln, supra note 235, at 136–37.
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and a hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles and the restoration of
fraternal sympathies and affections.237
Fraternalism thus served as the glue that held the Union together. Renouncing the
Union left only anarchy and despotism.238 Lincoln thus emphasized that the Union
must be maintained—signaling a retreat to the core national security interests of
the Founding.
Throughout the Civil War, preserving the Union provided an overriding national
security interest. “Rally for the union,” one ad called, “The Peace of this Union
must be restored. We must have national security and peace.”239 The People had
ordered it thus.240 Protection of the Constitution was therefore a central concern.
Accordingly, as President Andrew Johnson took office in 1865, he noted,
The best security for the perpetual existence of the States is the “supreme
authority” of the Constitution of the United States. The perpetuity of the
Constitution brings with it the perpetuity of the States; their mutual relation
makes us what we are, and in our political system their connection is
indissoluble. The whole can not exist without the parts, nor the parts without
the whole. So long as the Constitution of the United States endures, the States
will endure. The destruction of the one is the destruction of the other; the
preservation of the one is the preservation of the other.241
The Civil War would serve to preserve the Constitution.
Following the war, the question of what to do with the territory within the limits
of the Confederate States immediately presented itself.242 The land could be held
under military authority, as derived from the President’s commander-in-chief
authorities.243 But strict military rule offered little by way of security.244 Such an
arrangement, according to Andrew Johnson, “would have divided the people into
the vanquishers and the vanquished, and would have envenomed hatred rather than
have restored affection.”245 It would lack a precise end, and it would entail
237. Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 138 (“A majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing
easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.
Whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or to despotism.”).
239. Display Ad 2—No Title, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, 1861, at 5 (“Assembly to support the Union, ‘By order of
50,000 citizens’”).
240. Id.
241. President Andrew Johnson, First Annual Message (Dec. 4, 1865) [hereinafter Andrew Johnson, First
Annual Message], available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid"29506#axzz1Wo2idoeG (em-
phasis added).
242. See id. (“Whether the territory within the limit of [Confederate] States should be held as conquered
territory, under military authority emanating from the President as the head of the Army, was the first question that
presented itself for decision.”).
243. Id.
244. See id. (“The willful use of such powers, if continued through a period of years, would have endangered
the purity of the general administration and the liberties of the States which remained loyal.”).
245. Id.
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considerable expense.246 Instead, security depended upon the restoration of
national fraternity: “Peaceful emigration to and from that portion of the country is
one of the best means that can be thought of for the restoration of harmony.”247
Commitment to the Constitution, and the constitutional order, would ensure
security.248 This approach directly reflected Hamilton’s concern with protecting
the political institutions of government in their ability to act on the purpose for
which they had been formed. New governments must submit “loyally and heartily
to the Constitution and the laws—the laws of the nation and the laws of the States
themselves—accepting and obeying faithfully the whole Constitution as it is.”249
The Constitution lay at the core of the common defense. “Under this Constitution,”
President James Garfield later reflected, “our people long ago made themselves
safe against danger from without and secured for their mariners and flag equality
of rights on all the seas.”250 President Grover Cleveland also acknowledged its
importance, declaring as he took office:
On this auspicious occasion we may well renew the pledge of our devotion to
the Constitution, which, launched by the founders of the Republic and
consecrated by their prayers and patriotic devotion, has for almost a century
borne the hopes and the aspirations of a great people through prosperity and
peace and through the shock of foreign conflicts and the perils of domestic
strife and vicissitudes.251
This meant respect for the division of powers between the branches, an awareness
of the authorities reserved to the States or to the people, and an appreciation for the
powers granted to the executive branch. Cleveland vowed to protect and defend
the U.S. Constitution—noting that this duty rested not just on the President, but on
every patriotic citizen, whatever his occupation.252
246. Id. (“Once established, no precise limit to their continuance was conceivable. They would have
occasioned an incalculable and exhausting expense.”).
247. Id.
248. President Ulysses S. Grant, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1869), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note
20, at 145–48. Ulysses S. Grant turned all focus during his first term to restoring harmony, ensuring public credit,
and re-engaging commerce. See President Ulysses S. Grant, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1873) [hereinafter
Grant, Second Inaugural Address], in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 149–52. By his second term, the
states “lately at war with the General Government” had been “[h]appily rehabilitated,” with no executive control
exercised in any of them “that would not be exercised in any other State under like circumstances.” Id. at 150.
249. Hayes, supra note 137, at 155.
250. President James Garfield, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1881), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at
162.
251. President Grover Cleveland, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1885) [hereinafter Cleveland, First
Inaugural Address], in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 170.
252. Id. at 171 (“[H]e who takes the oath today to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United
States only assumes the solemn obligation which every patriotic citizen—on the farm, in the workshop, in the
busy marts of trade, and everywhere—should share with him. The Constitution which prescribes his oath, my
countrymen, is yours; the Government you have chosen him to administer for a time is yours; the suffrage which
executes the will of freemen is yours; the laws and the entire scheme of our civil rule, from the town meeting to
the State capitals and the national capital, is yours.”).
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Throughout his time in office, Cleveland remained cognizant of the importance
of the Constitution. In his Second Inaugural Address, he explained that the oath of
office meant vowing obedience to the document’s commands.253 The Constitution
itself, and the protection of the national government’s power (and the limits
thereon), lay at the heart of his duties as President.254 He stated,
I shall to the best of my ability and within my sphere of duty preserve the
Constitution by loyally protecting every grant of Federal power it contains, by
defending all its restraints when attacked by impatience and restlessness, and
by enforcing its limitations and reservations in favor of the States and the
people.255
In this manner, during the second epoch, the national security of the country rested
on the protection of this Constitution, itself derived from the people and upheld in
the interests of the entire nation.
3. Return to International Independence and Economic Growth
Having secured the Union at great expense, the country’s position in the
international arena gradually crept back into the national consciousness. If any-
thing, the Civil War had demonstrated the country’s success in achieving interna-
tional independence. President Andrew Johnson reflected,
Under any circumstances our great extent of territory and variety of climate . . .
make us singularly independent of the varying policy of foreign powers and
protect us against every temptation to “entangling alliances,” while at the
present moment the reestablishment of harmony and the strength that comes
from harmony will be our best security against “nations who feel power and
forget right.”256
Johnson would seek to promote peace and amity with all foreign nations—from
Europe and Asia to Africa and South America—with commerce as the main
instrument of intercourse.257 Like Johnson, President Grover Cleveland and
subsequent Presidents reiterated their commitment to the course set by Washington
253. President Grover Cleveland, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1893), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 187, 192.
254. See id.
255. Id.
256. Andrew Johnson, First Annual Message, supra note 241.
257. Id. (“Our relations with the Emperor of China, so recent in their origin, are most friendly. Our commerce
with his dominions is receiving new developments, and it is very pleasing to find that the Government of that great
Empire manifests satisfaction with our policy and reposes just confidence in the fairness which marks our
intercourse. The unbroken harmony between the United States and the Emperor of Russia is receiving a new
support from an enterprise designed to carry telegraphic lines across the continent of Asia, through his dominions,
and so to connect us with all Europe by a new channel of intercourse. Our commerce with South America is about
to receive encouragement by a direct line of mail steamships to the rising Empire of Brazil . . . . A hope is
entertained that our commerce with the rich and populous countries that border the Mediterranean Sea may be
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during the first epoch.258 Underlying this policy was a sense not just that the
United States needed to increase its economic strength, but that Europe had been
waging an economic war against the United States.259 Benjamin Harrison later
explained:
To hold in check the development of our commercial marine, to prevent or
retard the establishment and growth of manufactures in the States, and so to
secure the American market for their shops and the carrying trade for their
ships, was the policy of European statesmen, and was pursued with the most
selfish vigor.260
The United States, no longer locked in civil war, could direct its energy “to the
duty of equipping the young Republic for the defense of its independence by
making its people self-dependent.”261 This meant stamping out “injurious foreign
competition.”262
But two problems, stemming from the first epoch, presented themselves: First,
tension existed between expansion and the maintenance of a neutral, non-
aggressive policy towards other countries. The former pulled the United States in
the direction of an outward projection of American strength. The latter required
restraint in the international arena. Second, the formation of alternative (i.e., non-
political) domestic power-bases challenged the authority of the federal govern-
ment.
a. Tension Between Expansion and Neutrality
In some areas, the expansionist drive met with little resistance. The Monroe
Doctrine, for instance, succeeded in dissuading Russia from further involvement
across the Pacific.263 In October 1867, Russia ceded Alaska, marking a full
largely increased. Nothing will be wanting on the part of this Government to extend the protection of our flag over
the enterprise of our fellow-citizens.”).
258. See, e.g., Cleveland, First Inaugural Address, supra note 251, at 172 (“The genius of our institutions, the
needs of our people in their home life, and the attention which is demanded for the settlement and development of
the resources of our vast territory dictate the scrupulous avoidance of any departure from that foreign policy
commended by the history, the traditions, and the prosperity of our Republic. It is the policy of independence,
favored by our position and defended by our known love of justice and by our power. It is the policy of peace
suitable to our interests. It is the policy of neutrality, rejecting any share in foreign broils and ambitions upon other
continents and repelling their intrusion here. It is the policy of Monroe and of Washington and Jefferson—‘Peace,
commerce, and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliance with none.’”); Harrison, supra note 137, at
180–81 (“We have happily maintained a policy of avoiding all interference with European affairs . . . . Our
citizens domiciled for purposes of trade in all countries and in many of the islands of the sea demand and will have
our adequate care in their personal and commercial rights.”).
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retreat.264 But not all efforts to establish American dominance succeeded so easily.
Military engagement with Native American tribes in New Mexico and Arizona did
not end until Geronimo’s surrender in 1886.265 In 1889, tension with Germany
over the Samoan Islands resulted in the islands’ partition into German and
American Samoa.266 The year 1893 witnessed revolution in the Hawaiian Is-
lands.267 In Latin America, the Baltimore created friction between the United
States and Chile.268 In a special message to Congress, President Harrison re-
quested a formal apology from Chile for the mob attack on American sailors in the
True Blue Saloon in Valparaiso.269 Chile backed down and made reparations for
the harm suffered.270 The Venezuelan affair of 1895 subsequently gave rise to the
first formal invocation of the Monroe Doctrine, when President Grover Cleveland
resisted the expansion of British Guiana by informing the United Kingdom that the
doctrine was still in force.271
264. Treaty concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by his Majesty the Emperor
of all the Russias to the United States of America, U.S.-Russ., art. I, Mar. 20, 1867, XV Stat. 539–41.
265. ODIE B. FAULK, THE GERONIMO CAMPAIGN 132–51 (1969).
266. See Letter from Thomas F. Bayard, to George H. Pendleton, Am. Minister in Berlin (Jan. 17, 1888), in 2
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1888, at 595–608 (1889) (discussing partition of the Samoan Islands).
267. See Letter from John L. Stevens, to John W. Foster, Sec’y of State (Nov. 20, 1892), in 2 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1894, app. II, at 383–88 (1895) (discussing Hawaiian Revolution of 1893).
268. Letter from Patrick Egan to James G. Blaine, Sec’y of State (Oct. 22, 1891), in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1891, at 210 (1892).
269. President Benjamin Harrison, Message to Congress (Jan. 25, 1892), reprinted in 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, at 223–26 (James D. Richardson ed., 1898) (“In submitting these papers to
Congress for that grave and patriotic consideration which the questions involved demand I desire to say that I am
of the opinion that the demands made of Chile by this Government should be adhered to and enforced. If the
dignity as well as the prestige and influence of the United States are not to be wholly sacrificed, we must protect
those who in foreign ports display the flag or wear the colors of this Government against insult, brutality, and
death inflicted in resentment of the acts of their Government and not for any fault of their own. It has been my
desire in every way to cultivate friendly and intimate relations with all the Governments of this hemisphere . . . .
It must, however, be understood that this Government, while exercising the utmost forbearance toward weaker
powers, will extend its strong and adequate protection to its citizens, to its officers, and to its humblest sailor when
made the victims of wantonness and cruelty in resentment not of their personal misconduct, but of the official acts
of their Government . . . .”).
270. Id. at 227.
271. Letter from Richard Olney, Sec’y of State, to Thomas F. Bayard, U.S. Ambassador in London (July 20,
1895), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1895, at 545–58 (1896) (“By the frequent interposition of
its good offices at the instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting the restoration of diplomatic
relations between the two countries, by pressing for the arbitration of the disputed boundary [between Great
Britain and Venezuela], by offering to act as arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new alleged
instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the
United States has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy is one in which both its honor
and its interests are involved and the continuance of which it can not regard with indifference . . . . That America is
in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its first
enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical
application of the Monroe doctrine the disregard of which by an European power is deemed an act of
unfriendliness towards the United States . . . . The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no
European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and
power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies . . . . The states of
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The United States’ interests overseas grew so rapidly that a parallel concern kept
pace: whether such growth was sustainable or whether it would ultimately un-
dermine U.S. national security. During Grant’s tenure as President, for instance,
Congress rejected incorporating Santo Domingo into the territory of the Union.272
Of primary concern was the danger involved in incorporating non-white peoples—
translated at the time as weakening the core of the country through overexpan-
sion.273 By Garfield’s presidency, though, the territory of the United States had
expanded to fifty times greater than that of the original thirteen states, and
population had increased by more than twenty-fold.274 The center of population
steadily moved westward.275
The tension between the United States’ expansionist tendencies and its unwill-
ingness to become locked in international conflict came to a head in the Spanish-
American War. Reports of the unfolding crisis in Cuba painted a dire picture.276
McKinley had come to office vowing to continue the same approach to interna-
tional affairs “inaugurated by Washington, keeping [the United States] free from
entanglement, either as allies or foes, content to leave undisturbed with them the
settlement of their own domestic concerns.”277 McKinley wanted “no wars of
conquest” and sought to “avoid the temptation of territorial aggression.”278 For
him, “War should never be entered upon until every agency of peace has failed;
peace is preferable to war in almost every contingency.”279
The sinking of the Maine in Havana, however, tipped McKinley past the point of
no return.280 While he gave lip-service to humanitarian concerns, the key issue for
McKinley was one of U.S. national security—the continued economic (and
physical) strength of the United States:
America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by similarity of governmental
constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of
any of them by an European power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all
the advantages incident to their natural relations with us.”).
272. Grant, Second Inaugural Address, supra note 248, at 150.
273. Id.
274. Garfield, supra note 250, at 162.
275. Harrison, supra note 137, at 175–86.
276. 55 CONG. REC. 2916, 2916–19 (quoting Senator Proctor, “Conditions [confronting Cuban refugees] are
unmentionable . . . . Torn from their homes, with foul earth, foul air, foul water, and foul food or none, what
wonder that one-half have died and that one-quarter of the living are so diseased that they can not be saved . . . .
Little children are still walking about with arms and chest terribly emaciated, eyes swollen, and abdomen bloated
to three times the natural size. The physicians say these cases are hopeless. Deaths in the streets have not been
uncommon.” Proctor continued, “[O]ut of a population of 1,600,000, two hundred thousand had died within these
Spanish forts, practically prison walls, within a few months past from actual starvation and diseases caused by
insufficient and improper food.”).
277. President William McKinley, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1897), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 199 (hereinafter McKinley, First Inaugural Address).
278. Id. at 200.
279. Id.
280. Naval History and Heritage Command, The Destruction of USS Maine, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq71-1.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
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The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace and
entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict
waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such
trade and business relations; when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in
constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined; where our
trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships
of a foreign nation; the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to
prevent altogether . . . these and others that I need not mention . . . are a
constant menace to our peace and compel us to keep on a semi war footing
with a nation with which we are at peace.281
At stake for McKinley was more than just Cuban independence; at stake was the
United States’ position in the global arena.
In the 1890s, calls grew for a stronger navy, and Congress passed legislation to
allow for the construction of new modern battleships.282 Alfred Thayer Mahan
contributed significantly to naval reform.283 His writings emphasized the impor-
tance of sea-power, suggesting that the advent of submarine telegraphs and
blockades demanded a robust naval response.284 Mahan postulated a difference
between pure defensive war (so-called “passive defense”) and defense that relies
on attack.285 The latter “may seem to be really offensive war, but it is not; it
becomes offensive only when its object of attack is changed from the enemy’s fleet
to the enemy’s country.”286 To Mahan, attack on the enemy’s country belonged to
the Army; attack on the enemy’s fleet lay in the domain of the Navy.287 For full
defensive capabilities, both were essential.288
Theodore Roosevelt, at age thirty-two, wrote glowingly about Mahan’s book:
He never for a moment loses sight of the relations which the struggles by sea
bore to the history of the time; and, for the period which he covers, he shows,
as no other writer has done, the exact points and the wonderful extent of the
influence of the sea power of the various contending nations upon their
ultimate triumph or failure, and upon the futures of the mighty races to which
they belonged.289
281. 9 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, supra note 269, at 147–48.
282. See Navy Act of 1890, ch., 640, 26 Stat. 189.
283. See, e.g., Fred W. Gaudlip, Vision to Victory—Space, Mahan, and Mitchell: The Role of the Visionary in
Cross-Organizational Innovation 8–9 (2001), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/gaudlip.pdf (unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University (United States Air Force)).
284. For a collection of his writings, see MAHAN ON NAVAL WARFARE: SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF REAR
ADMIRAL ALFRED T. MAHAN (1999).
285. See ALFRED THAYER MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY: 1660–1783, at 81–88 (1890)
(hereinafter MAHAN, THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER).
286. Id. at 87 n.1.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Theodore Roosevelt, Books Reviewed: Captain A.T. Mahan: THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON
HISTORY: 1660–1783, 66 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 563, 564 (1890).
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While the U.S. Navy had proven strong enough during the Civil War, its ability to
withstand attack from European powers lay in question.290 “It is true,” Roosevelt
wrote, “that at the end of four years’ warfare we had developed a formidable fleet;
but in the event of a European contest, it is not likely that we should be allowed as
many weeks before the fatal blow fell.”291 While public belief in American
ingenuity was high, it would be “sheer folly” to rely on it to prevent attack: “Proper
forts, with heavy guns, could do much; but our greatest need is the need of a
fighting fleet . . . . We need a large navy, composed not merely of cruisers, but
containing also a full proportion of powerful battleships, able to meet those of any
other nation.”292
Eight years later, the United States had the ability to find out in first-hand terms
what would happen when the U.S. Navy was pitted against one of the leading
European powers. Battles between Spain and the United States raged from the
Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean, in the course of which America repeatedly
demonstrated its military and naval superiority.293 In the end, the 1898 Treaty of
Paris acknowledged that America was no longer merely a group of loosely
affiliated colonies-turned-states, lacking strength and international standing.294
Spain relinquished control over Cuba and ceded to the United States the island of
Puerto Rico, all Spanish islands in the West Indies, the island of Guam, and the
Philippines.295
The event proved to be a watershed in the history of U.S. national security. The
country secured a prominent place on the world stage. It had stood face-to-face
with the Spanish Navy and triumphed. Its economic and military power could no
longer be ignored. U.S. interests expanded. No longer would the country focus
merely on unity or on building international independence. It had obtained both.
The economic growth it so jealously sought paid off. The new and immediate
question confronting the United States was how to best exercise its power to
advantageously shape international affairs. This question pushed the United States
from the first epoch and into the second. Its very success in gaining access to more
land meant that the country was becoming more intimately familiar with the
geopolitics of South America, Central America, and Asia, as well as Europe and
Africa, where the country continued to maintain a strong diplomatic and commer-
cial presence.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 567.
292. Id.
293. For a thoughtful treatment of the causes, consequences, and conduct of the Spanish American War, see
CRUCIBLE OF EMPIRE: THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH (James C. Bradford ed., 1993).
294. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. I–III, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
295. Id.
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b. Increasing Number of Domestic Power-Bases
The second problem that confronted the United States and that helped move the
country into the second epoch similarly stemmed from the successes of the first
age in shoring up the country’s economic strength. To some extent, the problem
also related to increasing protections afforded to individuals and groups—rights
central to the constitutional amendments, which over time evolved into their own
source of power. In this context, new and expanding domestic economic, political,
and religious power-bases began to challenge state and federal authority.
Industrialization brought with it prodigious growth. The 1870s witnessed the
extension of railroads into the interior, the creation of iron and steel plants, the
production of more coal and oil, the introduction of electricity (leading, eventually,
to automation), and new concepts of corporate structure and finance.296 The
question became how to mitigate the deleterious consequences of increased
mobilization and rapid urbanization.
As a domestic matter, industrialization became a national security concern to the
extent that corporate interests usurped the power of the government. From their
early days, the railroads attempted to gain access to political levers.297 Successive
administrations saw this as putting the republican form of government, founded on
the sovereignty of the people, at risk. President Andrew Jackson warned Congress,
In this point of the case the question is distinctly presented whether the people
of the United States are to govern through representatives chosen by their
unbiased suffrages or whether the money and power of a great corporation are
to be secretly exerted to influence their judgment and control their deci-
sions.298
President Martin Van Buren, following Jackson, remarked that he, too, was
convinced of the dangers to which political opinion would be exposed “by any
further increase of the already overgrown influence of corporate authorities.”299
President Abraham Lincoln later saw the growing power of corporations and the
consequent threat to the national government in the aftermath of the Civil War and
296. See generally ALLAN NEVINS, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA, 1865–1878 (1941) (discussing how
agriculture gave way to industry in the post-bellum period); ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE EMPIRE OF BUSINESS
291–302 (1903) (discussing the management of railroads); History of the United States: Continued, Page 5, INT’L
WORLD HISTORY PROJECT, http://history-world.org/history_of_the_united_states5.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012)
(“Corporations introduced new styles of management, or business organization. The railroads, which needed to
manage crews, fuel, repairs, and train schedules over large areas, were the first to develop new management
techniques.”).
297. MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1861–1901, at 348–56
(1962).
298. President Andrew Jackson, Fifth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1833), in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 269, at 30.
299. President Martin Van Buren, First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1837), in 3 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 269, at 381.
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remarked:
As a result of the war, corporations have been enthroned and an era of
corruption in high places will follow, and the money power of the country will
endeavor to prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices of the people
until all wealth is aggregated in a few hands and the Republic is destroyed. I
feel at this moment more anxiety than ever before, even in the midst of war.300
By the time Republican President Ulysses S. Grant sought a third term, the
growing influence of corporate interests had reached such a height that his party
nominated Rutherford B. Hayes instead.301 President Grover Cleveland later
warned Congress, “Corporations, which should be the carefully restrained crea-
tures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the people’s
masters.”302
It was not just corporate entities that threatened federal authority. Other private
power-bases emerged. They too created a challenge for the federal government, as
did their interactions with nongovernmental entities. The conflict between labor
unions and corporations for instance, prompted the federal government to act over
the authority of the states. The legal framework adopted was a national security
one, consistent with the country’s actions in war. The confrontation between
Eugene Debs’s American Railway Union and the Pullman Palace Car Company
provides a vivid example of how the federal government responded to the labor
conflict as a threat to national security.303
During the Panic of 1893, Debs responded to cut wages and a “wildcat” strike (a
strike that is unauthorized or uncoordinated by the union) by attempting to directly
negotiate with Pullman and, once negotiations failed, formally striking.304 President
300. Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to Col. William F. Elkins (Nov. 21, 1864), in ARCHER H. SHAW,
THE LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA 40 (1950).
301. HANS LOUIS TREFOUSSE, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES 58 (2002) (“The year 1872 saw the Liberal Republicans’
revolt against the Grant administration, provoked by its efforts to annex the Dominican Republic, its failure to
carry out civil service reforms, and its dependence on corrupt political machines.”); YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE
ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 61, 63 (2001) (“A large contingent of Republicans was
disillusioned with the Grant scandals . . . . These disgruntled ‘Liberal Republicans’ were high-minded, erudite
men who wanted reform and believed that government deserved better men than Grant and his ilk. Decrying
‘Grantism,’ a term that became synonymous with graft and corruption, they broke away . . . the election of 1876
turned out to be the most drawn-out in American history. . . . Ulysses S. Grant . . . wanted to run for a third term,
but the Republicans would not hear of it. . . . Grant’s sorry record of scandals would have made him a liability for
the Republicans. What they needed was a man of unimpeachable integrity. . . . The country was offended by the
corruption of the Grant administration.”).
302. President Grover Cleveland, Annual Address to Congress (Dec. 3, 1888).
303. Letter from John Altgeld, Governor, Ill., to Grover Cleveland, President of the U.S. (July 6, 1894), in
THE DAILY NEWS ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1895, at 84 (2d ed. 1895) [hereinafter THE DAILY
NEWS ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1895], available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.
39015026439961?urlappend"%3Bseq"90.85 (referencing the first federal military interference in a labor
dispute).
304. See Theresa Ann Case, Labor Upheaval on the Nation’s Railroads, 1877–1922, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
STRIKES IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 490–94 (Aaron Brenner, Benjamin Day & Immanuel Ness eds., 2009).
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Grover Cleveland, over the objection of the Governor of Illinois, sent in federal
troops.305 He acted under an 1861 statute that Congress introduced in the context
of the Civil War.306 The pertinent section read:
[W]henever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages
of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United
States, it shall become impracticable, in the judgment of the President of the
United States, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the
laws of the United States within any State or Territory of the United States, it
shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia or
any or all of the states of the Union, and to employ such parts of the land and
naval forces of the United States as he may deem necessary to enforce the
faithful execution of the laws of the United States, or to suppress such rebellion
in whatever State or Territory thereof the laws of the United States may be
forcibly opposed, or the execution thereof forcibly obstructed.307
Although the statute required the President to accompany any action with a
proclamation, Cleveland failed to do so; instead, he simply authorized the military
to put down the strikes.308 John P. Altgeld, the Governor of Illinois, lodged a
formal protest: “[I]t is not soldiers that the railroads need so much as it is men to
operate trains.”309 The country was not at war. The question was not one of
political rebellion. The statute of 1861, Altgeld argued, “authorized the use of
federal troops in a state whenever it shall be impracticable to enforce the laws of
the United States within such state by the ordinary judicial proceedings. Such a
condition does not exist in Illinois.”310 The strikes, for Altgeld, should have been a
matter of local self-government. “As governor of the state of Illinois,” Altgeld
wrote, “I protest against this and ask the immediate withdrawal of the federal
troops from active duty in this state.”311
305. Id. at 492 (“By July 10, nearly 2,000 troops were in Chicago to aid the railroads in restoring freight
traffic . . . . Soldiers were also sent to Los Angeles, Raton (New Mexico), Trinidad (Colorado), and many other
towns to enforce the approximately 100 orders against the ARU and other unions engaged in the strike.”).
306. See Law of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (revising the basic laws of 1795 and 1807 dealing with the
domestic use of the military to respond to civil disorder).
307. Id.
308. See id. (“[W]henever, in the judgment of the President, it may be necessary to use military force hereby
directed to be employed and called forth by him, the President shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such
insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited time.”); The Pullman
Boycott, in THE DAILY NEWS ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1895, supra note 303, at 84–85 (discussing
the chronology of events and President Cleveland’s actions); see also G. NORMAN LIEBER, THE USE OF THE ARMY
IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER 27 (1898) (noting that President Cleveland used the military before issuing the
proclamation).
309. Letter from John Altgeld, Governor, Ill., to President Grover Cleveland (July 5, 1894), in THE DAILY
NEWS ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1895, supra note 303, at 83.
310. Id.
311. Id. (“Each community should govern itself so long as it can and is ready and able to enforce the law, and it
is in harmony with this fundamental principle that the statute authorizing the president to send troops into states
must be construed. Especially is this so in matters relating to the exercise of the police power and the preservation
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President Cleveland saw matters rather differently. He replied the following
day:
Federal troops were sent to Chicago in strict accordance with the constitution
and laws of the United States, upon the demand of the post-office department,
that obstruction of the mails should be removed, and upon the representations
of the judicial officers of the United States that process of the federal courts
could not be executed through the ordinary means, and upon abundant proof
that conspiracies existed against commerce between the states.312
Cleveland added that the positioning of soldiers was “not only proper but
necessary.”313 The immediate constitutional claims stemmed from the national
legislature’s authorities under Article I § 8, cl. 7 (post offices) and Article I § 8, cl. 3
(commerce), as well as Article I § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause) claims
for federal jurisdiction. Underlying Cleveland’s claim, however, were a series of
legal opinions that suggested constitutional justification rested with the President’s
commander-in-chief power and his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. The President’s power and duty bore an intimate connection. Former
Attorney General William Miller, writing on July 11, 1894 to Attorney General
Richard Olney about the President’s use of the military to put down the strikes,
explained:
That the President has the authority and that it is his duty to use the whole
power of the Government for the enforcement of the laws of the United States
seems to me to be axiomatic. It is made his duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. He is made Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
In my judgment, the power thus conferred is given in order that he may execute
the duty thus imposed.314
The U.S. Army analysis that followed the Pullman strikes agreed with Miller’s
position.315 It cited In re Neagle, which provides, “The power and duty imposed on
the President to ‘take care that the laws are faithfully executed,’ necessarily carries
with it all power and authority necessary to accomplish the object sought to be
of law and order. To absolutely ignore a local government in matters of this kind when the local government is
ready to furnish assistance needed and is amply able to enforce the law, not only insults the people of this state by
imputing to them an inability to govern themselves or an unwillingness to enforce the law, but is in violation of a
basic principle of our institutions. The question of federal supremacy is in no way involved.”).
312. Letter from Grover Cleveland, President of the U.S., to John P. Altgeld, Governor, Ill. (July 5, 1894), in
THE DAILY NEWS ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1895, supra note 303, at 83.
313. Id.
314. Letter from William H.H. Miller, Ex-Att’y Gen., to Richard Olney, Att’y Gen. (July 11, 1894), in LIEBER,
supra note 308, at 15 n.1.
315. See LIEBER, supra note 308, at 37 (discussing how the Take Care Clause supports presidential power).
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attained.”316 The Army found further impetus in the Vesting Clause of Article II,
combined with the Take Care Clause.317 Support could also be found in Article IV,
§ 4.318 The “United States” could not be limited to just Congress when it was in
session—the guarantees in question were “intended to be effective at all times.”319
The power to provide the protections guaranteed by the Constitution, moreover, by
definition requires the power to command—an authority held by the President as
Commander in Chief.320
Altgeld again objected, writing that Cleveland’s answer involved startling
conclusions and evaded the point at issue: that self-government was as essential as
federal supremacy.321 He noted that under the Constitution, “except in times of
war, the military shall be subordinate to civil authority.”322 No state of war existed;
yet the federal troops ordered into Chicago were neither under the civil authorities
nor were they in any way responsible to them for their conduct.323 “They are not
even acting under the United States marshal or under any federal officer of the
state, but are acting directly under military orders issued from military headquar-
ters at Washington, and insofar as these troops act at all it is military govern-
ment.”324
Altgeld also argued that the opinions of various executive branch officials were
meaningless from a perspective of checks on federal authority: “All of these
officers are appointed by the executive. Most of them can be removed by him at
will. They were not only obliged to do his bidding, but they are in fact a part of the
executive.”325 By this logic, any local disturbance might provide an excuse “for an
ambitious executive to order out the military forces of all of the states and establish
at once a military government.”326 President Cleveland replied that perhaps
instead of discussing the matter, those in authority ought to focus on restoring law
316. In re Neagle, 39 F. 833, 859–60 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1889), aff’d sub nom. Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1
(1890); see also LIEBER, supra note 308, at 40 n.2, 55 (“The President’s constitutional duty to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed must be carried out by the means placed in his hands by or under the Constitution.”).
317. See Miller, supra note 314; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
318. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 2 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.”); see
also LIEBER, supra note 308, at 29.
319. LIEBER, supra note 308, at 32 (“[I]t can not be said, nor would it be practicable, nor as to the guaranty
against domestic violence historically true, that the guaranties against invasion and domestic violence are
exclusively in the hands of Congress. To hold that would be to destroy the value of these guarantees. They are not
limited in time to the sessions of Congress, but are intended to be effective at all times. Who, then, is to furnish the
guaranty when Congress is not in session?”).
320. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
321. Letter from John P. Altgeld, Governor, Ill., to Grover Cleveland, President of the U.S. (July 6, 1894), in
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and order.327
The strike got worse. Attorney General Olney realized, days into the military
action, that the President had neglected to issue a formal proclamation as required
by law.328 Accordingly, on July 8th, the President issued a statement, warning all
those engaged in the strike to desist.329 “Those who disregard this warning and
persist in taking part . . . cannot be regarded otherwise than as public enemies.”330
Cleveland stated, moreover, that it may be impossible for the troops to distinguish
between those engaged in the strike and mere observers.331 The President advised
that those merely curious about the strike remain at home.332
The incident provides one of many examples in which the federal government
inserted itself into labor union disputes, above the authority of state government
and within a national security framework. Underlying such decisions was a fear
that the private power-bases would bypass federal authority. Ironically, these very
power-bases emerged as a result of the government’s success in strengthening the
economy during the first epoch.
The question that arose was not just how to deal with individual manifestations
of the domestic groups’ power, but also what to do about general corporate power
over the long-term. Concern grew about the unfair competition created by
monopolies, particularly in regard to the railroads.333 In 1887, Congress thus
passed the Interstate Commerce Act, which established the Interstate Commerce
Commission.334 This body was given the power to investigate and to prosecute
companies that violated the law.335 Corporate power, outside the law, must be
curbed, as Benjamin Harrison explained two years later: “If our great corporations
would more scrupulously observe their legal limitations and duties, they would
have less cause to complain of the unlawful limitations of their rights or of violent
interference with their operations.”336
327. Letter from President Grover Cleveland to John P. Altgeld, Governor, Ill. (July 6, 1894), in THE DAILY
NEWS ALMANAC AND POLITICAL REGISTER FOR 1895, supra note 303, at 84.
328. See Case, supra note 304, at 493.





333. Herbert Hovencamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97
YALE L.J. 1017, 1038 (1988).
334. An Act to Regulate Commerce (Interstate Commerce Act), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (prior to 1935
amendment).
335. See id.
336. Harrison, supra note 137.
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Concern extended beyond the economic sphere. Political and economic writings
challenging the existing order began to emerge, raising questions about whether
the laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith and the Democratic-Republican tenets
underlying the political system had yielded an optimal system.337 Special attention
was drawn to the ideas of Karl Marx (e.g., his Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts, which questioned private property and advocated communism).338
The anarchist movement drew inspiration from William Goodwin’s An Enquiry
Concerning Political Justice, the anti-statist and anti-authoritarian ideas of Peter
Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin, and Emma Goodman’s demands that workers
take matters into their own hands through collective anarchy.339 The attention
drawn by such works and those embracing these theories intensified in the context
of serious threats. In assassinating President McKinley, Leon Czolgosz imitated
Gaetano Bresci, who had killed King Umberto I of Italy in 1900.340 For President
Roosevelt, “When compared with the suppression of anarchy, every other question
sinks into insignificance.”341
The national government would not tolerate challenges to national authority
from the economic, political, or religious spheres. Any effort to usurp national
power would be stopped. President James Garfield thus reflected on the Mormon
Church that, quite apart from its polygamist teachings, it prevented the administra-
tion of justice “through ordinary instrumentalities of law.”342 No ecclesiastical
organization could “be safely permitted to usurp in the smallest degree the
functions and powers of the National Government.”343 President William McKin-
ley similarly noted that the purpose for denying vigilantism of any sort was to
protect the domestic order:
337. See, e.g., Richard T. Ely, Past and Present Political Economy, in JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN
HISORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (1884) (questioning the premise that individuals are solely motivated by self
interest and suggesting that the laissez-faire system had failed). The year after Ely published his treatise, the
American Economics Association formed in concurrence with a statement of principles drafted by Ely: “While we
recognize the necessity of individual initiative in industrial life, we hold that the doctrine of laissez faire is unsafe
in politics and unsound in morals; and that it suggests an inadequate explanation of the relations between the state
and the citizens.” NANCY COHEN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1865–1914, at 165 (2002).
338. See, e.g., Karl Marx, Third Manuscript: Private Property and Communism, in ECONOMIC AND PHILO-
SOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Martin Milligan trans., Progress Publishers 1959) (1932), available at http://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf.
339. See generally ALEX BUTTERWORTH, THE WORLD THAT NEVER WAS: A TRUE STORY OF DREAMERS,
SCHEMERS, ANARCHISTS, AND SECRET AGENTS (2011).
340. See Sidney Fine, Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley, 60 AM. HIST. REV. 777 (1955); Leon
Czolgosz (1873–1901) and President William McKinley, 14 September 1901, INT’L INST. OF SOC. HIST.,
http://www.iisg.nl/collections/anarchist-assaults/czolgosz.php (last updated Aug. 23, 2011).
341. Brian Doherty, The First War on Terror: What the Fight Against Anarchism Tells Us About the Fight
Against Radical Islam, REASON MAG., Jan. 2011, http://reason.com/archives/2010/12/17/the-first-war-on-terror/
singlepage (reviewing BUTTERWORTH, supra note 339).
342. Garfield, supra note 250.
343. Id.
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The constituted authorities must be cheerfully and vigorously upheld. Lynch-
ings must not be tolerated in a great and civilized country like the United
States; courts, not mobs, must execute the penalties of the law. The preserva-
tion of public order, the right of discussion, the integrity of courts, and the
orderly administration of justice must continue forever the rock of safety upon
which our Government securely rests.344
What these perceived threats to national authority shared in common was that they
themselves were the product of a successful national security strategy. Yet their
very existence presented a threat to the national government. This led, in the
second epoch, to an increased emphasis on the dominance of federal power, and
direct investment in social and economic concerns previously left in the hands of
the states.
B. Formative International Engagement and Domestic Power: 1898–1930
The second epoch built on the first age, in that it incorporated the basic tenets of
the Founding era: primarily, unity; and secondarily, international independence
and economic growth. To these, it added formative international engagement, as
well as efforts to counter growing bases of domestic power. To the extent that the
two epochs found themselves in tension, the values of the first era dominated.
1. Political, Economic, and Military Concerns
The war of 1898 proved pivotal in the United States’ approach to national
security. By expanding the perception of what would be required in the service of
national interests, it introduced a new epoch in American history. The country
proved itself able to compete and hold its own on the world stage. Attention
gradually turned to how the United States could have a more formative impact on
world affairs. In the political realm, international arbitration took center stage.
Immediately prior to the war, arbitration drew some attention as an instrument
of international law—one (of many) tools in the diplomatic chest.345 It brought
with it a number of advantages: by participating in international arbitration, the
United States could shape, and not merely respond to, the global political
environment. Such an approach, moreover, extended American influence beyond
bilateral or multilateral agreements on specific issues of dispute. It provided the
country with the power to determine how disputes would be handled in the future.
With the country’s outward projection of power, however, came internal
conflict. An early effort to craft an international arbitration instrument (signed with
Great Britain early in 1897) failed to pass the Senate based on constitutional
344. McKinley, First Inaugural Address, supra note 277, at 198.
345. See Office of the Historian, Biographies of the Secretaries of State: William Jennings Bryan, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ST., http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/bryan-william-jennings (last visited Feb.
19, 2012) (discussing Bryan’s accomplishment of negotiating peace treaties through arbitration).
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concerns.346 The issue for the Senate was whether the treaty in question was an
agreement to enter arbitration, or whether each arbitration would produce a new
treaty requiring subsequent Senate approval.347 In 1904 and 1905, though, Secre-
tary of State John Hay negotiated more than ten arbitration treaties.348 Elihu Root,
who succeeded Hay in President Theodore Roosevelt’s Second Administration,
negotiated another forty such treaties.349 In 1913, Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan proposed the further negotiation of “cooling-off treaties.”350 By
the end of the year, approximately thirty such agreements had been signed.351
Support for the use of international instruments to prevent war grew, leading to
U.S. participation in the First Hague Conference. The meeting of 1899 resulted in
the creation of a permanent court of arbitration, accessible at all times by the
party-states.352 The First Hague Conference also produced a convention that
prohibited the launching of projectiles and explosives from balloons.353 The
convention codified the behavior of belligerents, including qualifications (§ 1, cl.
1), prisoners of war (§ 1, cl. 2), and treatment of the sick and wounded (§ 1, cl.
346. The Senate vote on the Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain registered forty-three in favor and twenty-six
against, leaving it three votes shy of the two-thirds majority required to ratify treaties. See S. JOURNAL, 30TH
CONG, 55 SESS. (1897).
347. Treaty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11, 1897 (not ratified), reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:
1896, at 238–40 (1897).
348. Under Hay’s guidance, the United States reached arbitration agreements with France, Switzerland,
Germany, Portugal, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Mexico, and Sweden and Norway. Arbitration,
Mediation, and Conciliation—The Hague Peace Conferences, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NEW AM. NATION, http://www.
americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Arbitration-Mediation-and-Conciliation-The-hague-peace-conferences.
html#b (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). See Arbitration Treaty: United States and Portugal, THE ARGUS (Melbourne,
Vict.), Nov. 25, 1905, at 5, available at http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/10352137; Britain and America:
Arbitration Treaty, THE ADVERTISER (Adelaide, S. Austl.), Nov. 2, 1904, at 7, available at http://trove.nla.gov.au/
ndp/del/article/5029296; Anglo-American Arbitration, THE MERCURY (Hobart, Tas.), Nov. 2, 1904, at 3, available
at http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/9390758?searchTerm"an%20anglo-american%20arbitration&search
Limits".
349. Taft initiated a new set of treaties in August 1911, beginning with agreements with France and Great
Britain. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ST., PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE
ANNUAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO CONGRESS 189–97, 247–73 (1911), available at http://
digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id"FRUS.FRUS1911. Complex documents, the Senate quickly
made mincemeat out of them before Taft formally withdrew them. John P. Campbell, Taft, Roosevelt, and the
Arbitration Treaties of 1911, 53 J. AM. HIST. 279, 287 (1966); see also The Nobel Peace Prize 1912: Elihu Root,
THE OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE NOBEL PRIZE (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/1912/root.html?print"1 (crediting Root with negotiating forty reciprocal arbitration treaties).
350. See William Jennings Bryan, WOODROW WILSON HOUSE, http://www.woodrowwilsonhouse.org/timeline/
ImageDisplay.asp?ID"13 (last visited Oct. 26, 2011); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT TO CONGRESS 8 (1913), available
at http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?id"FRUS.FRUS1913 (“The parties hereto agree that
all questions of whatever character and nature, in dispute between them, shall, when diplomatic efforts fail, be
submitted for investigation and report to an international commission (the composition to be agreed upon); and
the contracting parties agree not to declare war or begin hostilities until such investigation is made and report
submitted.”).
351. William Jennings Bryan, supra note 350.
352. See First Peace Conference of The Hague, art. 20, 21, 24, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1839.
353. See id.
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3).354 It addressed the manner of hostilities, discussing bombardments (§ 2, cl. 1),
spies, (§ 2, cl. 2), flags of truce (§ 2, cl. 3), capitulation (§ 2, cl. 4), and armistices
(§ 2, cl. 5).355 In addition, the Annex discussed military authority over hostile
territory (§ 3), as well as the internment of belligerents and care for the wounded in
neutral countries (§ 4).356 These instruments, and the role of the United States in
crafting them, demonstrated that the country had come to view what fell within its
national security interests more broadly: it now focused on shaping the interna-
tional environment in which it had obtained independence.
The United States also experimented with becoming an arbiter in international
disagreements. The Franco-German conflict over Morocco in the early twentieth
century provided one such opportunity.357 As a formal matter, the United States
was only nominally involved: a local Moroccan bandit had captured an American
citizen, Ion Perdicaris.358 France stood poised to assume control of Morocco.359
Germany opposed France, and sought to negate France’s efforts by recognizing the
sultanate of Morocco.360 The United States did not have to become involved;
however, it subsequently worked to broker an agreement.361 Roosevelt himself
evinced concern that there might be a war.362 He later reflected,
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See id. The Second Hague Conference, which met in 1907, was much less successful in forging
international agreement. John Q. Barrett, The Path from the 1907 Hague Conference to Nuremberg and Forward,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DIALOGS 9–54 (Elizabeth Andersen & David M.
Crane eds., 2008), http://www.google.com/url?sa"t&rct"j&q"&esrc"s&source"web&cd"9&cts"13312176
35677&ved"0CFoQFjAI&url"http%3A%2F%2Fwww.stjohns.edu%2Fdownload.axd%2Fa3a7110f759c41c3a5c
456e6265996c3.pdf%3Fd%3DHague%2520ASIL%2520lecture&ei"ZsNYT8raOc6F0QGAhZi5Dw&usg"AFQ
jCNHgipUA5SVgq7tBWhQm1OLpfK2PeA&sig2"ZrXz0EYEcxzKeTVyrZsPKQ. In part, this was due to
looming tensions that would lead to the First World War. See id. Roosevelt, concerned about Japan’s posture, sent
a fleet to the Far East. See Mike McKinley, Naval History and Heritage Command, The Cruise of the Great White
Fleet, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/gwf_cruise.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2012). The United States sponsored only a minor convention, which came to be known as the Porter Resolution
(named for the U.S. ambassador to France, General Horace Porter). See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting for
State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign Debt Arbitration, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 335, 340. The
resolution narrowly required that the party-states not use armed force to recover monies owed from another
country, unless the other country refused arbitration or blocked efforts to obtain a compromise. See THE SECOND
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE, S. Doc. No. 60-433 (1st Sess. 1908) (discussing the results of the Convention).
357. See Eugene Staley, Mannesmann Mining Interests and the Franco-German Conflict over Morocco, 40
J. OF POL. ECON. 52, 52 (1932) (discussing the international crisis that resulted from the Morocco crisis).
358. See generally Paul Baepler, Rewriting the Barbary Captivity Narrative: The Perdicaris Affair and the
Last Barbary Pirate, 24 PROSPECTS 177–211 (1999). Perdicaris’s captivity was later recounted by John Millius in
his 1975 film, THE WIND AND THE LION (Warner Brothers 1975).
359. Staley, supra note 357.
360. Id.
361. See Morocco: Diplomatic Intrigues Under Roosevelt, U.S. HIST., http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/
h889.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2012).
362. Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Whitelaw Reid, Ambassador (Apr. 28, 1906), in 5 LETTERS
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 240 (Elting E. Morison et al. eds., 1951) [hereinafter LETTERS OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT].
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I felt in honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the first place,
because I should have felt such a war to be a real calamity to civilization; and
in the next place, as I was already trying to bring about peace between Russia
and Japan, I felt that a new conflict might result in what would literally be a
world conflagration; and finally for the sake of France.363
Ultimately, U.S. plenipotentiaries signed the final agreement with the inclusion of
a reservation that exempted the country from any responsibility for the treaty’s
terms.364
Political affairs presented just one way in which the country could pursue a
more aggressive international role. The United States also took steps in the
economic realm. Beyond protecting its commercial routes and goods, the country
began exploring ways to prevent future threats to U.S. trade.
Following the Spanish-American War, for instance, Spain ceded the Philippines
to the United States.365 It was not immediately clear what to do with the islands.366
They provided the United States, though, with territory in Asia, drawing American
attention eastward. Accordingly, in 1899, Secretary of State John Hay attempted to
open trade with China.367 After making inquiries to Russia, France, Britain,
Germany, Italy, and Japan, he announced that trade with China could commence
(despite some question as to whether this was actually the case).368 In 1900, Hay
issued what has come to be called the Second Open Door Note, which was a
request that European powers not use the Boxer Rebellion in China as an excuse to
partition the region.369
The United States’economic interests in the second epoch overrode its longstand-
ing aversion to “entangling alliances.” Instead, to ensure that U.S. commerce
would flow, the United States proved willing to commit its military forces to
protect the political structures of other countries. In 1902, Panama separated from
363. Id.
364. General Act of the International Conference of Algeciras, Apr. 7, 1906, 34 Stat. 2905 (“The Government
of the United States of America, having no political interest in Morocco and no desire or purpose having animated
it to take part in this conference other than to secure for all peoples the widest equality of trade and privilege with
Morocco . . . declares that, in acquiescing in the regulations and declarations of the conference . . . it does so
without assuming obligation or responsibility for the enforcement thereof.”).
365. See Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Spain, art. 1–3, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
366. President William McKinley, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1901), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 203–08 (raising question of what to do about the Philippines).
367. See, e.g., Letter from John Hay to the U.S. Ambassador in St. Petersburg (Sept. 6, 1899), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1899, at 140–42 (1901).
368. See id.
369. Letter from John Hay to American Representatives in Major Capitals (July 3, 1900), in FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1901 app. at 12 (1902) (“[T]he policy of the Government of the United States is
to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and
administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.”). U.S.
policy towards China over the next four decades, though, proved somewhat irregular: unwilling to back up its
claims with force, the United States’ economic advance and retreat proved sensitive to interstate politics.
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Columbia and almost immediately offered the United States a treaty for the
Panama Canal.370 Following byzantine negotiations, the United States agreed.371
As part of the treaty, the United States vowed to maintain Panama’s indepen-
dence.372 In exchange, Panama agreed to give the United States “in perpetuity the
use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for the
construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation and protection of said
Canal . . . .”373 The United States’ approach in this matter leaned towards the
Monroe Doctrine by preventing other countries from interfering in the Americas;
however, it also signaled a willingness to form explicit, written “entangling
alliances” that could bring the United States to the brink of war.374
As a military matter, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt established a more
aggressive position for the United States in the international arena. He favored a
proactive stance over a more reactive one, famously stating, “Speak softly and
carry a big stick; you will go far.”375 Shortly after he uttered his remarks, an
assassin struck William McKinley and Roosevelt took the presidency.376 As
President, Roosevelt immediately put his words into action negotiating a treaty
with Cuba.377 The treaty stipulations, explicitly backed by the land and naval
forces of the United States, restricted Cuba’s future actions,378 and prevented Cuba
from entering into any agreements with any foreign power.379 The treaty also gave
the United States the right to intervene in the country to maintain Cuban
independence,380 and ratified and validated “all Acts of the United States in Cuba
during its military occupancy thereof.”381
Roosevelt took a similarly aggressive stance towards the disputed boundary
separating Alaska and Canada382—a dispute made all the more important follow-
ing the discovery of gold in the Klondike in August 1896.383 Great Britain, having
370. See Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty), U.S.-Pan., Nov. 18,
1903, 33 Stat. 2234.
371. See id.
372. See id.
373. Id. at art. 2.
374. See Mark T. Gilderhus, The Monroe Doctrine: Meanings and Implications, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 5,
5–16 (2006).
375. Letter from Theodore Roosevelt, Gov., to Henry L. Sprague (Jan. 26, 1900), available at http://
www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/trm139.html.
376. Theodore Roosevelt 1901–1909, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/theodore
roosevelt (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
377. See Permanent Treaty with the United States, U.S.-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2248, reprinted in 6 TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776–1949, at 1116–19 (Charles I.
Bevans ed., 1968).
378. Id. at 1116.
379. Id. at art. 1.
380. Id. at art. 3.
381. Id. at art. 4.
382. See F. W. Gibson, The Alaskan Boundary Dispute, 24 REP. ANN. MEETING CAN. HIST. ASS’N 25, 34 (1945)
(describing Roosevelt’s open willingness to use force if necessary for a favorable outcome).
383. Id. at 26.
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just fought (and won) the Boer War,384 and cognizant of America’s forward-
leaning stance, decided not to press its claims and largely conceded.385 Britain
supported the form of arbitration selected by the U.S. Administration386—a rather
loaded deck, in favor of the United States. Roosevelt appointed Secretary of War
Elihu Root, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, and former Senator
George Turner of Washington as jurists on the arbitration board.387 The sole British
commissioner who took part in the exercise sided with the Americans.388 That the
exercise was primarily a matter of politics, and not of law, was abundantly clear, as
evidenced by the lack of American jurists on the panel.
Policies adopted in Cuba, Panama, China, and Alaska presaged a more aggres-
sive stance towards matters in the Western Hemisphere, and the potential for the
United States to perform a type of policing role presented itself. Roosevelt spelled
out his position in more detail in his 1904 State of the Union Address:
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly,
and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count
upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with
reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps
order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United
States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general
loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere,
ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western
Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may
force the United States, however reluctantly . . . to the exercise of an interna-
tional police power.389
The articulation of Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine signaled that the
United States would begin to involve itself more directly in matters in the Western
Hemisphere. The justification for such actions included U.S. interests, but began
also to take on an appeal to humanitarian concerns.390 Thus, while attention to
crimes and violence perpetrated at home deserved attention, the exercise of
384. The Boer War, NAT’L ARCHIVES AUSTL., http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs67.aspx (last
visited Oct. 28, 2011).
385. See Gibson, supra note 382, at 32–33 (noting the presence of American troops on the boundary
contributed to Britain agreeing to arbitration).
386. Id. at 33.
387. Id.
388. Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Arthur Lee (Dec. 7, 1903), in 3 LETTERS OF THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, supra note 362, at 665–66.
389. President Theodore Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Dec. 6, 1904), in 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1790–1966, at 2134 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966); see also id. at 2134–35.
390. Id. at 2135 (“In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba,
Venezuela, and Panama, and in endeavoring to circumscribe the theater of war in the Far East, and to secure the
open door in China, we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large.”).
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violence on a larger scale, in the international environment, could hardly be
ignored:
We have plenty of sins of our own to war against, and under ordinary
circumstances we can do more for the general uplifting of humanity by striving
with heart and soul to put a stop to civic corruption, to brutal lawlessness and
violent race prejudices here at home than by passing resolutions about
wrongdoing elsewhere. Nevertheless there are occasional crimes committed
on so vast a scale and of such peculiar horror as to make us doubt whether it is
not our manifest duty to endeavor at least to show our disapproval of the deed
and our sympathy with those who have suffered by it.391
American strength would not come from acting with good will, but from being
willing to engage with force, when necessary. It was no longer sufficient simply to
have peace; it must be seen as a just peace—otherwise, recourse to force might be
necessary.392
The United States’ new, more invigorated role on the international stage
stemmed from its self-awareness of the power accumulated during the first epoch.
“Power,” Roosevelt reflected, “invariably means both responsibility and dan-
ger.”393 The Founders had faced dangers that no longer presented a threat:
We now face other perils, the very existence of which it was impossible that
they should foresee. Modern life is both complex and intense, and the
tremendous changes wrought by the extraordinary industrial development of
the last half century are felt in every fiber of our social and political being.394
The country thus moved from the defensive posture of the first epoch—wherein
the United States sought primarily to ensure the existence of the Union and
secondarily to establish international independence and economic strength—to a
more aspirational position.395 The domestic picture was not always rosy. But, as
391. Id.
392. President Theodore Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1905) [hereinafter Theodore Roosevelt,
Inaugural Address], in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 209–12 (“We wish peace, but we wish the peace
of justice, the peace of righteousness. We wish it because we think it is right and not because we are afraid.”).
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Starting in the 1890s, navalists became convinced of the need for a canal to protect U.S. commercial
interests and to unite the U.S. fleets on the two coasts in the event of war. See, e.g., MAHAN, INFLUENCE OF SEA
POWER, supra note 285, at 26 (emphasizing the importance of being able to quickly move the fleet to shift power,
thus underscoring the importance of the Isthmian Canal). The Caribbean would become an “American lake,”
around which subservience to European powers would not be tolerated. Epharaim R. McLean, The Carib-
bean—An American Lake, 67 U.S. NAVAL INST. PROCEEDINGS 947–60 (1941). It was time for the United States to
use its strength to shape international political, economic, and military matters: “Upon the success of our
experiment . . . much depends, not only as regards our own welfare, but as regards the welfare of mankind. If we
fail, the cause of free self-government throughout the world will rock to its foundations, and therefore our
responsibility is heavy, to ourselves, to the world as it is to-day, and to the generations yet unborn.” Theodore
Roosevelt, Inaugural Address, supra note 392, at 209–12.
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Roosevelt noted in 1905, “[W]hen I feel gloomy about democracy I am positively
refreshed by considering the monstrous ineptitude of the ideal absolutism when
tried out [in Russia] during the last eighteen months.”396
a. Military Might
To take on this new, more formative international role, the United States
required a stronger naval force. Gone were the concerns of the Jeffersonians, who
feared that building such strength would attract unwanted attention from Great
Britain and challenge her rule of the seas.397 In the nineteenth century, Britain had
exacted a high toll from the Dutch in response to their audacious efforts to
challenge British primacy.398 But by the dawn of the twentieth century, having
established the United States’naval credentials by taking on Spain—and winning—
doubt about further expanding the nation’s naval capacities all but vanished.399
President William Howard Taft came to office determined to continue Roos-
evelt’s program: “My distinguished predecessor,” he began, “has in many speeches
and messages set out with great force and striking language the necessity for
maintaining a strong navy commensurate with the coast line, the governmental
resources, and the foreign trade of our Nation.”400 Taft reiterated the reasons that
Roosevelt had presented “in favor of the policy of maintaining a strong navy as the
best conservator of our peace with other nations, and the best means of securing
respect for the assertion of our rights, the defense of our interests, and the exercise
of our influence in international matters.”401 Taft emphasized that even as the
United States pursued its interests through shaping international law and forging
bilateral treaties, the country must be prepared for hostilities.402 Military might,
moreover, would increase the country’s credibility abroad—not just in Europe, but
also with regard to Asia:
In the international controversies that are likely to arise in the Orient growing
out of the question of the open door and other issues the United States can
maintain her interests intact and can secure respect for her just demands. She
396. Letter from President Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Spring “Springy” Rice (July 24, 1905), in 3 LETTERS
OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT, supra note 362, at 1283–86.
397. Julia H. Macleod, Jefferson and the Navy: A Defense, 8 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 153, 153 (1945) (discussing
the widespread criticism of “Jeffersonian policy” regarding the Navy).
398. ARTHUR HERMAN, TO RULE THE WAVES: HOW THE BRITISH NAVY SHAPED THE MODERN WORLD 441–70
(2004).
399. See American President: A Reference Resource, MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org/president/roosevelt/
essays/biography/5 (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (discussing Roosevelt’s increased use of the military and his belief
that a strong military was the key to national defense).
400. Taft, supra note 137, at 213–26.
401. Id. at 217–18.
402. Id. at 218 (“[W]e should be blind to existing conditions and should allow ourselves to become foolish
idealists if we did not realize that, with all the nations of the world armed and prepared for war, we must be
ourselves in a similar condition, in order to prevent other nations from taking advantage of us and of our inability
to defend our interests and assert our rights with a strong hand.”).
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will not be able to do so, however, if it is understood that she never intends to
back up her assertion of right and her defense of her interest by anything but
mere verbal protest and diplomatic note.403
The Treasury could afford a stronger military presence. A navy, unlike a large
standing army, would give the Republic little to fear. And the Spanish-American
War had presented the country with an opportunity. Taft explained,
The policy of the United States in the Spanish war and since has given it a
position of influence among the nations that it never had before, and should be
constantly exerted to securing to its bona fide citizens, whether native or
naturalized, respect for them as such in foreign countries.404
The emphasis, as in the first epoch, would be on commerce; but it would be backed
with military might to ensure the elimination of trade barriers in Europe, the
transfer of goods through the Panama Canal, and the flow of trade with Asia.
b. Secondary Inquiry: From Rule of Law to Type of Law
As a domestic matter, industrialization had created powerful actors who threat-
ened to usurp national authority. Urbanization meant that population centers were
growing, with scant attention yet paid to a host of deleterious consequences—such
as poor sanitation, growing incidence of disease, and bad working conditions.405
Companies were beginning to wield a significant amount of power.406 President
Woodrow Wilson recognized in his First Inaugural Address that the economic
success of the country had come at a price:
There has been something crude and heartless and unfeeling in our haste to
succeed and be great. Our thought has been “Let every man look out for
himself, let every generation look out for itself,” while we reared giant
machinery which made it impossible that any but those who stood at the levers
of control should have a chance to look out for themselves.407
Wilson sought to ensure that the government did not become “a facile instrument
in the hand of private interests.”408 It was essentially a battle for domestic power.
The question was not whether the national government needed to protect the
rule of law per se—this was a core aspect of U.S. national security in the first
epoch. Instead, attention turned to a secondary conversation: what types of laws
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. BRUCE S. JANSSON, THE RELUCTANT WELFARE STATE: ENGAGING HISTORY TO ADVANCE SOCIAL WORK
PRACTICE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 98 (2009).
406. See President Woodrow Wilson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1913), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 229.
407. Id.
408. Id.
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were best for society. “The first duty of law,” Wilson reflected, “is to keep sound
the society it serves. Sanitary laws, pure food laws, and laws determining
conditions of labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves
are intimate parts of the very business of justice and legal efficiency.”409
Although this era in American history is often discussed in terms of the
protection of laborers, what could be missed in observing this period is the role of
the federal government in diminishing the strength of corporate entities and
bolstering its own power. It took on a more aggressive role in shaping not just
international law and global political, economic, and military affairs, but also the
political, economic, and social fabric of domestic life—a role traditionally left in
state hands.410
Wilson’s initial decision to stay out of World War I reflected the domestic
national security concerns that had been at the heart of the first epoch. Made up of
citizens from many different countries, the United States could hardly jump into
the battle on one side. To do so risked alienating part of the citizenry and opening
lines of schism where national fraternity had, slowly and painstakingly, been
nurtured. Wilson observed,
The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from
the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the
utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues
and circumstances of the conflict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to
succeed . . . .411
Wilson anticipated that in such circumstances, it would be “easy to excite passion
and difficult to allay it.”412 In short, “Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to
our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance
of our duty as the one great nation at peace . . . .”413
National fraternity, however, splintered over the new and emerging power-bases
within society. Among the most prominent advocacy groups was the National
Security League (“NSL”), an organization formed in 1915 to encourage the United
States to prepare militarily for engagement in the war.414 The NSL focused on what
it called “patriotic education” and inculcating belief in national military ser-
409. Id. at 230.
410. See 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 336 (describing the police power of the states).
411. WOODROW WILSON, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: AN APPEAL BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC, REQUESTING THEIR ASSISTANCE IN MAINTAINING A STATE OF NEUTRALITY DURING THE
PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR (DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY), S. Doc. No. 63-566, at 3–4 (1914).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. See To Investigate and Make Report as to the Officers, Membership, Financial Support, Expenditures,
General Character, Activities, and Purposes of the National Security League, a Corporation of New York, and of
Any Associated Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 469 and H.R. 476 Before a Special Comm. of the H.R., 65th
Cong. 4–5 (1918) [hereinafter 1918 Hearing]; see also To Investigate and Make Report as to the Officers,
Membership, Financial Support, Expenditures, General Character, Activities, and Purposes of the National
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vices.415 It opposed isolationism and sought government regulation of the economy,
a unified national defense agency, and, interestingly, an interstate highway sys-
tem.416 (The last being seen as necessary for consolidating national control of the
domestic arena.) The NSL strongly supported the Espionage Act of 1917 and the
Sedition Act of 1918.417 Despite the group’s embrace of strong federal powers,
however, the NSL’s size and its increasing influence generated concern at a federal
level.418 Congress initiated hearings to gain insight into the power structure of the
organization, in the process diminishing the NSL’s stature.419 The hearings directly
questioned the NSL’s support for the President during the war effort.420 The
government would not tolerate criticism by domestic power-bases, whatever their
support for government initiatives might be.421
The United States’ decision to involve itself in World War I following the
sinking of the Lusitania involved defensive considerations—typical of the first
epoch in U.S. national security—as well as elements of the formative concerns that
mark the second age. The German submarine attack on the Lusitania off the coast
of Ireland killed 1198—including 128 Americans.422 Germany’s stated goal was to
counter the military threat presented by the merchant vessel.423 A U.S. State
Security League, a Corporation of New York, and of Any Associated Organizations: Hearing on H.R. 469 and
H. R. 476 Before a Special Comm. of the H.R., 65th Cong. (1919) [hereinafter 1919 Hearing].
415. 1919 Hearing, supra note 414; 1918 Hearing, supra note 414.
416. 1918 Hearing, supra note 414.
417. See id.
418. Id. at 102–03 (estimating the NSL’s membership in 1918 at some 85,000 people). The NSL declared
bankruptcy in 1939. JOHN CARVER EDWARDS, PATRIOTS IN PINSTRIPES: MEN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LEAGUE
137 (1982). In 1940, the organization burned its archives. Id. For review of some of the few remaining primary
documents providing details on the inner workings of the NSL, see generally ARTHUR L. FROTHINGHAM,
HANDBOOK OF WAR FACTS AND PEACE PROBLEMS (PATRIOTISM THROUGH EDUCATION ORGANIZED EDUCATION
SERIES) (1919); ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, AMERICA AT WAR: A HANDBOOK OF PATRIOTIC EDUCATION REFERENCES
(1918).
419. See, e.g., 1919 Hearing, supra note 414; 1918 Hearing, supra note 414.
420. 1918 Hearing, supra note 414, at 516 (questioning whether the NSL was criticizing the President during
the war).
421. The Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 themselves can be seen as further attempts by
Congress to shore up national power in the context of war.
422. Niall Ferguson, Sinking Globalization, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2005, available at http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/60622/niall-ferguson/sinking-globalization.
423. FOREIGN MINISTER GOTTLIEB VON JAGOW, THE SINKING OF THE LUSITANIA—OFFICIAL GERMAN RESPONSE
(1915), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/lusitania_germanresponse.htm (“The Government of
the United States proceeds on the assumption that the Lusitania is to be considered as an ordinary unarmed
merchant vessel. The Imperial Government begs in this connection to point out that the Lusitania was one of the
largest and fastest English commerce steamers, constructed with Government funds as auxiliary cruisers, and is
expressly included in the navy list published by the British Admiralty. It is, moreover, known to the Imperial
Government from reliable information furnished by its officials and neutral passengers that for some time
practically all the more valuable English merchant vessels have been provided with guns, ammunition and other
weapons, and reinforced with a crew specially practiced in manning guns. According to reports at hand here, the
Lusitania when she left New York undoubtedly had guns on board which were mounted under decks and
masked . . . . In taking them on board in spite of this the company quite deliberately tried to use the lives of
American citizens as protection for the ammunition carried, and violated the clear provisions of American laws
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Department investigation later found that the Lusitania was carrying both contra-
band and ammunition—suggesting, if anything, that the United States was
something more than neutral in the course of the war.424
The sinking of the ship called the United States’ international reputation into
question, convincing Great Britain that the United States would now enter the
war.425 The U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Walter Hines Page,
reported to Secretary of State Robert Lansing:
Official comment is of course reticent. The freely expressed unofficial feeling
is that the United States must declare war or forfeit European respect. So far as
I know this opinion is universal. If the United States come in, the moral and
physical effect will be to bring peace quickly and to give the United States a
great influence in ending the war and in so reorganizing the world as to prevent
its recurrence.426
The question was thus not just one of international reputation. Equally important
was the role that the United States could then play in shaping the new world order:
“If the United States submits to German disregard of her citizens’ lives and of her
property and of her neutral rights on the sea, the United States will have no voice or
influence in settling the war nor in what follows for a long time to come.”427
Herein the two epochs converged: international independence mattered. The
sinking of the Lusitania demonstrated that the nation was not free to act as it
wished internationally. But failure to act would mean that the country would miss
an opportunity to shape the global environment in the aftermath of hostilities.
Ambassador Page’s remonstration failed to win the day, but it proved prescient
in pinpointing U.S. interests, which eventually prevailed. President Wilson ini-
tially refused to go to war.428 He nonetheless went after Germany with all the
diplomatic strength the country could muster, causing Secretary of State William
which expressly prohibit, and provide punishment for, the carrying of passengers on ships which have explosives
on board.”).
424. See Letter from A.J. Peters, Ass’t. Sec’y of the Treasury, to Robert Lansing, Counselor of the U.S. Dep’t
of State (May 8, 1915), in 2 POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD MARITIME COMMERCE IN WAR 307–08 (Carlton
Savage, ed. 1934) [hereinafter POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES].
425. See Letter from Walter Hines Page, Ambassador, to Robert Lansing, Counselor of the U.S. Dep’t of State
(May 8, 1915), in 2 POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 424, at 308–09.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. It was not until April 2, 1917 that President Woodrow Wilson called on Congress to declare war upon
Germany—nearly two years after the sinking of the Lusitania. President Woodrow Wilson, Speech to Congress
(Apr. 2, 1917), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/usawardeclaration.htm. Four days after Wil-
son’s speech, the United States formally entered the war. Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists
Between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the People of the United States and Making
Provision to Prosecute the Same (Apr. 6, 1917), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/usofficial
awardeclaration.htm; see also BURTON JESSE HENDRICK ET AL., 2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF WALTER H. PAGE 48–49
(1922) (expressing frustration with the American inaction following the Lusitania incident).
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Jennings Bryan to resign in protest.429 Germany, in response, assured the United
States that it would be more careful with regard to neutrals’ rights.430
By January 1917, however, the German position had changed, and a series of
incidents shifted the United States’ stance. On January 31, the German Ambassa-
dor, Count Johann von Bernstorff, informed the new Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing, that Germany would henceforward engage in unlimited warfare.431
Believing that its submarine forces were sufficient to win the war, Germany
intended to bring all commerce to a halt.432 In March of 1917, the British
government intercepted a message from the German Foreign Minister, Arthur
Zimmermann, to the German Ambassador in Mexico City.433 The “Zimmermann
Telegram,” as it came to be called, directed the Ambassador to offer U.S. territory
to Mexico in return for engagement in the war.434 The chilling message read:
Strictly Secret . . . We intend from the first February un-restricted U-boat war
to begin stop (.) Together war make stop (.) Together peace stop (.) Generous
financial support and understanding our part that Mexico in Texas comma (,)
New Mexico comma (,) ARIZONA former lost territory back conquer stop (.)
Settlement in the details. Your Excellency to be left stop (.) You will of the
foregoing the President in strictest secrecy inform comma (,) as soon as war’s
outbreak with United States certain is It will attempted by United States
nevertheless neutral to keep stop (.) In the event that this not succeed should
comma (,) offer we Mexico on following terms alliance stop (.)435
429. LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, DEFENDER OF THE FAITH: WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN, THE LAST DECADE: 1915–
1925, at 14–16 (1987). Bryan wrote in his resignation letter,
Obedient to your sense of duty and actuated by the highest motives, you have prepared for
transmission to the German Government a note in which I cannot join without violating what I
deem to be an obligation to my country, and the issue involved is of such moment that to remain a
member of the Cabinet would be as unfair to you as it would be to the cause which is nearest my
heart, namely, the prevention of war . . . .
Id. at 16.
430. See Letter from Johann von Bernstorff, Ger. Ambassador, to William Jennings Bryan, Sec’y of State
(Sept. 1, 1915), in 2 POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 424, at 378 (“Liners will not be sunk by our
submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try
to escape or offer resistance.”).
431. See Diplomatic Note from Johann von Bernstorff, Ger. Ambassador, to Robert Lansing, Sec’y of State
(Jan. 31, 1917), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/uboat_bernstorff.htm (“[T]he Imperial Govern-
ment—in order to serve the welfare of mankind in a higher sense and not to wrong its own people—is now
compelled to continue the fight for existence, again forced upon it, with the full employment of all the weapons
which are at its disposal.”).
432. See id.; Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Address to the Reichstag on German Policy of Unrestricted
U-boat Warfare (Jan. 31, 1917), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/uboat_bethmann.htm (“[T]he
most important fact of all is that the number of our submarines has very considerably increased as compared with
last spring, and thereby a firm basis has been created for success.”).
433. See generally BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE ZIMMERMANN TELEGRAM 201 (1958) (quoting the text in full).
434. See id.
435. Id.
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American opinion shifted strongly in support of war.436
Upon taking office on March 5, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson gave voice to
Ambassador Page’s previous concerns. He suggested that the United States could
not avoid the impact of world war: “The war inevitably set its mark from the first
alike upon our minds, our industries, our commerce, our politics and our social
action. To be indifferent to it, or independent of it, was out of the question.”437 The
United States had been wronged upon the seas, but had not injured in return;
instead, the nation’s focus had been on “armed neutrality.”438 Eventually, however,
strong economic interests drew America towards war.439 Wilson went on to
articulate a set of principles that built on Washington’s articulation of international
independence, yet he took it to the next step, calling for engagement to shape the
global post-war environment.440 Wilson thus embraced the more forward-leaning
posture articulated by Roosevelt even as he ensured that the interests of the first
epoch remained protected.
Although Wilson ran on a platform of “He Kept Us Out of War” during his
reelection campaign, within a month of his second inauguration, he approached
Congress to request a formal declaration of war.441 Wilson appealed to the memory
of noncombatants killed in the prosecution of the war, as well as Germany’s
decision to target international commerce: “The present German submarine
warfare against commerce,” Wilson argued, “is a warfare against mankind. It is a
war against all nations.”442 The United States’ purpose, though, was not solely to
436. See id.
437. President Woodrow Wilson, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 5, 1917), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 232–36.
438. Id. (“We have been obliged to arm ourselves to make good our claim to a certain minimum of right and of
freedom of action. We stand firm in armed neutrality since it seems that in no other way we can demonstrate what
it is we insist upon and cannot forget.”).
439. Id. (“Our own fortunes as a nation are involved whether we would have it so or not.”).
440. Id. (“That all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world and in the political stability of free
peoples, and equally responsible for their maintenance; that the essential principle of peace is the actual equality
of nations in all matters of right or privilege; that peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of
power; that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no other powers
should be supported by the common thought, purpose or power of the family of nations; that the seas should be
equally free and safe for the use of all peoples, under rules set up by common agreement and consent, and that, so
far as practicable, they should be accessible to all upon equal terms; that national armaments shall be limited to the
necessities of national order and domestic safety; that the community of interest and of power upon which peace
must henceforth depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its
own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually suppressed
and prevented.”).
441. 55 CONG. REC. 101, 103 (1917) (quoting President Woodrow Wilson) (“With a profound sense of the
solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but
in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent
course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the government and people
of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it
take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power
and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.”).
442. Id.
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defend its interests. Ambassador Page’s remonstration resurfaced: the object
would be to defeat autocratic power “and to set up amongst the really free and
self-governed peoples of this world such a concert of purpose and of action as will
henceforth ensure the observance of those principles.”443 The United States would
act upon the international environment.
Wilson went on to lay out exactly what this would look like in a post-war world.
Democratic nations would have a crucial role to play: “A steadfast concert for
peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No
autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its
covenants. It must be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion . . . .”444 U.S.
national security depended upon eliminating autocratic governments. That is, the
national government could not act to further its basic purpose—the common
defense of the members, the preservation of peace against external attacks, the
regulation of commerce, and maintenance of political and commercial intercourse
with foreign countries—absent a new world order.
The defining feature of this second epoch, built as a concentric circle on the first
era, moved the country to a posture of formative engagement. Wilson claimed
necessity in the interests of U.S. national security:
We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose, because we know that in
such a government, following such methods, we can never have a friend; and
that in the presence of its [an autocratic] organized power, always lying in wait
to accomplish we know not what purpose, there can be no assured security for
the democratic governments of the world.445
The fight would not be easy, but it would be instrumental in protecting “the rights
and liberties of small nations” and creating “a universal dominion of right by such
a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the
world itself at last free.”446
Thus, from the beginning of the United States’ entry into the war, Wilson made it
clear that U.S. national security required the United States to take a prominent role
in shaping the global post-war environment. In January 1918, Wilson usurped
whatever European initiative there might have been to lead post-war discussions
by announcing fourteen points on which the United States would proceed.447 A
new world order would be created in accordance with U.S. interests: covenants of
443. Id.
444. Id. at 104.
445. Id. (emphasis added).
446. Id.
447. President Woodrow Wilson, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points Delivered in Joint Session (Jan. 8, 1918).
The contours of the points raised by Wilson have been exhaustively studied and carefully discussed elsewhere.
For our present purposes, the key point is that the Wilson Administration’s approach to the question of national
security—its effort to play a more active role in shaping international relations—expanded beyond the concentric
circles of the first epoch.
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peace; absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas; the removal of all economic
barriers; reductions in national armaments; diminished colonial claims; evacuation
of Russia, Belgium, and France; readjustment of Italy’s borders; the break-up of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire; evacuation of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro;
the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire; the establishment of an independent
Poland; and the creation of a League of Nations all pointed towards a new world
order.
2. Tension Between the Epochs: Independence v. Engagement
The Fourteen Points became the basis for U.S. negotiations with Germany.
Nevertheless, President Wilson’s course could not be totally divorced from the key
national security interests of the first epoch. Specifically, international indepen-
dence, absolutely central to the administrations of Washington, Jefferson, Monroe,
and others, stood in tension with Wilson’s commitment to a League of Nations.
This tension undermined the Paris Peace Treaty when Wilson turned to the Senate
for ratification.
The Senators’ central concern was whether the United States would be free to
determine its own course in the international arena, or whether its actions would be
hampered by the League.448 Senators proved reluctant to join an organization
whose primary interests might be European in character.449 Reservations attached
to the treaty included, inter alia: “The United States assumes no obligation to
preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or
to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the league or
not—under the provisions of article 10.”450 The Senate refused to allow any
questions relating to the Monroe Doctrine to be submitted to arbitration under the
League of Nations.451 The Senate further objected to potentially footing the bill for
an organization with interests (potentially) so different from those of the United
States.452 All of these exceptions carved out for the country an independent role in
the international arena, even as the United States embraced a more active global
role.
As Wilson’s health failed, President Warren G. Harding came to office in 1921
with the tensions between the two epochs foremost in the public discourse. His
Inaugural Address lurched between the articulations of national security. On the
one hand, he invoked Washington’s legacy:
448. See 58 CONG. REC. 493, 502–03 (1919) (quoting Sen. Johnson).
449. Accord id.
450. 58 CONG. REC. 8767, 8777 (1919) (Reservation 2).
451. See id. (Reservation 5). But see League of Nations Covenant, art. 21, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
20th_century/leagcov.asp (stating “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international
engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the
maintenance of peace.”).
452. 58 CONG. REC. 8767, 8777 (Reservation 9) (“The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any
expenses of the league of nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, etc.”).
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The recorded progress of our Republic, materially and spiritually, in itself
proves the wisdom of the inherited policy of noninvolvement in Old World
affairs. Confident of our ability to work out our own destiny, and jealously
guarding our right to do so, we seek no part in directing the destinies of the Old
World. We do not mean to be entangled. We will accept no responsibility
except as our own conscience and judgment, in each instance, may deter-
mine.453
But the Old World did not have a monopoly on the New World. And in this new
global order, the United States would play a more formative role:
We are ready to associate ourselves with the nations of the world, great and
small, for conference, for counsel; to seek the expressed views of world
opinion; to recommend a way to approximate disarmament and relieve the
crushing burdens of military and naval establishments. We elect to participate
in suggesting plans for mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, and would
gladly join in that expressed conscience of progress, which seeks to clarify and
write the laws of international relationship, and establish a world court for the
disposition of such justiciable questions as nations are agreed to submit
thereto. In expressing aspirations, in seeking practical plans, in translating
humanity’s new concept of righteousness and justice and its hatred of war into
recommended action we are ready most heartily to unite, but every commit-
ment must be made in the exercise of our national sovereignty. Since freedom
impelled, and independence inspired, and nationality exalted, a world supergov-
ernment is contrary to everything we cherish and can have no sanction by our
Republic. This is not selfishness, it is sanctity. It is not aloofness, it is
security.454
U.S. national security depended upon engagement that stopped short of a “world
super-government.”455 But that very engagement departed from tradition: “We
have come to a new realization,” Harding commented, “of our place in the world
and a new appraisal of our Nation by the world.”456 America was “ready to
encourage, eager to initiate, [and] anxious to participate” in any program “likely to
lessen the probability of war.”457 The goal was nothing short of “a high place in the
moral leadership of civilization . . . .”458 Engaging in trade for the benefit of the
United States would, therefore, no longer be sufficient.
The practical manifestation of this approach came in the form of a series of
agreements. The Four-Power Pact would henceforward govern altercations in the
453. President Warren G. Harding, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1921), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20,
at 238.
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Pacific.459 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, initiated by France, quickly bound other
major powers to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international
controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another.”460 The settlement “of all disputes or conflicts of whatever
nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them” would
never be sought “except by pacific means.”461 In 1936, Secretary Hull suggested
that the very purpose of the Inter-American Peace Conference was to “banish war
from the Western Hemisphere.”462
The League of Nations might be looked to as a solution to international conflict.
Indeed, the Lytton Commission (unsuccessfully) attempted to intervene in 1932
when the Japanese Army in Manchuria attacked Chang Hsueh-Liang, allied with
Chiang Kai-shek.463 But the failure of international institutions did not mean that
the United States’ hands were subsequently tied. The country would continue to
protect its economic interests through forward engagement—militarily if neces-
sary. With the Fourth Marine Regiment stationed in China, the Stimson Doctrine—
established by Secretary of State Henry Stimson in diplomatic notes sent to both
Japan and China—followed the course first enunciated by John Hay in 1899.464 It
announced that the U.S. government would not recognize as legally binding any de
facto situation, nor any treaty or agreement entered into between Japan and China
“which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China,
including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial
and administrative integrity of the Republic of China.”465 Secretary Stimson
subsequently sent a letter to the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,
noting the two principles invoked by Hay: “(1) equality of commercial opportunity
among all nations in dealing with China, and (2) as necessary to that equality the
preservation of China’s territorial and administrative integrity.”466
In this picture, domestic concerns still mattered. Harding stated, “I wish for an
America no less alert in guarding against dangers from within than it is watchful
459. See 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1922, at 35 (1938) (signed by Japan, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France).
460. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Reunification of War as an
Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), art. I, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343 (1929).
461. Id. at art. II.
462. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PEACE AND WAR: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1931–1941, at 41 (1943)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PEACE AND WAR], available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/index.html.
463. See T.A. Bisson, The United States in the Pacific: A Survey of the Relations of the United States with
Pacific Countries from September 1, 1931 to September 1, 1932, 5 PACIFIC AFF. 1047, 1048 (1932).
464. Arnold D. McNair, The Stimson Doctrine of Non-Recognition: A Note on Its Legal Aspects, 14 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 65, 65 (1933).
465. Id. See also Telegram from Sec’y of State, to Ambassador in Japan (Jan. 7, 1932), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES: JAPAN, 1931–1941, at 76 (1943).
466. Telegram from Sec’y of State, to the Consul Gen. at Shanghai (Feb. 24, 1932), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES: JAPAN, 1931–1941, supra note 465, at 83–87.
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against enemies from without.”467 The concerns that stemmed from industrializa-
tion had not abated. “My most reverent prayer for America is for industrial peace,
with its rewards, widely and generally distributed, amid the inspirations of equal
opportunity.”468 Here, the Great Depression may have masked the growing power
of corporate entities, but concerns about the role played by business continued—
with respect to the munitions industry. In 1936, Senator Gerald P. Nye chaired a
Special Committee on the Investigation of the Munitions Industry, which focused
on the role played by military companies in the buildup to World War I.469 The
Committee found “that almost without exception, the American munitions compa-
nies investigated have at times resorted to such unusual approaches . . . as to
constitute, in effect, a form of bribery of foreign governmental officials or of their
close friends in order to secure business.”470 The Committee further determined,
“that not only are such transactions highly unethical, but that they carry within
themselves the seeds of disturbance of the peace and stability of those nations in
which they take place.”471 Nye’s Committee charged munitions companies with
weakening democratic government and threatening the peace and civic process of
nations.
Scholars have looked at this period and suggested that, as a matter of interna-
tional relations, it is marked by increasing American isolationism. Professor John
Lewis Gaddis, for instance, posits that prior to World War II:
[M]ost Americans believed that their country could best protect itself by
minimizing political entanglements overseas. Events of 1939–40 persuaded
leaders of the Roosevelt Administration that they had been wrong; Pearl
Harbor convinced remaining skeptics. From then on, American policy-makers
would seek security through involvement, not isolation: to prevent new wars,
they believed, the whole system of relations between nations would have to be
reformed.472
What is missed in this analysis and similar accounts are, first, the extent to which
the United States was already engaged in a formative role, and, second, the degree
to which national security concerns operated at a domestic level.
On the first point, there is certainly no shortage of military interventions in the
first three decades of the twentieth century. Salient examples include: three
occupations of Cuba; several decade-long occupations of Haiti, Santo Domingo,
and Nicaragua (twenty-four years in the last case); intervention in Mexico;
467. Harding, supra note 453, at 237–46.
468. Id.
469. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATION OF THE MUNITIONS INDUS., S. DOC. NO. 74-944, pt. 8, at 3
(1936).
470. Id.
471. Id. at 4.
472. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 1941–47, at 353–54 (1972)
[hereinafter GADDIS, ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR].
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involvement in Venezuela; and military support to the rebellion that led to the
creation of Panama in 1904.
As for the second point, this era could equally be looked at through a lens of
congressional efforts to restrict executive branch latitude as well as the undue
influence of corporate entities within the national security arena. It is not that the
United States was not engaged overseas; to the contrary, since the Spanish-
American War it had adopted a policy of formative international engagement. The
crafting of arbitration agreements, the negotiation of instruments designed to
address international conflict, the creation of the League of Nations, and continued
efforts to shape trade agreements demonstrated the United States’ willingness to
shape the international environment. This is distinguishable from the country’s
reluctance to commit itself to the binding decisions of international bodies.
The battle over the League of Nations has thus widely been interpreted as a
symbol of American isolationism. But it can equally be regarded as a product of
domestic conflict over the exercise of power with regard to U.S. national security.
It is not the only example.
Consider, for instance, the Neutrality Acts, enacted between 1935 and 1937.
These statutes undermined President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ability to assist the
United Kingdom in the face of German aggression.473 The first such measure, of
August 1935, required the President to proclaim any outbreak of war; it also
prevented any export of arms, or ammunition to any named belligerent states.474
Roosevelt signed the legislation and later invoked it in the Second Italo-
Abyssinian War (Italy invaded Ethiopia in October 1935). Nonetheless, he
memorialized his objections in a signing statement: “It is the policy of this
Government,” he wrote, “to avoid being drawn into wars between other nations,
but it is a fact that no Congress and no Executive can foresee all possible future
situations . . . . It is conceivable that . . . the inflexible provisions might drag us into
war instead of keeping us out.”475 The President chafed at having his hands tied by
Congress. Roosevelt reiterated his commitment to the principles of the first epoch:
“The policy of the Government is definitely committed to the maintenance of
peace and the avoidance of any entanglements which would lead us into con-
flict.”476
Congress continued to insert itself into commercial affairs related to war. In
February 1936, the Second Neutrality Act forbade loans to belligerents.477 The
Third Neutrality Act of January 1937 embargoed shipments to belligerents in the
473. Quincy Wright, Repeal of the Neutrality Act, 36 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 8, 8–23 (1942).
474. Neutrality Act of Aug. 31, 1935, ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 441 note
(2006)).
475. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Statement on Approval of Neutrality Legislation, August
31, 1935, in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 345–46 (1935).
476. Id. at 346.
477. Extending and Amending the Joint Resolution (Neutrality Act of Feb. 29, 1936), ch. 106, 49 Stat 1152
(current version at 22 U.S.C. § 441 note (2006)).
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Spanish Civil War.478 The Fourth Neutrality Act, passed in May 1937, allowed for
non-munitions trade for two years, as long as the goods were not carried in
American ships.479 The Fifth Neutrality Act, entered into force after the Second
World War had begun, limited all trade with belligerents named by the President
via proclamation.480
Each of these measures placed Congress in a prominent role with regard to U.S.
national security. Each of the measures restricted the executive branch’s sphere of
influence and freedom of action. And each of the measures granted Congress
greater control over the munitions industry.
3. Expanding National Spheres of Influence
During the second epoch, as a matter of national security, direct confrontation
between corporate power and state authority generated federal responses couched
in a national security framework. One example, provided above, was the use of the
military to respond to the Chicago strikes.481 The federal government overrode
state objection to the use of troops, on the grounds that federal interests, powers,
and duties required federal action.482 Industrialization and urbanization brought
more, however, than just direct power confrontations between corporate interests
and the federal government. It also brought a host of social and economic
concerns, which the states appeared unable to alleviate, following the stock market
crash of 1929.483 The federal government began to respond: Hoover thus marked
1929 with a report on recent social trends.484 And Roosevelt’s New Deal ushered
in a new era.485
Between 1930 and 1940, federal involvement in social welfare programs
radically expanded.486 From merely $21 million spent on public aid programs in
1913, by 1932, the total federal outlays had risen to $208 million. By 1939, this
number had skyrocketed to $4.9 billion.487 Whereas federal public-aid in 1913 and
478. 81 CONG. REC. 61, 74–80 (1937).
479. Joint Resolution (Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937), ch. 146, 50 Stat. 121 (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 441
note (2006)).
480. Joint Resolution (Neutrality Act of November 4, 1939), ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C. §§ 441–57, supp. II) (repealing sections of the 1939 Neutrality Act).
481. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
482. See id.; see also Cleveland, Proclamation, supra note 329.
483. See RONALD SNELL, STATE FINANCE IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION 4 (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/print/fiscal/
STATEFINANCEGREATDEPRESSION.pdf.
484. See PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMM. ON SOC. TRENDS, RECENT SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(1933).
485. See President Franklin Roosevelt, Address (May 7, 1933), available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/
chat2.html (discussing efforts of the New Deal).
486. NAT’L RES. PLANNING BD., SECURITY, WORK, AND RELIEF POLICIES 7 (1942), http://www.ssa.gov/history/
reports/NRPB/NRPBChapter1.pdf (“The years 1930 to 1940 witnessed a vast expansion of governmental activity
in providing income to needy or presumably needy persons, which will undoubtedly stand out as a major social
development of our times.”).
487. Id. at 7–8.
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1923 amounted to less than 1 percent of all governmental expenditures, the
proportion increased to 6.5 percent in 1933, and to 27.1 percent in 1939.488
Not only did public-aid outlays substantially increase, but the type of public
relief provided rapidly expanded. By 1940, public relief no longer consisted solely
of providing income to needy persons, but also included: programs ranging from
education and vocational guidance to the provision of roads, schools, and other
public buildings; public conservation efforts; recreational facilities; expanded
nursing and medical assistance; and economic and social assistance programs.489
Concepts of need-based assistance broadened. The system no longer responded
only to those who were utterly destitute; it anticipated potential problems by
investing in social insurance.490 By the 1940s, so many changes had occurred that
the government agency tasked with anticipating and considering relief programs
called for such support to henceforth be termed “public aid.”491
These programs had a significant domestic impact.492 In 1942, the National
Resources Planning Board found that between 1933 and 1940, ten to twenty-two
percent of the total population at any one time depended on socially provided
income.493 Public health, education, child welfare services, and public housing
became enmeshed in the federal portfolio.
Notably, social security was different from national security. Both were within
federal purview. And both received attention. Personal security also rose to the
fore, spurring the federal government to become more involved in the criminal law
realm. The Eighteenth Amendment played a pivotal role.494
The prohibition of alcohol brought with it a booming trade in illegal goods,
ushering in the conditions ripe for criminal enterprise. Cosa Nostra, for instance,
was present in the United States since the late nineteenth century;495 however, it
wasn’t until Prohibition that it gained significant power in American cities.496
Profits from the illegal sale of alcohol became the group’s main source of
income—significantly overshadowing earnings made from prostitution, gambling,
and racketeering schemes.497 Small-time gangsters like Al Capone, Meyer Lansky,
488. Id. at 8.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
492. Legislation, for instance, cemented many of the changes into domestic law. See, e.g., Social Security Act
(Old Age Pension Act), Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
493. Id. at 7.
494. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
495. DAVID CRITCHLEY, THE ORIGIN OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA: THE NEW YORK CITY MAFIA,
1891–1931, at 39 (2009).
496. Id. at 138–39.
497. See generally EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA (1996); EDWARD
BUTTS, OUTLAWS OF THE LAKES: BOOTLEGGING AND SMUGGLING FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO PROHIBITION 109
(2004).
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and Lucky Luciano built syndicates, in the process modernizing organized
crime.498 In many areas, police turned a blind eye to the sudden proliferation of
speakeasies and alcohol distribution centers—at times themselves benefiting from
a slice of the profits.499 Detroit became so notorious for this practice that it earned
for itself the title, “City on a Still.”500
Prohibition proved a double-edged sword: not only did it give rise to conditions
ripe for abuse, but the manner in which it was enforced left much to be desired. As
one account notes, “Over-zealous police and federal agents violated civil rights
when searching for and destroying the paraphernalia of alcohol.”501 The frequency
of such raids underscored libertarians’ concerns about federal government over-
reaching, heightened all the more because the Eighteenth Amendment was only the
second amendment to directly affect the private rights of citizens.502 If private
rights fell beyond federal authority, efforts to restrict such liberties raised question
about the rule of law.
Upon assuming office, President Herbert Hoover underscored the growing
concern:
The most malign of all [the] dangers [facing self-government] today is
disregard and disobedience of law. Crime is increasing. Confidence in rigid
and speedy justice is decreasing. I am not prepared to believe that this indicates
any decay in the moral fiber of the American people. I am not prepared to
believe that it indicates an impotence of the Federal Government to enforce its
laws.503
To remedy the problem, the national government would have to take a more active
role. In 1933, Congress passed a new measure to eliminate loopholes in criminal
procedure.504 President Hoover issued a signing statement coincident with the
bill’s passage, pointing out that the legislation represented four years of recommen-
dations made by the President and the Attorney General.505 It tied directly to his
efforts to crack down on crime: “[This legislation] should prevent well-endowed
498. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 365–66 (2010); see also David
Oshinsky, Temperance to Excess, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010, at BR20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
05/23/books/review/Oshinsky-t.html?pagewanted"all.
499. See MICHAEL NEWTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 99 (2007).
500. Id.
501. Notes on the Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/
const.html#Am18 (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
502. The other notable amendment with a direct impact on private rights was the Thirteenth Amendment,
which abolished slavery and gave Congress the power to pass legislation preventing slavery and involuntary
servitude. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
503. Hoover, supra note 137, at 257–68.
504. Act of Feb. 24, 1933, ch. 119, 47 Stat. 904 (giving the Supreme Court the authority to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure in criminal cases) (repealed 1988).
505. See President Herbert Hoover, Presidential Statement on Signing an Act on Reform of Criminal
Procedures in Federal Courts (Feb. 25, 1933), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid"
23438#axzz1pILWZj3L.
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criminals, who have been convicted by juries, from delaying punishment by years
of resort to sharp technicalities of judicial procedure. It will,” he concluded,
“increase the respect for law.”506
The realm of criminal law therefore laid side-by-side with the national govern-
ment’s concerns about social security, economic security, and national security.
Together these issues comprised some of the most important spheres of national
influence. The rise of authoritarian governments abroad, however, lent energy to
the national security concerns.507 For many, the question of national security was
not one amongst various competing issues; it was quickly becoming the defining
feature of the generation.
William Yandell Elliott, a professor of government at Harvard University, chose
this moment to publish a program for U.S. national security.508 He called for a
constitutional overhaul, in which the executive would be given greater powers and
more latitude in the field of foreign relations: “In order to achieve the recovery
which will once more afford social and national security,” he wrote, “we must go
to the roots of our problems: political reform is essential for security at home and
abroad.”509 Subjecting treaties to the scrutiny of the Senate was part of the
problem:
We have a national inferiority complex of the most painful type on all
questions dealing with foreigners. The result is that by keeping at least one
hand of the Executive always handcuffed to a minority of the Senate we make
it impossible for our negotiators to deal on equal terms and with foresight. It is,
and will remain, impossible to have an intelligence foreign policy until Mr.
Roosevelt and his Secretary of State are given freer hands to deal with our
foreign problems. This means as much power to negotiate war-debts settle-
ments as to make tariff bargains—with a wide discretionary latitude for
concessions.510
Elliott derided the Senate’s refusal to try to act through the League of Nations:
This is again the age of Machiavelli. Japan, Germany, Italy, these countries
make small pretense to any other policy than that of craft and might in gaining
506. Id.
507. I use the term “authoritarian” to denote regimes in which single entities hold a monopoly on political
power. This type of political structure can be distinguished from “totalitarianism,” in which other spheres, such as
education, science, and the arts, become controlled by the individual or group holding a monopoly on political
power, consistent with a formally recognized ideological perspective. Concerns about the latter form of political
and social organization emerged with growing efforts to find parallels between communism and fascism. See
LOWELL BARRINGTON ET AL., COMPARATIVE POLITICS: STRUCTURES AND CHOICES 195–97 (Carolyn Merrill et al.
eds., 2009).
508. See WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT, THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY 11 (1st ed. 1935) (noting that an essential theme of the year 1935 was the need to reflect on the status of
our government).
509. Id. at 10.
510. Id. at 246–47.
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national ends. Others who profess peace are pursuing ends that may lead to
war. So far the policy of the United States has been to avoid war. But we are
unwilling to attempt any participation in a system that would try to guarantee
security.511
As a domestic matter, security trumped economic equality.512 For the former,
economic vitality and a positive balance of trade would prove essential. Elliott,
here, consciously or not, was hearkening back to the first epoch, wherein economic
growth proved central. France and Japan, he pointed out, had been most forthright
in admitting the importance of economic strength and a positive trade balance:
“War must not find them unprepared in industry, raw materials, or food stuffs, any
more than in armaments. And as gold and financial power are equally important
sinews of war, every state begins to adopt a mercantilist attitude toward its trade
balance.”513 The rejection of foreign capital and sources of supply lay at the heart
of U.S. national security.514 For increasingly complex systems, Elliott hypoth-
esized, more centralized solutions may be required.515
One year later, Edward Pendleton Herring, also a professor at Harvard Univer-
sity (later President of the American Social Science Research Council), argued an
even more extreme position.516 For Pendleton Herring, democratic countries were
losing ground to authoritarian regimes, which were more effective at exploiting
new technologies.517 He argued that if the United States employed sophisticated
management science techniques, it could gain a commensurate level of control
without relinquishing American values.518 The country would have to eliminate
special interests, instead promoting the state “over and above the purposes of the
medley of interests that compose it.”519 His approach was a direct attack on the
structure of parallel interests that characterized federal power at the time.
Pendleton Herring, like Elliott, prioritized U.S. national security above other
interests: “Air power means that the globe has shrunk. Mechanized warfare means
that armies of industry are in conflict. . . . The margins of safety that our
511. Id. at 272.
512. See id. at 17, 19 (“The catchword of the new era has become not equality but security. In an age where
surplus rather than scarcity governs economic life, security to the masses means economic adequacy of
livelihood.”).
513. Id. at 21.
514. ELLIOTT, supra note 508, at 142.
515. Id. at 202.
516. See Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, Pendleton Herring, 100, Pioneer in Political Science, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/21/nyregion/pendleton-herring-100-pioneer-in-political-
science.html.
517. Cf. STUART, supra note 13, at 5 (“[A]uthoritarian regimes were gaining enormous economic and political
advantages over democracies by their exploitation of modern technologies of communication and transporta-
tion.”).
518. Id. (“[M]anagement science could help America to replicate the efficiencies of totalitarian governments
without doing violence to our democratic values.”).
519. EDWARD PENDLETON HERRING, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 380 (1936).
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democracy has known have been cut away.”520 The United States must return to
the Founding, “when the flintlock hung over every hearth and the powder horn was
kept ready.”521 Importantly, Pendleton Herring’s reference to the early years of the
country focused not on the form U.S. national security had taken at that time—with
preservation of the Union a primary matter, and international independence and
economic growth as a second—but merely on the fact that overriding national
security concerns had set the political, economic, and military agendas.
New technologies underscored Pendleton Herring’s concerns: advances in
transportation, communication, and the lethality of weapons again created an
instable world. Powerful European actors could no longer be kept at bay simply by
distance. It was thus not just the passive retention of colonial possessions that was
at stake, as it had been at the Founding, but the aggressive posture of autocratic
governments, intent on expanding their sphere of influence, that posed a threat.
The October Revolution produced a Stalinist regime, bent on global dominance.522
Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy emphasized military might and em-
braced expansionism.523 The rise of the Third Reich from 1933 similarly conveyed
military aggression, such as the German government’s decisions to withdraw from
the League of Nations, reject the Treaty of Versailles, and engage in re-
armament.524
Western governments, including the United States, looked at these develop-
ments overseas and debated how to best respond to the threat. Calls by Elliott,
Pendleton Herring, and others to centralize the national response, and to take steps
towards ever-greater control against autocratic regimes fell on fertile ground. In
1937, Harold Laski, professor of political science at the London School of
Economics, and a frequent public lecturer in the United States, gave voice to
concern about such shifts in the modern state: “In the seven years since this book
was first published the condition of liberty has visibly deteriorated over most of the
civilized world . . . . At times it seems not improbable that mankind is about to
enter a new dark age.”525
Even as authoritarian governments grew in strength, the doctrines embraced by
autocratic States abroad diminished support for the other domestic spheres of
influence. Eugene Debs, for instance, led the Socialist Party in the United
States—a doctrine to which he converted while serving jail time for his role in the
520. EDWARD PENDLETON HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR 15–16 (1941) [hereinafter PENDLETON HERRING,
IMPACT OF WAR].
521. Id. at 12.
522. See JOSEPH STALIN, THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION: A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES AND SPEECHES 15–16 (1934).
523. See generally CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, IL DUCE: THE LIFE OF BENITO MUSSOLINI 21–109 (1962).
524. MICHAEL BURLEIGH, THE THIRD REICH: A NEW HISTORY 791 (discussing withdrawal from the League of
Nations); id. at 46–50 (discussing the perceived iniquities of the Versailles treaty); id. at 681 (rearmament).
525. HAROLD J. LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE 11 (1937); see also STUART, supra note 13, at 19.
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Pullman strikes.526 In 1912, he ran for President on the Socialist ticket, in the
process earning more than 900,000 votes—six percent of the votes cast that
year.527 He opposed the United States’ involvement in World War I—a position
that quickly became seen as a threat to national security. The Espionage Act of
1917, followed by the Sedition Act of 1918, targeted interference with the draft
and other wartime policies, as well as any utterance of “disloyal or abusive
language” about the government, the Constitution, the U.S. flag, or even the
military uniform.528 As Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia,
fear of imminent revolution in America spread.529 The Red Scare soon found
Debs, along with nearly 1500 others, imprisoned.530
In light of the fear of communism—particularly as practiced by the U.S.S.R.—
that subsequently swept the United States, federal involvement in social and
economic security raised the specter of socialism. A sort of heighted awareness
of—and concern about—its creeping influence grew. In 1944, Friedrich A. Hayek
published The Road to Serfdom, warning that federal programs were beginning to
assume a socialist character.531 Hayek cited the New Deal, as well as the Fair Deal
Administrations of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, as
examples.532 Social programs gradually fell from favor, sped by the Cold War and
the fear generated by McCarthyism.533
In this manner, government designs on private industry became unpalatable.
Instead, where industry might be essential to U.S. national security, a partnership
between the United States and private industry provided a more acceptable route.
This represented a very different approach than that which had been adopted
during the Pullman strikes, when industry and the federal government were at
loggerheads. It also presented a very different picture than that in which social and
526. Debs formally announced his conversion to socialism while in jail on January 1, 1897. There is evidence,
however, that he was thinking about the issue months prior to that announcement. Letter from Eugene V. Debs to
Henry Demarest Lloyd (Feb. 1, 1896), in GENTLE REBEL: LETTERS OF EUGENE V. DEBS 23 (James Robert
Constantine ed., 1995); see also Eugene V. Debs, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
EBchecked/topic/154766/Eugene-V-Debs (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
527. Debs received 901,551 votes; Taft received 3,486,242; Roosevelt gained 4,122,721 votes; and Wilson
obtained 6,296,284 votes. Dave Leip’s Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections, 1912 Presidential General Election
Results, NAT’L ELECTION RESULTS, http://www.uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?f"0&year"1912 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2012). Debs, however, did not win any electoral votes. Id.
528. Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217; Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40
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530. Debs’s imprisonment and the clemency proposals by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer are discussed
in careful detail in ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–1920, at 211–25
(1955).
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2007).
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economic security represented just one of many spheres of national influence.
Instead, national security would become dominant, with industry one way to
ensure the protection of U.S. interests both at home and overseas. Thus entered the
third epoch.
C. The Ascendance of National Security: 1930–1989
Prior to the Second World War, the values of the first epoch resurfaced:
primarily, protection of the Union and, secondarily, international independence
and economic growth. Strains of the second epoch also continued to shape U.S.
conceptions of national security. The United States now considered itself a major
international player and sought to influence the global course of events, not just
through continued insistence on the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt’s Corollary,
but through military engagement. In addition to these basic approaches to U.S.
national security, though, a third concentric circle emerged, wherein national
security began to dominate other federal spheres of influence. Social and economic
security, as well as personal security (as manifested via law enforcement) became
subservient to overriding national security interests. Significantly, this shift oc-
curred outside of active military hostilities, cementing the nation into a permanent
condition of emergency.
In this context, the federal government could ill afford to alienate corporate
interests; instead, it co-opted industry into the national security infrastructure.
While not without its own risks, such a move was seen as imperative to counter the
threat posed initially by autocratic governments and, later, more directly, by the
Soviet Union. For the third epoch took hold not with World War II, but with the
early 1930s rise of totalitarianism and fascist corporatism, wherein those holding a
monopoly on political power sought to control the evolution of education, science,
the economy, and the arts in a manner consistent with the dominant political
ideology.534 The linkage between communism and fascism as totalitarian regimes,
in the context of aggressor nations, presented an existential threat. World War II
acted as a lens, focusing the national security infrastructure on one dominant aim:
containment of the U.S.S.R. From the beginning, this epoch was marked by a
blurring of the line between foreign and domestic. Threats to the national
government could arise from either quarter.
The third epoch instituted a Manichean worldview, wherein “good” fought
“bad.” The evils of autocracy morphed into the evils of totalitarianism and, finally,
Soviet communism. Democracy, in contrast, stood for good. National security
became more than protecting the Union and establishing international indepen-
dence; it became a matter of moral superiority. President Dwight D. Eisenhower
thus remarked in his First Inaugural Address, “Freedom is pitted against slavery;
534. In this manner, totalitarianism can be distinguished from authoritarian regimes. See supra, note 507.
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lightness against the dark.”535 Just over a decade later, Ronald Reagan referred to
the threat posed by the Soviet Union: “We are faced with the most evil enemy
mankind has known in his long climb from the swamp to the stars. There can be no
security anywhere in the free world if there is no fiscal and economic stability
within the United States.”536 In 1982, Reagan reiterated this worldview, telling the
British House of Commons that the “forces of good ultimately rally and triumph
over evil.”537
Like the second age, the third epoch gave rise to tension with the aims of the
first. Specifically, the basic understanding of national security as stemming from
the protection of the U.S. Constitution, and the people as sovereign appeared to be
violated by actions taken by the executive branch precisely in the name of national
security. The McCarthy era and the Church Committee that followed may thus be
seen as flip sides of the same coin: both responded to perceived threats to the same
underlying U.S. interests. And both, in turn, became seen as a threat to the same.
Together, they reflect a remarkably consistent take on the primary aims of U.S.
national security that have persisted since the Founding.
1. A New Domestic Order
The rise of totalitarianism in the 1930s shifted American thinking about what
steps would have to be taken to ensure U.S. national security. A new domestic
order characterized by a stronger military base and an overriding focus on national
security concerns emerged.
Having urged Congress to maintain American neutrality, Roosevelt announced
one year later that he had forged an executive agreement to trade fifty destroyers
for bases in British possessions in the New World.538 “We have,” he stated,
“certain ideas and ideals of national safety, and we must act to preserve that safety
today and to preserve the safety of our children in future years.”539 Echoes of the
second epoch reverberated: U.S. national security was bound up with the safety of
535. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1953) [hereinafter Eisenhower, First
Inaugural Address], in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 293–99.
536. President Ronald Reagan, A Time for Choosing Speech (Oct. 27, 1964), available at http://www.
fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964reagan1.html.
537. President Ronald Reagan, Address to Members of the British Parliament (June 8, 1982), available at
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm (“We’re approaching the end of a bloody
century plagued by a terrible political invention—totalitarianism. Optimism comes less easily today, not because
democracy is less vigorous, but because democracy’s enemies have refined their instruments of repression. Yet
optimism is in order because day by day democracy is proving itself to be a not at all fragile flower.”). Note that
this framing persisted into the fourth epoch, with regard to terrorism.
538. In July 1940, Germany had destroyed eleven British destroyers, prompting British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill to request assistance from the United States. In March 1941, the Lend-Lease Act subsequently
expanded the type of aid the United States could give the United Kingdom. See Lend-Lease Act, Pub. L. No.
77-11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941). For a general discussion of the Lend-Lease Act and its role in British-American
relations, see infra note 597 and accompanying text.
539. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PEACE AND WAR, supra note 462, at 483–86.
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the Western Hemisphere and the surrounding oceans.540 The Monroe Doctrine
bore a close relationship to the course set by the Founders, with its essential aim of
avoiding European entanglements:
We seek to keep war from our firesides by keeping war from coming back to
the Americas. For that we have historic precedent that goes back to the days of
the administration of President George Washington. . . . It is our national duty
to use every effort to keep [the wars on other continents] out of the Ameri-
cas.541
Roosevelt considered his decision to trade destroyers for bases in Newfoundland,
the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, Antigua, and
British Guiana to be the most important action in the reinforcement of the United
States’ national defense since the Louisiana Purchase: “Then as now,” he said,
“considerations of safety from overseas attack were fundamental. The value to the
Western Hemisphere of these outposts of security is beyond calculation.”542 The
United States could no longer afford to see itself as “remote and isolated and,
therefore, secure against the dangers from which no other land is free.”543 The
decision also completed the process of removing the Caribbean from European
influence, in this case removing the world’s largest navy from the so-called
“American lake.”544
Rapid mobilization followed. The Army swelled from 174,000 soldiers in 1940
to 1.4 million.545 The military began building munitions plants, with 375 major
projects completed by the time Congress declared war and another 320 under-
way.546 In 1945, Congress increased defense authorizations to $17 billion—nine
times the amount granted in the previous year.547
Expansion of the United States’ military intelligence infrastructure and capabili-
ties accompanied the military buildup. Roosevelt created the Office of the
Coordinator of Information to ensure that the Army and Navy exchanged informa-
tion.548 Whether this effort was successful is open to question. Nonetheless, as a
formal matter, it required that “[t]he several departments and agencies of the
government shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all and any
540. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
541. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PEACE AND WAR, supra note 462, at 483–86.
542. Message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress (Sept. 3, 1940), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 475, at 391–92.
543. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Defense (May 26, 1940) [hereinafter Franklin
D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Defense], available at http://www.mhrcc.org/fdr/chat15.html.
544. Cf. Campaign Summaries of World War 2: British and Commonwealth Navies at the Beginning and End
of World War 2, NAVAL HIST., http://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignRoyalNavy.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2012) (stating that the British Royal Navy was the largest in the world through 1940).
545. STUART, supra note 13, at 32.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 31.
548. Exec. Order No. 9182, 7 Fed. Reg. 4467 (June 13, 1942).
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such information and data relating to national security as the Coordinator, with the
approval of the President, may from time to time request.”549 Further reorganiza-
tion of military intelligence led to the creation of a separate Military Intelligence
Service, which included an Administrative Group, an Intelligence Group, a
Counterintelligence Group, and an Operations Group.550 Increasing emphasis on
signals intelligence paralleled broader efforts to disseminate and make use of
information thus obtained.551
The need to obtain more information through intelligence operations was not
limited to the overseas arena. Ideas recognized neither distance nor geopolitical
borders. “Today’s threat to our national security,” Roosevelt announced, “is not a
matter of military weapons alone. We know of (new) other methods, new methods
of attack. The Trojan Horse. The Fifth Column that betrays a nation unprepared for
treachery.”552 According to the President,
Spies, saboteurs and traitors are the actors in this new strategy. With all of these
we must and will deal vigorously. But there is an added technique for
weakening a nation at its very roots, for disrupting the entire pattern of life of a
people. And it is important that we understand it. The method is simple. It is,
first, discord, a dissemination of discord . . . . The aim . . . is to create confu-
sion of counsel, public indecision, political paralysis and eventually, a state of
panic.553
The problem, then, was not just overseas: it was inside the country as well. By
questioning national policies, foreign agents could sow seeds of discontent:
Singleness of national purpose may be undermined. Men can lose confidence
in each other, and therefore lose confidence in the efficacy of their own united
action. Faith and courage can yield to doubt and fear. The unity of the state (is)
can be so sapped that its strength is destroyed.554
This was no idle concern: for Roosevelt, foreign intrigue had been weakening
American resolve for the past two years, as agents infiltrated domestic bounds.555
549. STUART, supra note 13, at 60 (citing KERMIT ROOSEVELT, WAR REPORT OF THE O.S.S. 8 (1976)).
550. See JOHN PATRICK FINNEGAN, World War II: Military Intelligence at the Center, in MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
64 (1998); Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, NAT’L ARCHIVES (1995), available at
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/165.html (discussing effective date of the Military
Intelligence Service).
551. FINNEGAN, supra note 550, at 60–68 (dissemination); id. at 78–81 (signals intelligence).
552. President Franklin Roosevelt, Address of the President Delivered by Radio from the White House (May




555. Id.; see also STUART, supra note 13, at 31.
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a. Re-channeling of Law Enforcement to National Security
To respond to the domestic threat, Roosevelt instructed the War Department and
the Navy to coordinate intelligence gathering with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (“FBI”).556 The FBI was to be given all data, information, and material
relating either directly or indirectly to espionage, counterespionage, or sabo-
tage.557 This did not mean that the State Department’s intelligence gathering
would cease; to the contrary, in memoranda to Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
Roosevelt directed such activities to continue.558 However, it did place a priority
on the military and law enforcement agencies, with all information subsequently
forwarded to the directors of the three organizations.559
These shifts demonstrated the growing institutional dominance of national
security concerns, particularly with regard to the FBI—an organization hitherto
concentrated on personal security and criminal activity.560 Henceforward, the
Bureau would assume national security responsibilities.561
State law enforcement interests mirrored those of the federal agency.562 The
New York City Police Department, for instance, created a special sabotage squad
and planned to later expand it to 150 officers.563 Such actions, however, posed a
direct threat to the FBI’s control, raising concerns about the federal government’s
dominance in the field.564 As a result, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover convinced the
Attorney General to draft a document directing police officials to turn over to the
FBI “any information obtained pertaining to espionage, counterespionage, sabo-
tage, and neutrality regulations.”565 The President subsequently issued an Execu-
556. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS, 3 SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, pt. 3, at 403 (1976) [hereinafter S. REP. NO.
94-755] (quoting Confidential Memorandum of the President (June 26, 1939), available at http://www.aarclibrary.
org/publib/contents/church/contents_church_reports_book3.htm (“It is my desire that the investigation of all
espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the
Office of Naval Intelligence in the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a
committee to coordinate their activities.”)).
557. Id.
558. See, e.g., Draft Memorandum, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Secretary of State Cordell Hull and
Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles (Dec. 1, 1941) (directing the State Department to obtain information
about the Japanese troop movement and military preparations), http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/
pearlharbor.pdf.
559. Id.
560. See A Brief History of the FBI, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/brief-
history/brief-history (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
561. See id.
562. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 403–04.
563. Id.
564. See id. (noting Hoover’s concern that private citizens were more likely to report information concerning
sabotage to the New York City Police Department’s well-publicized special sabotage squad than to the FBI).
565. Id. at 404 (quoting Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigations, to the Att’y
Gen. (Sept. 6, 1939)). President Roosevelt continued to renew the Attorney General’s call for cooperation from
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tive Order requesting that all law enforcement officers promptly yield the relevant
information.566 Soon thereafter, Roosevelt proclaimed a national emergency “in
connection with and to the extent necessary for the proper observance, safeguard-
ing, and enforcing of the neutrality of the United States and the strengthening of
our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations.”567 He simulta-
neously issued an Executive Order expanding the number of persons assigned to
the FBI to ensure that the Bureau could perform its national security functions.568
Although Roosevelt never formally authorized either the FBI or military intelli-
gence to perform domestic intelligence investigations of subversive activities (the
written records being limited to espionage, sabotage, and violations of the
neutrality regulations), the Church Committee later found that he clearly knew
about, and informally approved, the broad subversive investigations being carried
out by the Bureau.569
Congress acquiesced to the FBI’s expanded role, considering it a necessary
response to the national emergency.570 The legislature’s attention to the matter
extended beyond formally blessing the FBI’s new mandate through appropriations.
Immigration Act amendments would have deported individuals for affiliating with
Communist groups.571 In 1939, the Supreme Court ruled that the amendments
were not retroactive572—a loophole Congress closed the following year.573 The
Smith Act made it a federal crime to advocate for the violent overthrow of the
United States government; it also outlawed encouraging military insubordina-
tion.574 Within four months, more than 4.7 million aliens had been registered under
local law enforcement during the war. See, e.g., id. at 406 (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Statement on
Police Cooperation (Jan. 8, 1943)).
566. Id. Note that although the order is referred to as an “Executive” order, it lacks the formal numbering of
executive orders and, instead, appears to be more of a public statement, which was subsequently picked up by the
press and widely reported.
567. Proclamation No. 2352, 54 Stat. 2643 (1939).
568. Exec. Order No. 8247, 4 Fed. Reg. 3864 (Sept. 12, 1939).
569. S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 405.
570. See, e.g., Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1940: Hearing on H.R. 7805 Before the
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 76th Cong. 302–307 (1939); Department of Justice Appropriation
Bill for 1941: Hearing on H.R. 8319 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 76th Cong. 151
(1940); Departments of State, Commerce, and Justice Appropriation Bill for 1941: Hearing on H.R. 8319 Before
the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 76th Cong. 75 (1941).
571. Immigration Act of 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (1918) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 137) (repealed
1952).
572. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 30 (1939) (“[W]e are not at liberty to conclude that Congress intended
that any alien, no matter how long a resident of this country, or however well disposed toward our Government,
must be deported, if at any time in the past, no matter when, or under what circumstances, or for what time, he was
a member of the described organization.”); see also Deportation of Aliens: Hearing on H.R. 4860 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Immigration, 76th Cong. 2 (1940) (discussing Supreme Court decision).
573. See Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (1940). For further discussion of
amendments to the Act reflecting national security concerns, see To Amend the Nationality Act of 1940: Hearing
on H. R. 6250 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Immigration, 77th Cong. 23 (1942).
574. See §§ 2385, 2387.
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the statute.575 The Commission on Government Security later reported: “From its
inception [the Smith Act] was intended to combat and resist the organization of
Fascist and communist groups owing allegiance to foreign governments whose
operations and activities were clearly contrary and dangerous to the Government
of the United States.”576
The fact that such a measure had been enacted outside of actual war was highly
unusual. Harvard law professor Zechariah Chaffee described the statute at the time
as incorporating “the most drastic restrictions on freedom of speech ever enacted
in the United States during peace.”577
While Chaffee was correct, the statute also reflected the evolution of U.S.
national security. Specifically, it echoed the Founding generation’s concern about
maintaining the government of the United States against attack. Roosevelt con-
sciously hearkened back to the Founding, reinforcing the priority accorded to U.S.
national security.578 On December 29, 1940, he began his weekly radio address
saying,
This is not a fireside chat on war. It is a talk on national security, because the
nub of the whole purpose of your President is to keep you now, and your
children later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the
preservation of American independence and all of the things that American
independence means to you and to me and to ours.579
He postulated that not since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock had such dangers
loomed.580 Foremost amongst Roosevelt’s concerns was the aggressive nature of
the enemy: “[T]he Axis proclaims,” Roosevelt said, “that there can be no ultimate
peace between their philosophy of government and our philosophy of govern-
ment.”581
This, then, was an even direr situation than that which confronted the Founders.
At that time, the primary aim had been to avoid entanglement in European affairs.
Now, however, unrestrained aggressor-nations sought to conquer the world.
Should America’s friends in Europe fail to contain totalitarianism—particularly
the racist and fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini—a new and terrible era
would emerge, “in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run
by threats of brute force. [And] to survive in such a world, we would have to
convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war
575. Alien Registration Act, SPARTACUS EDUC., http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAalien.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2012).
576. COMM. ON GOV’T SEC., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY 621 (1957), available at
http://www.archive.org/details/reportofcommissi1957unit.
577. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 439–41 (1941).
578. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on National Security, supra note 543, at 633.
579. Id.
580. See id.
581. Id. at 634.
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economy.”582 Even as he spoke, Roosevelt stated, spies and saboteurs had
infiltrated the domestic fabric, seeking to sow seeds of disunity.583
Congress shared the President’s concerns. Soon after Roosevelt’s address, the
Voorhis Act of 1941 required the registration of all “subversive” organizations
with foreign attachments that recommended the overthrow of the government.584
Passed with minimal debate and even less publicity, the Voorhis Act was incorpo-
rated into the Alien Registration Act of 1940.585 The Foreign Agents Registration
Act of 1938,586 in turn, grew out of the investigation of Communist and pro-Nazi
organizations by the Special House Committee on Un-American Activities, which
conducted its operations between 1935 and 1936.587
Collectively, these measures underscored the concern not only that saboteurs
had infiltrated U.S. shores, but also that American citizens with disparate political
views threatened U.S. national security—the security of the institution of federal
government and the constitutional structure safeguarded by the Union. To the
extent that a “Fifth Column,” as referenced by Attorney General Jackson in 1940
(and used by Roosevelt during his May 26, 1940 fireside chat),588 might infiltrate
the existing political structures, extraordinary steps had to be taken. Of central
importance was the collection of pure as well as preventive intelligence—the
former centered on investigations of current threats and the latter on the accumula-
tion of information for use in the event of an emergency or actual war.589
Subversive activities, investigations, and surveillance measures implemented by
the FBI have been well-documented elsewhere.590 It is not the purpose of this
Article to re-examine these accounts. For present purposes, the salient question is:
What was driving U.S. national security concerns, and what form did U.S. interests
take in terms of law and policy? It appears that what was happening at the time was
a retreat to the core national security concerns of the first epoch—protecting the
existence of the political institutions and the constitutional structure of the national
government. What made the third epoch different was the prioritization of core
national security concerns in response to political ideology, as opposed to active
582. Id. at 635.
583. Id.
584. Voorhis Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2386 (1941).
585. Alien Registration Act of 1940 (Smith Act), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387.
586. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938, 22 U.S.C. §§ 611–621.
587. See generally JOHN WILLIAM MCCORMACK, INVESTIGATION OF NAZI AND OTHER PROPAGANDA, H.R. REP.
NO. 74-153 (1935).
588. Robert H. Jackson, Our Government Is Prepared Against the Fifth Column, 29 SURVEY GRAPHIC 545
(1940), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/bibliography/our-government-is-prepared-against-
the-fifth-column/; Franklin Roosevelt, Radio Chat, supra note 552.
589. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 412–13.
590. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 249 (2008).
Targets range from Communist groups, Socialist parties, and fascist organizations, to civil rights leaders, civil
liberties organizations, nationalist movements, the women’s movement, and individuals opposed to the war effort.
See, e.g., id.; STONE, supra note 114.
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military hostility.
It could be argued that during the French Revolution, the Alien and Sedition
Acts represented a similar approach in that the country was concerned about the
transfer of European revolution within domestic bounds. To some extent, this may
have been true; but the centralization, militarization, and expansion of the national
security infrastructure in the third epoch significantly overshadowed movement in
this direction during the first era. This corresponded to the perceived threat:
ideology proved ubiquitous and intimately linked to civil society. Hoover declared
in 1940 that those advocating foreign “isms” had “succeeded in boring into every
phase of American life, masquerading behind front organizations.”591
b. The Threat of Totalitarianism
At his Third Inaugural Address, Roosevelt summarized the dominant national
security issues of the ages:
In Washington’s day the task of the people was to create and weld together a
nation. In Lincoln’s day the task of the people was to preserve that Nation from
disruption from within. In this day the task of the people is to save that Nation
and its institutions from disruption from without.592
The United States again faced an existential threat. As a result, the primary
interests of the first epoch returned. Roosevelt hearkened back to Washington’s
First Inaugural Address in 1789, explaining that democracy itself, and the
republican model of government entrusted to the United States, was in danger.593
The liberties the United States would seek would ensure the survival of the
political framework on which the country was built. Just a fortnight before his
address, Roosevelt laid out the four freedoms,
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world
founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech
and expression—everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every
person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world. The third is
freedom from want . . . —everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from
fear—which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of
armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be
591. S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 414–15 (citing J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Remarks at the Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense (Aug. 5–6, 1940)).
592. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Third Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1941), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES,
supra note 20, at 279–82.
593. Id. at 282 (quoting President George Washington, First Inaugural Address (Apr. 3, 1789) (“The
preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly
considered . . . deeply, . . . finally, staked on the experiment intrusted [sic] to the hands of the American
people.”)).
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in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—
anywhere in the world.594
The Atlantic Charter in August 1941 picked up the themes: self-determination;
free trade; improved labor standards; an end to “Nazi tyranny,” and its replacement
with world peace; freedom of navigation on the high seas; and the disarmament of
nations threatening aggression.595 These would be the aims of the allied nations.596
The United States could now count itself amongst the allied countries, for with the
Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, the country essentially became an undeclared
belligerent.597 The statute authorized the Secretary of War to manufacture arma-
ments and then sell, exchange, lease, or lend them to allies.598 Carefully calculated
to ensure U.S. national security, the statute widened the government’s commit-
ments to the allied nations.
c. The Purpose of the State
The United States prepared for war. Rapid mobilization was met by statutory
language giving the President the latitude to assist allied countries in their battle
against totalitarianism. The aggression of autocratic governments threatened the
United States. What role, then, ought the federal government perform in respond-
ing to such threats?
The answer, for Edward Pendleton Herring, was clear: the very purpose of the
federal government was to protect national security.599 In 1941, he argued that
advances in technology (i.e., airplanes) and political developments (i.e., the
expansion of totalitarianism) had converged, presenting a new and existential
threat to the United States.600 Correspondingly extreme shifts in the American
attitude towards government and society would have to follow. The United States
must now “give thought to the possibility of adapting our governmental institu-
tions to the maintenance of a powerful military force as part of the normal structure
of our society.”601 Americans would simply have to get over their aversion to a
militarized state. Even after the emergency passed, emphasis on arms would have
to continue: “[T]he Roman phalanx,” Pendleton Herring reflected, “was a neces-
sary preliminary to the Pax Romana.”602 The way to deter attack was through
594. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PEACE AND WAR, supra note 462, at 611.
595. Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 U.S.T. 1603, reprinted in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1941, at 368–69 (1958).
596. Id.
597. See Lend-Lease Act, Pub. L. No. 77-11, § 3(a), 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
598. Id.
599. See supra notes 516–521 and accompanying text.
600. PENDLETON HERRING, IMPACT OF WAR, supra note 520.
601. Id. at 2.
602. Id. at 243.
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military might.603 For the foreseeable future, the United States would have to
maintain a strong army to stave off the totalitarian threat.
Even more controversially, Pendleton Herring called for giving soldiers an
influential role in U.S. foreign policy.604 In confronting totalitarianism, moreover,
the United States would have to become more centralized and its economy
standardized.605 Arguing (unconvincingly) that no constitutional risks would
ensue, Pendleton Herring nevertheless seemed willing to accept the conse-
quences.606 He was not alone in calling for a more centralized governmental
structure to offset the threat posed by totalitarianism.607 But such calls gave rise to
concern.
Professor Harold Lasswell, a prominent sociologist at Yale Law School,
recognized that Russian communism posed a threat to U.S. national security.608
But, he warned, reaction to one danger could create another—namely, a garrison-
police state.609 Lasswell sketched the contours of such a state: declining access to
information, increasing suspicion and intolerance, declining civilian authority, and
ascendance of the military.610 Specialization shifted the emphasis “toward the
supremacy of the specialist on violence, the soldier.”611 Authority, under this
model, would become “dictatorial, governmentalized, centralized, and inte-
grated.”612
In the midst of this conversation, Pearl Harbor suddenly and violently vindi-
cated Pendleton Herring’s position.613 Aerial combat meant that the United States
could not depend upon its physical distance from other countries to protect itself.
Simultaneously, a more centralized structure might allow the country to better
coordinate its military, intelligence, and other national security functions. Profes-
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JAPAN, 1931–1941, at 793–94 (1943); see also STUART, supra note 13, at 40 (“Pearl Harbor seemed to confirm all
of the major elements of Herring’s prewar national security argument: America’s new situation geostrategic
vulnerability; the need for military preparedness before a war breaks out; the unique threat posed by dictatorships;
and the need to both expand and centralize the US government in order to remain competitive.”).
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directly attacked from a distance of nearly 4,000 miles did not just ‘sweep away
old conceptions of national security’; it established the concept of national security
as the unchallengeable standard against which all future foreign policy decisions
were to be made.”614 For Stuart, it prioritized the question of national security,
shifting the postwar debate from a fight between different approaches to the
question, to an effort to negotiate how to shape American values to its national
security interests—the latter being non-negotiable.615
Although I place more emphasis on the priority accorded national security prior
to Pearl Harbor, Stuart’s reading with regard to vindicating Pendleton Herring’s
position is correct. World War II subsequently became a testing ground for the
creation of institutions and procedures that would ensure civilian-military coopera-
tion, intelligence-gathering and dissemination, and inter-service policy coordina-
tion. The only piece of Pendleton Herring’s advocacy that dropped from the
picture was control of the economy.616 As Stuart has noted, removing constraints
on corporate entities would be preferable so long as a high level of preparedness
could be maintained—with respect to weapons, technology, and scientific ad-
vances.617 To paraphrase Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State at the time, the
United States could only afford to be wrong once.618
The creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to ensure not just civilian-
military cooperation, but inter-service coordination. The British model proved
instructive. From December 1941 to January 1942, the United States was in close
contact with the United Kingdom.619 At the Arcadia Conference, the British Chiefs
of Staff stood as a unit, offering the Prime Minister a consensus on matters of
military importance.620 In these meetings, the Royal Air Force also had a voice.621
The first meeting of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff occurred the following month; a
Chair was soon added.622 Simultaneously, the military began working with
scientists and civilians to develop new and critical technologies, with perhaps the
614. STUART, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis in original).
615. Id. at 3.
616. But see COMM. ON RECORDS OF WAR ADMIN., THE UNITED STATES AT WAR: DEVELOPMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR PROGRAM BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1946), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/
hyperwar/ATO/Admin/WarProgram/index.html; R. ELBERTON SMITH, THE ARMY AND ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION
40–45 (U.S. Army Ctr. of Military History 1991) (1959), http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/001/1-7/
CMH_Pub_1-7.pdf (discussing the War Department’s establishment of its own Industrial College, and the Army
and Navy Industrial Mobilization Plans); see also MARK SKINNER WATSON, CHIEF OF STAFF: PREWAR PLANS AND
PREPARATIONS 35 (1950) (discussing Forrestal’s consideration of the Army Navy Munitions Board as a key
element in mobilization).
617. STUART, supra note 13, at 7.
618. John Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, in 16 THE AMERICAN SECRETARIES OF STATE AND THEIR DIPLOMACY 14
(Robert H. Ferrell & Samuel F. Bemis eds., 1972).
619. STUART, supra note 13, at 52.
620. Id.
621. Id. at 53–54.
622. Id.
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most prominent example of this being the Manhattan Project.623 To encourage
better interagency cooperation on matters of intelligence, the Office of Strategic
Services, placed under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quickly grew to more than 13,000
people.624
2. Changing International Role: From Authoritarianism to Containment
Accompanying the discussion about the most appropriate domestic political,
military, and economic structures, were questions about the United States’ role in a
post-war order. Henceforward, instead of “trustees,” the United States, together
with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China, would perform global law
enforcement functions.625 The development of weapons of mass destruction also
changed the calculus: as Gaddis has observed, “The Big Four would remove from
the hands of other nations, friendly as well as hostile, all weapons more dangerous
than rifles.”626 Nuclear weapons secured for the United States a formative role in
the international environment. Sheer military might of such magnitude could
hardly be ignored.627 The question, though, was in what direction such power
would be directed. Here, it was not Pearl Harbor that was dispositive.628 Instead, it
was the thread of concern from authoritarianism that became, in the course of
World War II, increasingly focused. As Professor Hans Morgenthau, a prominent
international relations scholar at the University of Chicago, wrote in 1948, “The
modern totalitarian state has been able to fill the gap between government and
people . . . through the use of democratic symbols, totalitarian control of public
opinion, and policies actually or seemingly benefiting the people. Practically all
national energies flow into channels chosen by the government.”629 Classical
realism was on the rise, in direct response to the power plays marking the
international environment.
From authoritarianism, the United States’ concern narrowed to totalitarian
regimes, and, following the war, still more narrowly to communism. Containing its
advance became the overriding goal. The communist revolutions had been
presaged by political writings. Ideas thus became seen as the precursors to
revolutionary action. Resultantly, in the course of the third epoch, the object of
623. Id. at 58–59.
624. Id. at 63.
625. See Tom Bethell, Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for China, HOOVER INST. STAN. UNIV. (2007),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5835 (discussing when Kai-Shek became a member of
the “Big Four” Allied powers during World War II).
626. GADDIS, ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, supra note 472, at 24–25.
627. Id. at 253 (quoting President Harry S. Truman as describing nuclear weapons as “the Number One
problem of the world”).
628. Again, I disagree with both Gaddis and Stuart about the instrumental role of Pearl Harbor. While
extremely important in shaping Americans’ concept of security, the aim of the national security infrastructure was
in many senses determined in the 1930s, with World War II merely focusing the country further along the same
lines.
629. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 103 (1948).
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national security became not just limiting the military expansion of the Soviet
Union, but preventing the spread of communist and socialist political ideology.
This had both international and domestic implications.
World War II had been a battle for democracy, waged against the threat of
authoritarianism. The Tripartite Pact of 1940 drew together Adolf Hitler, Benito
Mussolini, and Emperor Hirohito.630 In a simple ceremony devoid of fanfare,
Roosevelt explained in his Fourth Inaugural Address, “We Americans of today,
together with our allies, are passing through a period of supreme test. It is a test of
our courage—of our resolve—of our wisdom—our essential democracy.”631 As
the war drew to a close, however, the threat was more than just authoritarianism.
Totalitarianism generally, and communism in particular, used mechanisms of
control to dictate social and cultural affairs.
In February 1946, George F. Kennan, the American Charge d’Affaires in
Moscow, presented his concerns in an 8000-word telegram to the U.S. Secretary of
State.632 Kennan carefully considered the Soviet Union’s post-war outlook, in light
of the country’s historical background, its animating political philosophy, the
likely course of Soviet foreign policy, and what that outlook would mean for the
United States.633 His conclusions were sobering. Russia, in Kennan’s view, would
use the post-war period to increase its power with the aim of achieving a
communist world system, coordinated and directed by Moscow.634 Russian
hostility towards the United States could not be reduced.635 The two countries’
underlying philosophies and histories lay diametrically opposed, as did the two
states’ futures.636
Kennan, writing later for a broader audience, cited the work of Marx and Lenin,
and noted the experience of the Russian Revolution:
[I]deology . . . taught [the Soviet leadership] that the outside world was hostile
and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond
their borders . . . . [P]owerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached
up to sustain them in this feeling . . . . Now it lies in the nature of the mental
world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no
630. See Treaty of Peace (Tripartite Pact), Japan-Ger.-It., Sept. 27, 1940.
631. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fourth Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1945), available at http://www.
bartleby.com/124/pres52.html.
632. See Telegram from George F. Kennan, Charge d’Affaires in Moscow, to James Byrnes, Sec’y of State
(Feb. 22, 1946) [hereinafter Long Telegram], http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/
documents/pdf/6-6.pdf (misidentifying recipient as Byrnes’s successor in office, George C. Marshall).
633. See id.
634. See id.
635. See id. (“In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there
can be no permanent modus vivendi[,] that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet
power is to be secure.”).
636. Id.
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opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or
justification whatsoever.637
Russia’s enemy was capitalism. Its quest was absolute power. And for the Soviet
Union, the Kremlin appeared infallible. “In these circumstances it is clear that the
main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of
long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tenden-
cies.”638 Domestically, the United States’ only option would be to strengthen the
health and vigor of its own society.639 Kennan explained,
World Communism is like [a] malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased
tissue. This is [the] point at which domestic and foreign politics meets. Every
courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own
society, to improve self confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of
our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow . . . .640
Professor John Lewis Gaddis has pointed to late February and early March 1946 as
a pivotal time in Soviet-American relations.641 From the Iranian crisis through the
balance of the year, “the United States made no concessions of significance to the
Soviet Union.”642 Professor Gaddis also made clear that Kennan was not alone in
his estimate of how future relations between the two countries would progress.643
The Forrestal Commission, appointed to examine Soviet foreign policy, ques-
tioned the degree to which communism had become a national religion; it
concluded that to the extent that Soviet leaders adhered to the doctrine, the two
countries’ futures lay in opposite directions.644
Stalin’s February 1946 speech did little to undermine Kennan’s analysis or to
dissuade Americans of the Soviet Union’s intent.645 In it, Stalin argued that victory
in World War II demonstrated that the Soviet approach was not only viable, but
that it was “a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social
system.”646 Victory vindicated the strength of the Soviet military.647 Stalin
considered communist advances in industry and agriculture as the key to the
637. George F. Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566, 569 (1947).
638. Id.
639. See id.
640. Long Telegram, supra note 632; see also Kennan, supra note 637, at 569 (reiterating many of the same
points).
641. See GADDIS, ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, supra note 472, at 312.
642. Id. at 316.
643. Id. at 299.
644. Id.
645. Joseph Stalin, Speech at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District (Feb. 9, 1946), in SPEECHES
DELIVERED AT MEETINGS OF VOTERS OF THE STALIN ELECTORAL DISTRICT, MOSCOW: DECEMBER 11, 1937 AND
FEBRUARY 9, 1946 (1950), available at http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html.
646. Id. at 27.
647. Id. at 28–29.
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country’s success.648 He claimed that the immediate future would witness even
greater growth, with Russian scientists outstripping “the achievements of science
beyond the borders of the country.”649 The American Administration considered
Stalin’s speech to be a declaration of war.650 Democracy and communism, Truman
concluded, could never coexist.651 The Administration went on to portray Soviet-
American relations as a clash between two irreconcilable ideologies.652
Almost immediately, the question of how to contain communism presented
itself. Greece and Turkey stood in a precarious position. Seeking assistance from
Congress, Truman explained:
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread
and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth
when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope
alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their
freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the
world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.653
To what lengths was the United States willing to go to prevent communist ideology
from taking hold? For Truman, failure to provide funding to the governments in
the Mediterranean could lead to the collapse of pro-Western governments through-
out Europe.654
From that moment, U.S. national security depended on strengthening demo-
cratic regimes abroad—a theme that continues today in the fourth epoch. If these
states fell to the opposing ideology, the United States’ interests would be signifi-
cantly harmed. In this manner, global containment of the expansion of communist
ideology became intimately tied to U.S. national security—itself the most impor-
tant priority for the United States.
3. Institutional Questions and the National Security Act of 1947
To counter the growing communist threat, two sets of institutional issues
confronted the United States: first, what to do about the armed services (in terms of
unification and civil/military control); and second, what reforms were necessary to
improve interagency communication, to strengthen presidential management of
648. Id. at 21–38.
649. Id. at 39–42.
650. GADDIS, ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR, supra note 472, at 300.
651. Id.
652. See id. at 317 (arguing that this approach ended up locking the United States into a pattern of response,
limiting successive administrations’ ability to be flexible with regard to the Soviet Union).
653. President Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine
(Mar. 12, 1945), in 1947 PUB. PAPERS 176, 180, available at http://quod.lib.umihc.edu/p/ppotus/4728447.1947.001/
216?rgn"full#text;view"image.
654. Cf. id. (“[W]e may endanger the peace of the world . . . .”).
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resources, and to ensure a more efficient national security bureaucracy.655 Much of
the public’s attention at the time was on the former question.656 But the second
issue proved equally important in cementing the dominance of national security
during the third epoch. For both issues, the National Security Act of 1947 (“1947
Act”) proved pivotal.
a. National Military Establishment
In enacting the 1947 Act, Congress sought:
To promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a
National Military Establishment; for a Department of the Army, a Department
of the Navy, and a Department of the Air Force; and for the coordination of the
activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and
agencies of the Government concerned with national security.657
The first question presented with regard to the organization of the armed forces
centered on unification.
On December 19, 1945, President Truman released a special message to
Congress recommending the establishment of a Department of National Defense,
within which ground, sea, and air forces would be combined under a single civilian
Secretary of National Defense.658 “We would be taking a grave risk with the
national security,” Truman stated, “if we did not move now to overcome perma-
nently the present imperfections in our defense organization.”659 While unified
command had been important in World War II, it was now imperative:
The boundaries that once separated the Army’s battlefield from the Navy’s
battlefield have been virtually erased. If there is ever going to be another global
conflict, it is sure to take place simultaneously on land and sea and in the air,
with weapons of ever greater speed and range. Our combat forces must work
together in one team as they have never been required to work together in the
past.660
655. STUART, supra note 13, at 73–74; see also Letter from James Forrestal to F. Eberstadt (June 19, 1945), in
S. COMM. ON NAVAL AFF., REPORT TO HON. JAMES FORRESTAL, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, ON UNIFICATION OF THE
WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS AND POSTWAR ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 1 (1945).
656. See, e.g., President Harry Truman, Special Message to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of
a Department of National Defense (Dec. 19, 1945) [hereinafter Truman, Recommending the Establishment of
Department of Defense], in 1945 PUB. PAPERS 546, 546–560, available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotus/
4728442.1945.001/586?rgn"full#text;view"image; Letter from James Forrestal to F. Eberstadt, supra note 655;
Editorial, Nimitz v. Eisenhower, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1945, at 8.
657. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
658. Truman, Recommending the Establishment of Department of Defense, supra note 656, at 546–60.
659. Id.
660. Id.
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In addition to the creation of a single defense department, Truman planned for a
Chief of Staff to work with the military commanders of the three coordinate
branches in order to advise the Secretary of National Defense, as well as the
President, on the most appropriate courses of action.661 This drive for a single
Chief of Staff unsettled the Navy and the Marine Corp and was later abandoned in
the Forrestal-Patterson compromise that structured the 1947 Act.662
Truman’s proposal reflected a concurrent conversation across the Atlantic;
similar questions had beset the United Kingdom since the end of World War I. In
1923, Britain rejected the formation of a united Ministry of Defense, in favor of a
Chiefs of Staff Committee, which would coordinate between the services.663
Gradually, however, Britain had progressed towards the creation of one depart-
ment: In 1936, the United Kingdom created a Minister for the Coordination of
Defense—a position initially without a department.664 The heads of the three
services (the First Lord of the Admiralty for the Royal Navy, the Secretary of State
for War for the Army, and the Secretary of State for Air for the Royal Air Force)
remained part of the Cabinet.665 Upon coming to power, Sir Winston Churchill
eliminated the Minister for the Coordination of Defence, creating instead the
Minister of Defence, whose job was to coordinate defense efforts and to oversee
the Chiefs of Staff Committee.666 Churchill himself held the post of Minister of
Defence coincident with Prime Minister (a tradition continued by Clement Attlee
when he became Prime Minister in July 1945).667
Following World War II, Britain, like the United States, struggled with how best
to organize its military. In 1946, the government circulated a “White Paper” that
rejected unification, stating, “Amalgamation [of land, sea, and air] . . . is a step
which could not and should not be taken here and now.”668 Nevertheless, the White
661. Id. (“There should be three coordinated branches of the Department of National Defense: one for the land
forces, one for the naval forces, and one for the air forces, each under an Assistant Secretary. The Navy should, of
course, retain its own carrier, ship, and water-based aviation, which has proved so necessary for efficient fleet
operation. And, of course, the Marine Corps should be continued as an integral part of the Navy.”).
662. STUART, supra note 13, at 96–126.
663. CORELLI BARNETT, BRITAIN AND HER ARMY, 1509–1970, at 362 (1970).
664. Resultantly, Thomas Inskip, the first to hold this post, was placed in an almost impossible position
vis-a`-vis the Services. For thoughtful discussion of these dynamics, see Sean Greenwood, Sir Thomas Inskip as
Minister for the Coordination of Defence, 1936–39, in GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES IN BRITAIN,
1856–1990, at 155–90 (Paul Smith ed., 1996).
665. Id.
666. Alex Danchev, Waltzing with Winston: Civil-Military Relations in the Second World War, in id. at
191–216.
667. Id. at 199 (quoting Churchill, “The key-change which occurred on my taking over was of course the
supervision and direction of the Chiefs of Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence with undefined powers. As
this Minister was also the Prime Minister, he had all the rights inherent in that office . . .”) (citation omitted);
JERRY HARDMAN BROOKSHIRE, CLEMENT ATTLEE 189 (1995) (“Upon becoming Prime Minister, [Attlee] also
assumed Churchill’s position as Minister of Defence, presiding over the Chiefs of Staff committee and the
Defence committee.”).
668. STUART, supra note 13, at 99.
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Paper called for the creation of a new Ministry of Defence (“MOD”) with “both the
time and the authority to formulate and apply a unified defence policy for the three
Services.”669 MOD would undertake three primary functions: it would determine
the allotment of the available resources between the three services; it would settle
questions of general administration on which a common policy for the three
services was required; and it would administer inter-service organizations, such as
the Combined Operations Headquarters and the Joint Intelligence Bureau.670
These recommendations quickly became law, leading to the formal establishment
of MOD in January 1947.671 The three existing service ministers, who remained in
direct control of ground, sea, and air services, ceased attending cabinet meet-
ings.672 Over time, the role of the Minister of Defence expanded.673 Finally, in
1963, the government proposed a unified MOD, with complete authority and
responsibility for the armed forces vested in one Secretary of State.674 As of April
1, 1964, a Secretary of State for Defence replaced the prior Cabinet position, with
responsibility over a new, united Ministry of Defence.675
The United Kingdom had emerged from World War II as the United States’
strongest ally in Europe. America thus paid attention to its military reorganization.
But there were other motives for doing so. The United States had moved into a
position of global prominence whence it could address the threat of commu-
nism.676 Its military structures, however, appeared inadequate for the challenges
ahead. It was a tenuous time, with high stakes. And national security had become
the most important consideration in U.S. policy. The services began fighting for
their institutional independence.677
The National Security Act of 1947 provided a solution to the competing
inter-service tensions.678 The Act created the Department of the Air Force, and
merged it, along with the Department of War and the Department of the Navy, into
669. Id.
670. Id.
671. See Records of the Ministry of Defence, Admin History, 1808–2011, U.K. NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.
nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/DisplayCatalogueDetails.asp?CATID"76&CATLN"1&FullDetails"




675. See id.; see also GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES IN BRITAIN, 1856–1990, supra note 664; DAVID
BUTLER & GARETH BUTLER, TWENTIETH CENTURY BRITISH POLITICAL FACTS 1900–2000 (8th ed. 2000).
676. It was clear that the country had a strong military: in addition to helping to win World War II, the United
States possessed nuclear weapons. See Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (discussing the
United States’ early monopoly on nuclear weaponry).
677. For detailed accounts of the inter-service tensions, see generally GADDIS, ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR,
supra note 472; STUART, supra note 13.
678. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
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a National Military Establishment (“NME”).679 The Secretary of Defense, like the
United Kingdom’s Minister of Defence, would provide the general direction for
the departments of the Army, Navy, and (newly formed) Air Force.680 As the
President’s principal assistant in matters relating to national security, the Secretary
of Defense would be responsible for supervising and coordinating budget esti-
mates for the departments and agencies comprising the NME, as well as minimiz-
ing duplication between the services.681
The second issue in the realm of the armed forces related to civil-military
control. On the one hand, there was concern that the military’s role in policymak-
ing would be too large.682 On the other hand, it seemed important to integrate those
in direct command of the military into the decision-making structures.683 The
solution came in the form of introducing a (civilian) Secretary of Defense, and
placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a statutory basis.684 The legislation provided
them with the authority to prepare strategic plans, provide strategic direction,
establish unified commands where required, and give military advice to the
President and to the Secretary of Defense.685 The NME underwent significant
changes in 1949 and 1958 via statutory amendments, with further revisions in the
interim period through Reorganization Plan No. 6.686 In 1949, the agency became
the Department of Defense.687
Importantly, many of the structures adopted during this time tended to restrict
the influence of the Department of State. Diplomacy became sidelined. The third
epoch is thus distinguished by an increasing militarization of U.S. national security
policy. The creation of the NME is one example of the priority accorded to military
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686. See National Security Act Amendments of 1949, ch. 412, 63 Stat. 578 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 408, 412) (renaming the NME the Department of Defense; adding a Deputy Secretary and the Chair of the
Joint Chiefs, and converting the special assistants to the title Assistant Secretary of Defense); Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-599, 72 Stat. 514 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 716)
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new Director of Defense Research and Engineering); REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 6 OF 1953 (abolishing the
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687. See National Security Act Amendments of 1949, ch. 412, 63 Stat. 578.
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In 1944, Secretary of War Stimson proposed the formation of the SWNCC.688
With Secretary of State Cordell Hull ill at the time, however, plans for the SWNCC
were put on hold.689 Hull’s replacement as acting Secretary of State, Edward
Stettinius, Jr., subsequently demanded that the Secretary of State be given greater
access to the White House.690 Roosevelt agreed to the presence of a State
Department liaison between the President and the President’s Chief of Staff.691 In
return, Stettinius agreed to the creation of the SWNCC.692 Despite the concession
of giving the State Department a direct line to the White House, the SWNCC itself
institutionalized military authority at the highest policymaking levels of govern-
ment.693 It also was weighted towards military interests, with the armed forces
obtaining two of the crucial three votes on all matters henceforward considered.694
Another example of the sidelining of the State Department and, with it, an
emphasis on diplomatic and foreign relations in favor of a military-driven national
security policy, can be found in the institutional arrangements related to the
National Security Council (“NSC”).
b. Coordination for National Security: The NSC and CIA
The Truman Administration faced numerous institutional challenges in the wake
of World War II. Issues associated with military organization have already been
discussed. Equally important for U.S. national security were questions that
concerned how to obtain, analyze, and disseminate information related to the
communist threat. Just as with the momentum created by the founding of the
NME, the sections of the 1947 Act focused on the NSC, the Central Intelligence
Agency (“CIA”), and other institutions, underscored the priority accorded to
national security.695
688. Letter from Henry L. Stimson and James Forrestal, U.S. Sec’ys of War and Navy, to Edward R. Stettinius,
U.S. Sec’y of State (Dec. 1, 1944), in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, at
1466–70 (1966), available at http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type"turn&id"FRUS.
FRUS1944v01&entity"FRUS.FRUS1944v01.p1482&isize"text.
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694. See ALAN F. CIAMPORCERO, THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND THE BEGINNING OF THE
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695. The 1947 National Security Act also created the National Security Resources Board, the Munitions
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Under the 1947 Act, the President would chair a new NSC.696 The Truman
Administration expressed concern that the NSC would become a second cabi-
net.697 The original bill supported this concern: under it, the function of the NSC
would have been “to integrate foreign and military policies.”698 The final statute
adopted a watered-down approach, stating that the purpose of the NSC was merely
“to advise the President with respect to the integration of foreign and military
policies” related to national security in order to achieve greater interagency
cooperation.699
The membership of the NSC reflected the priority given to the military in the
national security infrastructure. The organization would consist of the President,
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the
Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chair of the National
Security Resources Board (a creature of the NME), and such other officers as
designated by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.700 The State
Department thus represented only one vote in a sea awash with military interests.
As a substantive matter, emphasis was placed on military solutions to questions
of national security. The NSC, in addition to performing such functions as the
President might direct, would assess and appraise the objectives, commitments,
and risks of the United States in relation to the country’s actual and potential
military power, in the interest of national security, and consider policies on matters
of common interest to national security departments and agencies.701
Along with the NSC, the 1947 Act also created the CIA. Calls for such an
institution stemmed from the country’s experiences in World War II. Pearl Harbor
had caught the country by surprise. Truman later reflected,
I have often thought that if there had been something like co-ordination of
information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not
impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor . . . .
The war taught us this lesson—that we have to collect intelligence in a manner
that would make the information available where it was needed and when it
was wanted, in an intelligent and understandable form.702
696. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
697. See IVO H. DAALDER & I.M. DESTLER, IN THE SHADOW OF THE OVAL OFFICE 4 (2009).
698. STUART, supra note 13, at 130.
699. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
700. Id.
701. Id.; see also Office of the Historian, History of the National Security Council, 1947–1997, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ST. (Aug. 1997) [hereinafter Office of the Historian, History of the National Security Council,
1947–1997], http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm. The legislation envisioned a staff headed by a
civilian executive secretary. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at
50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006)). There was no provision made, at the outset, for a national security adviser. See id.
702. HARRY S. TRUMAN, 2 MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 56 (1965), quoted in
STUART, supra note 13, at 132.
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The 1947 Act established the CIA with a Director of Central Intelligence (“DCI”)
as its head.703 It was a political appointment, requiring the advice and consent of
the Senate, and its status would be civilian in character: any member of the armed
services would be removed from the direct supervision and control of the military
for the duration of his or her service as DCI.704 The CIA would coordinate,
correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence. Furthermore, it would hencefor-
ward be required to advise the NSC on intelligence activities relating to U.S.
national security.705
The statute did not explicitly make accommodation for the CIA to conduct
clandestine operations, nor did it directly address counterespionage.706 The Act
did, however, require the CIA “to perform such other functions and duties related
to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may
from time to time direct.”707 Such functions and duties had a limit: the statute
explicitly deprived the CIA of all police, subpoena, law enforcement, and internal
security functions.708 Perhaps because of these limitations, it was not until 1976
that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was even formed.709
Truman initially kept the NSC at arm’s length. He objected to Congress
directing the executive branch on matters involving national security.710 After
attending the first meeting of the NSC on September 26, 1947, Truman attended
only ten of the next fifty-five meetings.711 Truman’s decision to delegate his
authority to the State Department helped to stave off efforts by Secretary of
Defense Forrestal to gain control of the Council.712 It also, initially, gave the State
Department more influence in an organization heavily weighted towards the
military.
The NSC quickly took on the role of defining U.S. national security threats. NSC
703. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
704. Id.
705. Id. at § 102(d)(1).
706. See id.
707. Id. at § 102(e).
708. Id. at § 102(d)(3).
709. The purpose of the Senate Select Committee, created in 1976, was to “oversee and make continuing
studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Government,” to “submit to the Senate
appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and
programs,” and to “provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to
assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Overview of the
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence: Responsibilities and Activities, S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, http://
intelligence.senate.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). It grew directly from the Church Hearings and
concerns about the lack of oversight over intelligence agencies. Id.
710. Office of the Historian, History of the National Security Council, 1947–1997, supra note 701, at 4.
711. Id.
712. Id.
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20/4, issued in November 1948, described the nature of the Soviet threat.713 This
document became the basic statement of the country’s primary national security
concern: “The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the
foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the
U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet system.”714 Just as containment of the
U.S.S.R. presented the overriding national security goal for the United States, the
destruction of Western Europe appeared to be the Soviet Union’s top priority—one
the United States vowed to disrupt.715 NSC 20/4 cited the continuing danger of war
at any time—both military and political warfare.716 It warned against lapsing into
an isolationist foreign policy, which would result in a loss of allies and influ-
ence.717 The United States would have to focus on reducing the power and
influence of the Soviet Union to a point where it would no longer constitute a threat
to countries’ international independence. This objective resonated with the goals of
U.S. national security in the first epoch—ensuring for the United States interna-
tional independence. To accomplish its broader aim, the country would have to
maintain a high level of military readiness, ensure internal security against
sabotage, subversion, and espionage, and “[k]eep the U.S. public fully informed
and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to
support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.”718 In other words,
national security would have to be an overriding priority, with the government’s
articulation accepted—not questioned—by the population. The goal would be the
containment of communist Russia.
In his January 1949 Inaugural Address, Truman highlighted the priority of
national security concerns:
Each period of our national history has had its special challenges. Those that
confront us now are as momentous as any in the past. Today marks the
beginning not only of a new administration, but of a period that will be
eventful, perhaps decisive, for us and for the world.719
713. NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, DIRECTIVE 20/4: U.S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO THE USSR TO COUNTER SOVIET
THREATS TO U.S. SECURITY, in 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 663–69 (1948) [hereinafter NSC 20/4],
available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar/nsc20-4.htm.
714. Id.
715. Id. (“Communist ideology and Soviet behavior clearly demonstrate that the ultimate objective of the
leaders of the USSR is the domination of the world. Soviet leaders hold that the Soviet communist party is the
militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise to political power, and that the USSR, base of the world
communist movement, will not be safe until the non-communist nations have been so reduced in strength and
numbers that communist influence is dominant throughout the world. The immediate goal of top priority since the
recent war has been the political conquest of western Europe. The resistance of the United States is recognized by
the USSR as a major obstacle to the attainment of these goals.”).
716. See id.
717. See id.
718. Id. at 21.
719. President Harry Truman, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1949) [hereinafter Truman, Inaugural Address], in
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 286.
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Communism, Truman continued, “adheres to a false philosophy which purports to
offer freedom, security, and greater opportunity to mankind. Misled by this
philosophy, many peoples have sacrificed their liberties only to learn to their
sorrow that deceit and mockery, poverty and tyranny, are their reward.”720 Truman
dwelled on the battle that marked this age—the battle between communism and
democracy:
Communism is based on the belief that man is so weak and inadequate that he
is unable to govern himself, and therefore requires the rule of strong masters.
Democracy is based on the conviction that man has the moral and intellectual
capacity, as well as the inalienable right, to govern himself with reason and
justice.
Communism subjects the individual to arrest without lawful cause, punish-
ment without trial, and forced labor as the chattel of the state. It decrees what
information he shall receive, what art he shall produce, what leaders he shall
follow, and what thoughts he shall think.
Democracy maintains that government is established for the benefit of the
individual, and is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights of the
individual and his freedom in the exercise of his abilities.721
Consistent with the Founding era, protecting the constitutional order of the country
lay at the heart of U.S. national security interests. The third epoch, however, was in
full swing. The United States would not only protect its own political order, but
would also take responsibility for the entire “free world”:
We are moving on with other nations to build an even stronger structure of
international order and justice. We shall have as our partners countries which,
no longer solely concerned with the problem of national survival, are now
working to improve the standards of living of all their people. We are ready to
undertake new projects to strengthen the free world.722
In this articulation, the seeds of the current, fourth epoch, were sown. The
responsibility to fight for the free world rested with the United States.723 In this
battle between good and bad, in the effort to contain communism, the United
States must play its role—one consistent with both U.S. interests and the right. The
United Nations would play a key role in strengthening “freedom-loving nations






2011] THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1681
his address.725
4. Bureaucratic Evolution
Soviet influence immediately began to expand. In February 1948, communists
took power in Czechoslovakia.726 Within a short time, Hungary became a Soviet
republic.727 In mid-1948, the first Berlin crisis began.728 By 1949, these worldwide
events had further catapulted the institutional conversation forward. Concerted
efforts focused on what structures would be most appropriate for countering the
threat. The NSC, for instance, created the Intelligence Survey Group (“ISG”) to
consider the CIA’s relationship with other agencies.729 Chaired by Allen W. Dulles,
the ISG issued a report, which made fifty-six recommendations, many of which
excoriated the DCI and CIA.730 The report called for greater coordination between
the CIA and FBI.731 It recommended greater continuity of service.732 The report
also suggested that covert operations and clandestine intelligence-gathering be
combined into one organization within the CIA.733 Although the recommendations
were not immediately implemented, in 1952, the report became the framework for
a major overhaul of the CIA.734
In a separate effort, the so-called “Eberstadt Report,” prepared at the behest of
the first Hoover Commission, similarly addressed the national security infrastruc-
ture.735 It focused on continued tensions between the CIA, the military, and the
State Department, as well as the lack of cooperation within the intelligence
725. See id.
726. ROBIN H.E. SHEPHERD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE VELVET REVOLUTION AND BEYOND 22 (2000).
727. 1948 Selected Events, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW, STAN. UNIV., http://www-cdr.
stanford.edu/petrie/1948.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
728. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE BERLIN CRISIS: A REPORT ON THE MOSCOW DISCUSSIONS 1 (1948), available at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/berlin_airlift/large/moscowtalk/bal32-9.htm (“On
March 30, 1948, . . . the Soviet Deputy Military Governor, General Dratvin, stated in a letter to the United States
Military Government that supplementary provisions regarding communications between the Soviet and US zones
of occupation in Germany would go into effect on April 1, 1948.”). Provisions drafted by the Soviet government
included limitations on movement between the Western and Soviet zones of Berlin. See id.
729. STUART, supra note 13, at 261.
730. See INTELLIGENCE SURVEY GRP., THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
INTELLIGENCE: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (1949) [hereinafter Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report];
see also Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, 1949, in THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS
134–42 (William M. Leary ed., 1984) [hereinafter HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS] (declassified version of the report,
with some information still not available).
731. Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, supra note 730; see also RICHARD A. BEST, PROPOSALS FOR INTELLIGENCE
REORGANIZATION, 1949–2004, at 6 (2004), http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32500.pdf.
732. See Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, supra note 730.
733. BEST, supra note 731, at 7.
734. HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS, supra note 730, at 5.
735. See generally THE COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXEC. BRANCH OF THE GOV’T, TASK FORCE REPORT ON
NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION (1949) [hereinafter Eberstadt Report]. Note that the Commission on Organiza-
tion of the Executive Branch of the Government (alternatively known as the First Hoover Commission), was
established pursuant to the Lodge-Brown Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-162.
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community.736 Eberstadt, arguing for a more prominent role for the CIA,737 called
for the integration of covert operations into one office within the CIA, subservient
to the NSC.738 During war, oversight would transfer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.739
The evolution of institutional structures extended beyond the domestic realm
and into international military and economic structures. Soviet armies stationed in
Central and Eastern Europe prompted the United States and eleven other countries
to sign the North Atlantic Treaty.740 The first Secretary General of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), Lord Ismay, famously remarked that the
goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.”741
In addition to military preparedness, the United States looked to provide economic
assistance in the form of aid to countries on the brink of economic ruin.742 The
concern was that communism would find root in the socio-economic abyss if the
United States did not respond. The European Recovery Program extended from
July 1948 to June 1951, in the course of which the United States poured some $13
billion into Europe.743
In support of a stronger international role, the NSC almost immediately began
looking at ways to develop its covert-action capabilities. NSC 4, and its supple-
ment, NSC 4-A, stated that the U.S.S.R. was conducting an intensive propaganda
campaign against the United States by way of coordinated psychological, political,
and economic measures designed to undermine non-communist elements in
countries around the world.744 The alleged goal was to weaken and divide world
opinion to prevent any effective opposition to Soviet aims. “The present world
situation,” NSC 4 concluded, “requires the immediate strengthening and coordina-
tion of all foreign information measures of the U.S. Government designed to
influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of
its objectives and to counteract effects of anti-US propaganda.”745 The Council
736. Id.
737. ARTHUR B. DARLING, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT, TO 1950, at
293 (1990).
738. See Eberstadt Report, supra note 735.
739. Id. at 8.
740. See Responding to Change: Alliance Origins, WHAT IS NATO: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TRANSATLANTIC
ALLIANCE 11 (2011), http://www.nato.int/welcome/brochure_WhatIsNATO_en.pdf (“In 1949, when ideological
clashes between East and West were gaining momentum, ten Western European states, the United States and
Canada signed the North Atlantic Treaty.”).
741. DAVID JAMES SMITH, THE BALTIC STATES: ESTONIA, LATVIA AND LITHUANIA 145 (2002).
742. See, e.g., HADLEY ARKES, BUREAUCRACY, THE MARSHALL PLAN, AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (1972).
743. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-472; see also ARKES, supra note 742. The New York
Times later credited the Czechoslovak coup as “a major, perhaps a decisive, factor in the Congressional
acceptance of the European Recovery Program.” James Reston, Soviet Atom News Held Aid to Truman in Pushing
Aims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1949, at 3.
744. See NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, DIRECTIVE 4: COORDINATION OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEASURES (1947)
[hereinafter NSC 4]; NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, DIRECTIVE 4-A: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (1947) [hereinafter NSC
4-A].
745. NSC 4, supra note 744.
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thereafter assigned psychological operations to the CIA.746
The State Department, concerned about its diminishing role and the potential
that the military would create a second covert action office, pushed for a bright line
rule on not just psychological operations, but on covert action more broadly. In
June 1948, a new directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A, granting the DCI
control over all covert action, including, but not limited to psychological opera-
tions.747 It defined such activities as those:
conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or
groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so
planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not
evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government
can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.748
The directive envisioned a broad range of activities:
[P]ropaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile
states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas
and refugee liberations groups, and support of indigenous anti-[C]ommunist
elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not
include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-
espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.749
The domestic bureaucracy had to adjust to meet the threat posed, specifically, by
communist Russia.
The problem with the new powers assumed by the NSC and granted to the CIA,
however, was that they were not limited to the former Soviet Union.750 To the
contrary, they were blanket grants of authority. In part, this reflected the global
nature of the threat: communism presented the potential for worldwide Soviet
domination. Therefore, all countries could be legitimate theatres for U.S. opera-
tions. At the same time, the expanded powers could be used for means other than
fighting communism. This helped to pave the way for the attachment of a broad
range of interests in the fourth epoch.
Despite these institutional changes, rapidly evolving events continued to chal-
lenge the sufficiency of U.S. organizational structure. Specifically, in August of
746. See id.
747. See NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, DIRECTIVE ON OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS (1948) [hereinafter NSC 10/2],
available at http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html.
748. Id.
749. Id.; see also CIA COLD WAR RECORDS: THE CIA UNDER HARRY TRUMAN 213–16 (Michael Warner ed.,
1994) [hereinafter CIA COLD WAR RECORDS] (quoting NSC 10/2 in full). Although undated, this directive was
approved by the National Security Council at its June 17 meeting and the final text, incorporating changes made at
the meeting, was circulated to members by the Executive Secretary under a June 18 note. See id.
750. See NSC 10/2, supra note 747; CIA COLD WAR RECORDS, supra note 749.
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1949, the U.S.S.R. unexpectedly detonated its first atomic bomb.751 Since October
1946, intelligence analysts at the CIA’s Office of Reports and Estimates had
assumed that the Soviet Union would not develop a nuclear weapon until
sometime between 1950 and 1953, with stockpiles not developed until 1956.752
Although the document stating this conclusion, ORE 3/1, noted that “[a]ny report
of this nature is at best educated guesswork,” it cited the Soviet Union’s low
industrial potential and limited technological advancement (particularly with
regard to precision instruments and electronic controls) to support its claim that the
U.S.S.R. would be unable to develop ground-to-ground guided missiles over the
next decade.753 This estimate persisted without major changes until “Joe-1” (the
U.S. code name for the first Soviet nuclear test) occurred.754
The shock of the test reverberated across the American spectrum, driving public
discourse as well as decisions at the highest levels of government.755 The news
became public on September 23, 1949, when Truman announced to the country
that the Soviet Union had successfully carried out an atomic explosion.756 Three
days later, the New York Times reported that the incident was “already affecting the
political atmosphere” in the United States “very much as the communist coup in
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of Berlin affected it in 1948.”757 Public
fear skyrocketed.758 Deep within the executive branch, new initiatives followed:
The President, for instance, issued a directive requesting that the Secretary of State
and Secretary of Defense “undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace
751. DAVID HOLLOWAY, STALIN AND THE BOMB: THE SOVIET UNION AND ATOMIC ENERGY, 1939–1956, at 266–67
(1994) (noting that the design of the device also closely mimicked that of the United States’ plutonium weapon);
see CENT. INTELLIGENCE GRP., SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT (ORE 3/1) 1 (1946), www.foia.cia.gov/docs/DOC_0000256604/DOC_0000256604.pdf.
752. See HOLLOWAY, supra note 751.
753. Id.
754. Donald P. Steury, How the CIA Missed Stalin’s Bomb: Dissecting Soviet Analysis, 1946–1950, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (June 26, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/vol49no1/html_files/stalins_bomb_3.html.
755. See, e.g., id. (citing CIA historian Woodrow J. Kuhns’ conclusion that the CIA’s Office of Reports and
Estimates helped “calm” Western nerves “in those early, fearful years of the Cold War”); The American
Experience: Race for the Superbomb (PBS television broadcast Jan. 11, 1999).
756. Statement by President Truman, Sept. 23, 1949, DEP’T ST. BULL., Oct. 3, 1949, at 487, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad244.asp (“We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic
explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.”).
757. Reston, supra note 743. The paper prophesied: “[W]hatever the eventual military significance of Russia’s
progress in the field of atomic energy, the political significance of that progress is already evident. It will create
vast new problems overseas for the United States Government.” Id.
758. See Living Under a Mushroom Cloud: Fear and Hope in the Atomic Age, Atomic Fiction, THE WIS. HIST.
MUSEUM, http://www.wisconsinhistory.org/museum/atomic/fear.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2012). Immediately, an
incessant stream of films began depicting the horrors that would ensue from Soviet atomic power: THE RED
MENACE (1949); I WAS A COMMUNIST FOR THE FBI (1951); 1000 YEARS FROM NOW (1952); INVASION USA (1952);
THE THIEF (1952); MY SON JOHN (1952); THE BEAST FROM 20,000 FATHOMS (1953); KISS ME DEADLY (1955); and
THE DAY THE WORLD ENDED (1956). Id.
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and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of
the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability
of the Soviet Union.”759
The Soviet detonation of the bomb, however, was not the only shock that
autumn. On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong, leader of the Communist Party in
China, prevailed against the Nationalists and assumed control of the country.760
The West reeled: the Soviet Union now had a powerful ally in the East, potentially
freeing the U.S.S.R. to pursue its designs in Europe.
Within six months of the fall of China, the NSC adopted NSC 68, which became
a blueprint for the Cold War.761 This document further cemented national security
as the overriding national interest. “[T]he Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants
to hegemony,” the document reported, “is animated by a new fanatic faith,
anti-thetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of
the world.”762 The development of weapons of mass destruction meant that “every
individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict
enter the phase of total war.”763 NSC 68 hearkened back to the first epoch in U.S.
national security:
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to
the Constitution: “ . . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” In
essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our
free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.764
U.S. national security was, precisely the protection of such aims. The absolutism
of the Soviet system threatened U.S. interests: The U.S.S.R.’s aim was to subvert
and to destroy non-communist states, replacing them with communist regimes.765
As the one country that could marshal the resources to counter Russian designs, the
759. An excerpt of the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950, which led to the creation of NSC 68, was
included in NSC 68. See NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, DIRECTIVE 68: UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND PROGRAMS FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY (1950) [hereinafter NSC 68], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.
760. A Day that Shook the World: Mao’s Communists Take Over in China, THE INDEP. (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/history/a-day-that-shook-the-world-maos-communists-take-over-in-
china-2234547.html.




765. See id. (“The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union . . . is to retain and solidify their
absolute power . . . . The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the
machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement
by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin.”).
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United States was the Soviet Union’s number-one enemy.766
NSC 68 considered the underlying philosophical conflict between the two
countries. Different concepts of freedom and government marked the two re-
gions.767 In peace and in war, the Soviet Union challenged the United States. The
country would therefore have to make responding to the threat its top priority.768 It
would be a total war, with all focus placed on preventing the Kremlin from
advancing its designs and limiting the spread of communism.769 Political, psycho-
logical, economic, and military action would be required to contain the Soviet
Union. This meant blocking further expansion of Soviet power, exposing the
falsities of Soviet pretentions, inducing a retraction of the Kremlin’s control and
influence, and fostering the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system to where
the Kremlin must modify its behavior.770
NSC 68 outlined sweeping changes in resource allocation, institutional struc-
tures, and foreign and domestic policy.771 There would have to be a substantial
increase in military expenditures, an increase in economic assistance for other
countries, intensification of political and psychological warfare, the development
of internal security and civilian defense programs, and the expansion of the United
States’ intelligence activities.772 It would not be enough, however, merely to
increase the national security infrastructure—there would have to be a correspond-
ing reduction of federal expenditures for purposes other than defense and foreign
assistance.773
In short, national security would have to be the overriding aim of the govern-
ment. Other programs would become subservient to the country’s national security
interests.774 To pay for this initiative, taxes would have to be increased.775 Such
would be the price of peace. “The gravest threat to the security of the United States
within the foreseeable future,” the document concluded, “stems from the hostile
designs and formidable power of the U.S.S.R., and from the nature of the Soviet
system.”776
766. See id. (“The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of
opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or
destroyed . . . .”).
767. See id.
768. See id. (“[T]he Kremlin’s challenge to the United States . . . encompasses both peace and war and our
objectives in peace and war must take account of it.”).
769. See id. (“The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this
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5. The Soviet Threat and the Domestic Realm
As national security ascended in importance, other interests became subordi-
nate. Questions related to economic security and public health, for instance,
quickly became seen through a national security lens. Thus, in November 1945,
even as Truman elaborated upon a proposed “Economic Bill of Rights,” which
contained “[t]he right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and
enjoy good health,” he justified the establishment of a national health care system
in terms of national security.777 He cited the medical examinations conducted by
the Selective Service System during World War II.778 As of April 1, 1945,
approximately five million male registrants for service had been turned away for
health reasons.779 Another 1.5 million men had been discharged from the Army
and Navy for physical or mental disability—exclusive of injuries sustained in
combat—and an equal number had needed to be treated in the armed forces for
diseases that pre-existed entry into the military.780 “Among the young women who
applied for admission to the Women’s Army Corps,” Truman reported, “there was
similar disability. Over one-third of those examined were rejected for physical or
mental reasons.”781 The poor state of health care in the United States was
impacting the country directly where it most mattered: in the military services.
Public health was not the only sphere to become subservient to national security
interests. Law enforcement also took on a new role. Here, the perception of Soviet
design as including domestic political subversion stimulated the growth of new
institutions, programs, and authorities within the United States. Social and eco-
nomic concerns were not just sidelined; they themselves became seen as part of the
threat, to be countered with the most extreme measures possible. The existence of
the country depended upon it. The FBI presents perhaps the best example of how
the domestic fabric changed.
a. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
As early as 1946, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover informed U.S. Attorney General
Tom C. Clark that the Bureau “found it necessary to intensify its investigation of
Communist Party activities and Soviet espionage cases.”782 Hoover anticipated the
777. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the
Reconversion Period (Sept. 6, 1945), in 1945 PUB. PAPERS 263–80, available at http://name.umdl.umich.edu/
4728442.1945.001 (recommending the Economic Bill of Rights in a Special Message to the Congress).
778. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Recommending a Comprehensive Health





782. S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 430 (citing Personal and Confidential Memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Tom. C. Clark, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Mar. 8, 1946)).
1688 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1573
use of widespread detention in the event of an emergency.783 He encouraged the
Administration to undertake a detailed study of what additional legislation would
be required to ensure that the proper powers were in place prior to such an event.784
The threat, in Hoover’s eyes, did not merely come from communism, but from
liberalism itself—communism’s first assistant.785 FBI Assistant Director Ladd
explained,
To a large extent the power and influence of the Communist Party in this
country, which is out of all proportion to the actual size of the Party, derives
from the support which the Party receives from “Liberal” sources and from its
connections in the labor unions. The Party earns its support by championing
individual causes which are also sponsored by the Liberal elements.786
The Emergency Detention Program, which operated from 1946 to 1950,
subsequently prepared for the indefinite detention not just of active Communists,
but also of individuals who might be sympathetic (or important) to Soviet aims,
including individuals involved with organized labor, racial groups and coalitions,
nationality groups, youth organizations, education and cultural societies, and
science and research.787 Individuals were rated based on a so-called “Security
Index.”788 Draft executive orders stood ready to implement the program.789 The
“Communist Index,” a separate list of individuals potentially subject to indefinite
detention, swelled to more than 42,000.790
There was a remarkable consistency between the executive and the legislative
branches in the priority accorded national security and the corresponding extent to
which the domestic national security infrastructure—in terms of institutions,
authorities, and funding—would have to expand. For instance, in August 1950, the
House Un-American Activities Committee favorably reported H.R. 9490, which,
as subsequently amended by both Houses, became the McCarran Internal Security
783. See id.; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 325 (1957) (holding that the district court did not give a
proper instruction to the jury when it did not explain that advocacy under the Smith Act has to include urging of
forcible overthrow), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). But see Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 115 (1961) (upholding the registration requirement under
the Subversive Activities Control Board as consistent with the First Amendment).
784. S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 430 (citing Personal and Confidential Memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Tom. C. Clark, U.S. Att’y Gen. (Mar. 8, 1946)).
785. See id. (detailing the FBI’s approval of Ladd’s recommendations to counteract the possibility of a flood of
propaganda from “Lefist and so-called Liberal sources”).
786. Id. (citing Memorandum from D. Milton Ladd, Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to J. Edgar
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Feb. 27, 1946)). Note that Ladd added, without any apparent irony,
“[I]n truth, Communism is the most reactionary, intolerant and bigoted force in existence . . . .” Id.
787. See id. at 436–38.
788. See id. Nearly 10,000 native-born citizens were included on the Security Index list. Id. at 441. At the
outbreak of the Korean War, the number of individuals on the list further expanded to nearly 14,000 people. Id.
789. Id. at 439.
790. Id. at 442.
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Act.791 Title II of the bill embodied one of the most extreme grants of power in
American history.792 It derived from S. 4130, a bill that sought “to protect the
internal security of the United States, [and] to provide for the detention in time of
emergency of persons who may commit acts of espionage or sabotage.”793
Considered by supporters as a more effective response to the perceived threat than
the House bill simultaneously moving through Congress, opponents considered S.
4130 as a “concentration camp bill,” claiming it to be the most authoritarian
instrument to ever be presented on the floor of Congress.794 Senator Pat McCarran
balked at what he initially viewed as unconstitutional measures threatening to
attach themselves to his bill.795 Senator Kefauver commented, “We seem to be
running over each other in a contest to see who can devise the most ‘anti’
anti-Communist legislation.”796 In September 1950 the detention provisions of the
Senate instrument were added to the McCarran Bill.797 President Truman’s
subsequent veto of the bill was based not on the extremity of Title II—to the
contrary: that it did not go far enough.798 Congress subsequently overrode the veto,
passing the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950.799
The final bill limited the FBI’s latitude in indefinitely detaining individuals.800
The legislation required that there be “reasonable ground to believe that such
person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in,
acts of espionage and sabotage” before detention would be permissible.801 The
statute also required hearings, an administrative board review, and appeal to the
U.S. Courts of Appeals.802
The scheme outlined in the statute conflicted with Hoover’s plans for detaining
individuals considered a threat to national security. But neither the Department of
Justice nor the FBI made any plans to bring the detention program into conformity
with the statute. To the contrary, Attorney General J. Howard McGrath directed
791. Cornelius P. Cotter & J. Malcolm Smith, An American Paradox: The Emergency Detention Act of 1950,
19 J. POL. 20, 21 (1957).
792. Id.
793. S. 4130, 81st Cong. (1950). This bill was itself modeled after Britain’s Defense Regulation 18B, which
was used during World War II to detain individuals considered a threat to national security. Cotter & Smith, supra
note 791, at 21–22 (noting additionally that “The bill’s framers had a copy of the Regulation before them . . . .”).
The bill was sponsored by Democratic Senators Harley M. Kilgore (WV), Paul Douglas (IL), Hubert Humphrey
(MN), Herbert Lehman (NY), Frank Graham (NC), Estes Kefauver (TN), and William Benton (CT), with
Representatives John Carrol (D-NJ), Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-CA), and Jacob J. Javits (R-NY) subsequently
introducing a similar measure in the House. Id. at 26–27.
794. Id. at 24.
795. Id. at 27.
796. 96 CONG. REC. 14,439 (1950), cited in Cotter & Smith, supra note 791, at 27.
797. Cotter & Smith, supra note 791, at 29.
798. Id. at 30.
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Hoover to ignore the legislation.803 Moreover, in light of the rapidly expanding list
of names and the limited personnel available to ensure that everyone on the list
was actually a security risk, Hoover received instruction that “all persons now or
hereafter included by the Bureau on the Security Index should be considered
subjects for immediate apprehension, thus resolving any possible doubtful cases in
favor of the Government in the interests of the national security.”804 By 1952,
nearly 20,000 names on the Security Index fell outside the standards set forth in the
Internal Security Act of 1950.805 Nevertheless, for the duration of Attorney
General Herbert Brownell’s tenure, 1953 to 1954, the program remained in
place.806 By the close of 1954, more than 26,000 names graced the list.807 National
security trumped criminal law norms. Congress did little to push back.808
The FBI initiated myriad national security investigations, perceiving threats in
every element of civil society. The broadest program for collecting information
took the form of COMINFIL, a shorthand name for Communist Infiltration.809 Its
initial goal was “to focus on the Communist Party’s alleged efforts to penetrate
domestic groups,”810 but in practice, it expanded well beyond to target political
activities, legislative activities, domestic administration, civil rights, youth groups,
women’s liberation, farming matters, cultural activities, veterans activities, reli-
gious organizations, educational institutions, and industry.811 According to the
Attorney General, these investigations encompassed “the entire spectrum of the
social and labor movement in the country.”812 By 1960, the FBI had initiated some
432,000 investigations on individuals and groups.813 Over the next three years, the
FBI opened another 9000 files.814
Of great concern to the Bureau was the potential for individuals in government
service to do even greater harm to the country than ordinary citizens. With this in
mind, in 1947, Truman established a Federal Employee Loyalty Program, the basic
features of which became folded into Eisenhower’s Federal Employee Security
803. See ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, THE FBI: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE GUIDE 151 (1999).
804. S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 442 (citing Memorandum from Peyton Ford, Deputy Att’y Gen., to
J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 7, 1950)).
805. Id. at 445 (citing Memorandum from D. Milton Ladd, Assistant Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to J.
Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Nov. 13, 1952)).
806. Id.




811. Id. at 442 (citing Memorandum from Peyton Ford, Deputy Att’y Gen., to J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed.
Bureau of Investigation (Dec. 7, 1950)); id. at 449 (citing FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MANUAL, § 87, 5–11
(1960)).
812. Id. (citing U.S. ATT’Y GEN., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR FISCAL YEAR 1955, at 195
(1955)).
813. Id. at 451 (citing Memorandum from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to S. Select Comm. (Oct. 6, 1975)).
814. Id.
2011] THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1691
Program.815 The key question asked by each agency was whether the acceptance of
each applicant for government service would “be clearly consistent with the
national security.”816 What this meant was that where any question existed,
government interests prevailed.817 Considerable variation marked the way in
which different departments interpreted these requirements.818 Crucially, it was
administrative (not judicial) mechanisms that adjudicated—that is, the decision
was being made entirely within Article II agencies. At the most basic level this
called into question the level of constitutional protections available. It also cast
doubt on the enterprise being undertaken. In other words, it was the administrative
agencies themselves that were carrying out the program. It was not, however, for
business or economic expertise to which such agencies were looked; instead, they
were expected to be experts on ideas.819
In keeping with the overriding characteristics of the third epoch, concerns about
authoritarian regimes—and communism in particular—permeated these federal
programs. The standards for determining loyalty derived from membership in, or
association with, groups designated on the Attorney General’s list as:
[T]otalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which has adopted, or
shows, a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or
violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United
States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by
unconstitutional means.820
The programs evolved into the screening of employees based on their political
beliefs.821 They also spread well beyond sabotage and espionage to any political
idea that might be considered subversive.822
In some ways, these programs also looked to basic conceptions of U.S. national
security representative of the first epoch: the purpose of the Union was to protect
the Constitution, which itself framed the political institutions of government.
Efforts to undermine the Constitution (or the government) through sowing politi-
cal ideas thus represented an attack on U.S. national security.
In seeking to prevent political challenge, new initiatives undermined the
Constitution itself, creating tension between the object being secured and the
institution of the federal government. The Bureau’s activities targeted free speech,




818. See M. S. Livingston, Science and Security, 300 AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 4 (1955).
819. For further comment on this point see JOHN LORD O’BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 32–33 (1955).
820. 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
821. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 448.
822. See supra note 567–69 and accompanying text.
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freedom of association, privacy, and other rights considered central to constitu-
tional law. Unease surfaced. President Truman, for instance, expressed concern
about the risks to constitutional government posed by the Internal Security Act of
1950.823 At some point, it made little sense to talk about protecting the U.S.
Constitution, if the measures being implemented to protect it destroyed its
fundamental tenets.
b. Militarization
Under President Eisenhower’s stewardship, the NSC—rather than the State
Department, which would have been expected to make recommendations on
foreign policy—became the main source of major national and international
security issues.824 The organization’s hierarchical efficiency played a role here in
establishing it as the principal national and international security policymaking
body.825 Within the NSC, military interests dominated, further sidelining the State
Department.826 Eisenhower also developed the NSC’s covert operations capabili-
ties, emphasizing in the process not the tools of statecraft, but the cunning of
secrecy and military action. The so-called “5412 Committee” (named after NSC
5412) met regularly to review and recommend new operations.827
The continued primacy of national security in the domestic realm, and particu-
larly a militarized NSS, was consistent with Eisenhower’s background and
perspective. In his Second Inaugural Address, which he entitled “The Price of
Peace,” Eisenhower noted that the entire continent of Europe was divided, “[a]nd
so, too, is all the world. The divisive force is International Communism and the
power that it controls.”828 He maintained the Manichean analysis of good versus
evil that marked his First Inaugural Address:
823. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, supra note 556, at 428.
824. Office of the Historian, History of the National Security Council, 1947–1997, supra note 701. It is
perhaps unsurprising that the Secretary of State at the time, John Foster Dulles, bore an antipathy towards the
NSC. See id. (“Secretary of State Dulles . . . had reservations about the NSC system. He was the strongest
personality in the Eisenhower Cabinet and jealously guarded his role as principal adviser to the President on
foreign policy.”).
825. Id.
826. See id. The NSC was organized along hierarchical command structures. The Departments of State and
Defense would produce draft recommendations on specific topics, look for points of consensus, forward the report
to the planning board and then to the full Council, which met every Thursday morning. Id. Once a decision was
reached, the report would go to the Operations Coordinating Board for implementation. Id. Note that the
Operations Coordinating Board was established pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10483, 18 Fed. Reg. 5379 (1953).
See CODY M. BROWN, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENT’S MOST POWERFUL
ADVISERS 18 (2008), http://pnsr.org/data/images/the%20national%20security%20council.pdf.
827. BROWN, supra note 826, at 7. Similar committees were later named “303,” “40,” and “Special
Coordination Committee.” Id. at 29.
828. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 1957), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES,
supra note 20, at 300–04.
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The designs of that power, dark in purpose, are clear in practice. It strives to
seal forever the fate of those it has enslaved. It strives to break the ties that
unite the free. And it strives to capture—to exploit for its own greater
power—all forces of change in the world, especially the needs of the hungry
and the hopes of the oppressed.829
The United States, fighting on the side of right, could take hope from the change
sweeping through Europe. The country had a special responsibility to the world:
“We recognize,” Eisenhower said, “and accept our own deep involvement in the
destiny of men everywhere.”830
The United States’ formative role in the second epoch intensified during the
third as the nation proved itself willing to engage in military matters anywhere
communism threatened to take hold. Korea, Vietnam, South America—the United
States was now willing to use the military in a preemptive role. No longer was the
country merely protecting its commercial trade or responding to attack; now it was
ready to use its military might in order to shape the global environment. It was in
this third epoch that the United States first took on the role of international police.
To fuel this engine, the United States required enormous resources, for which a
close partnership with science and industry became critical.
When it came time to leave office, Eisenhower took the unusual step of issuing a
farewell address—hearkening back to George Washington, who had used his
departure to warn the fledgling country of looming risks to its national security.831
Eisenhower had taken his oath of office on the bible that Washington had used.832
Like Washington, Eisenhower came from a military background.833 And, like
Washington, Eisenhower evinced concern about too much emphasis on the
military; neither man felt mercenary armies (“which have at one time or another
subverted the liberties of all-most all the countries they have been raised to
defend”) could be tolerated.834 For Eisenhower, the great danger to the country
may have derived from worldwide communism, but the country’s response—the
829. Id.
830. Id.
831. See Washington, Farewell Address, supra note 71.
832. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, J. CONG. COMM. ON INAUGURAL CEREMONIES, http://
inaugural.senate.gov/history/chronology/ddeisenhower1953.cfm (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
833. See, e.g., Army Years, EISENHOWER PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARYAND MUSEUM, http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/
all_about_ike/army_years.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012).
834. See George Washington, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, May 2, 1783, Writings 26: 374–76,
388–91, in 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 128–29 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“Altho’ a
large standing Army in time of Peace hath ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a Country, yet a few
Troops, under certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably necessary. Fortunately for us our relative
situation requires but few. The same circumstances which so effectually retarded, and in the end conspired to
defeat the attempts of Britain to subdue us, will now powerfully tend to render us secure. Our distance from the
European States in a great degree frees us of apprehension, from their numerous regular forces and the Insults and
dangers which are to be dreaded from their Ambition. But, if our danger from those powers was more imminent,
yet we are too poor to maintain a standing Army adequate to our defence, and was our Country more populous and
rich, still it could not be done without great oppression of the people.”).
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pairing of military and industrial interests—might shift the conversation away
from what was best for the country: “In the councils of government,” Eisenhower
reflected, “we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,
whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”835 For Eisen-
hower, “The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will
persist.”836 The United States must never lose sight of the purpose of national
security:
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or
democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of huge industrial and
military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that
security and liberty may prosper together.837
The strong priority accorded to national security carried a grave risk—namely, the
capture of the intellectual, economic, and social fabric of society: “The prospect of
domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations,
and the power of money,” Eisenhower warned, “is ever present—and is gravely to
be regarded.”838 Therefore, although the country faced a serious external threat,
and though national security had been accorded priority, such matters were not
without risk.
c. National Security and Civil Rights
In 1944, Swedish economist (and later Nobel Laureate) Karl Gunnar Myrdal
published an extensive study of race relations in the United States.839 At nearly
1500 pages (including the index), Myrdal’s work provided an exhaustive look at
the domestic social structure.840 The study had a significant impact on the
evolution of racial integration in the United States.841 It also drew attention to the
fact that the United States’ efforts to counter fascism and nazism required the
country to reject the same within domestic bounds.842 “Fascism and nazism,”
Myrdal wrote, “are based on a racial superiority dogma . . . . In fighting fascism





839. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944);
see also GENE ROBERTS & HANK KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE
AWAKENING OF A NATION 8 (2006) (discussing Myrdal’s appointment by Rockefeller and the subsequent study).
840. See MYRDAL, supra note 839.
841. See ROBERTS & KLIBANOFF, supra note 839.
842. See MYRDAL, supra note 839, at 1004.
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and nazism, America had to stand before the whole world in favor of racial
tolerance and cooperation and of racial equality.”843
As a matter of national security, much appeared to turn on the United States’
ability to portray itself as a democratic country distinguished by liberty and
equality—this was precisely what separated the West from totalitarianism. Interna-
tional perception mattered.844 Further attention was drawn to the role of propa-
ganda in the Soviet effort to discredit the United States.845 Failure to address racial
disparity would fuel Soviet criticism of the West, giving the U.S.S.R. ammunition
to mount its psychological campaign.846 It would undermine the United States’
role within the western bloc, bringing disrepute on the very ideas that the West
claimed as its foundation.847 The extent to which the United States appeared
hypocritical would diminish American authority and perceptions of veracity across
the board.848
Accordingly, from 1946 to the mid-1960s, scholars and successive administra-
tions raised concern about the impact of domestic civil rights issues on the United
States’ international prestige.849 Writing in 1950, Harold Lasswell pointed out that
Jim Crow laws simply facilitated Soviet propaganda.850 Civil rights reform came
to be seen as essential to U.S. national security.851
Professor Mary Dudziak thoughtfully examined the intense international scru-
tiny that accompanied the civil rights movement in the context of the Cold War.852
Her work notes that the international dimension is just that—one side of a
complex, multifaceted movement—and thus does not substitute for a careful
examination of the civil rights movement from a domestic perspective.853 But in
looking at the international reaction to postwar racial violence and race discrimina-
tion, Dudziak found that the Soviet Union was more than willing to take advantage
of prominent incidents, leading the Truman Administration to recognize the
harmful effects of race discrimination on the country’s foreign relations.854
843. Id.
844. See, e.g., NSC 68, supra note 759.
845. See Long Telegram, supra note 632 (devoting one section of the telegram to transcription of the Soviet
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850. LASSWELL, supra note 612, at 51, 55 (“Two of the chief points of attack against the United States in
foreign countries, for instance, are the alleged inherent instability of our economic system and the prevalence of
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851. See id.
852. DUDZIAK, supra note 849.
853. See id. at 13–14.
854. Id. at 14, 18–46.
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For the Soviet Union, visible instances of American failure to treat its citizens as
equals supported its claims regarding the weaknesses of democracy and the
conditions in which individuals found themselves in the United States.855 Western
European powers, in turn, felt that the United States, with such a prominent
international role during the Cold War, was made more vulnerable to Soviet
allegations because of the United States’ domestic race relations.856 The claims
made against the United States, moreover, redounded to Western democratic
norms more generally. Thus, in 1958, the Secretary of the British Labour Party felt
the need to note, in response to the pending execution of Jimmy Wilson, an
African-American sentenced to death in Alabama for stealing less than two dollars,
that it was unfortunate that “those who wish to criticize western liberty and
democracy” had been provided with “such suitable ammunition for their propa-
ganda.”857 Secretary of State John Foster Dulles became involved in the case, and
the Governor of Alabama received an average of one thousand letters per day,
many of them from overseas.858 Dudziak explained,
During the Cold War years, when international perceptions of American
democracy were thought to affect the nation’s ability to maintain its leadership
role, and particularly to ensure that democracy would be appealing to newly
independent nations in Asia and Africa, the diplomatic impact of race in
America was especially stark.859
In short, from 1946 through the mid-1960s, failure to treat all citizens in
accordance with basic principles of liberal democracy undermined American
claims to a system grounded in concepts of equality and the protection of rights. To
the extent that the Soviet Union could exploit these failures, U.S. interests
suffered.
Despite the growing concern about the impact of race relations on national
security, between 1945 and 1957, Congress repeatedly struck down civil rights
bills.860 It was not until the Civil Rights Act of 1957, largely focused on voting
rights, that the legislature finally passed a civil rights measure, followed by another
in 1960.861 The steady expansion of marches and meetings in the early 1960s, in
conjunction with violence in Birmingham and elsewhere, put increasing pressure
on Congress to act.
855. See, e.g., id. at 12–15, 35, 196 (reprinting Soviet publication Krokodil’s cartoon of an African-American
student being stopped by police from entering an American university while background segregationist protesters
hold up racist signs).
856. See id. at 34–36.
857. Id. at 5.
858. Id. at 5–6.
859. Id. at 6.
860. See, e.g., H.R. 29, 80th Cong. (1947); C.P. Trussel, Civil Rights Debate Is Blocked in Senate, N.Y. TIMES,
July 25, 1956, at 1; William S. White, Civil Rights Bills Have Slim Chance, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1948, at 1.
861. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634; Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. 86-449, 74 Stat.
86.
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Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader from 1955 to 1961, went on to
play a key role in driving through the Civil Rights Act of 1964.862 His decisive
victory over Barry Goldwater in the presidential election of 1964 heralded further
support for civil rights and a renewed commitment to national security. Johnson
came to office noting: “[O]urs is a time of change—rapid and fantastic change
bearing the secrets of nature, multiplying the nations, placing in uncertain hands
new weapons for mastery and destruction, shaking old values, and uprooting old
ways.”863 He went on to frame the constitutional values of the country as an
“American covenant,” arguing that such covenant had been “[c]onceived in
justice, written in liberty, and bound in union . . . .”864 National security was,
precisely, the purpose for which the country had been founded: “In each genera-
tion, with toil and tears, we have had to earn our heritage again,” he said.865
“Underneath the clamor of building and the rush of our day’s pursuits, we are
believers in justice and liberty and union, and in our own Union.”866
6. Hypertrophic Executive Power
With the primacy accorded national security concerns, the corresponding
infrastructure enjoyed a period of unprecedented growth. World War II had
destroyed any homage to isolationism or appeasement that might otherwise mark
U.S. international relations.867 But engagement—especially global military, politi-
cal, and economic engagement—was expensive and required a complex bureau-
cratic structure to feed and coordinate. The National Security Act of 1947 had
created the NME, which quickly became the Department of Defense.868 Its
authorities and capabilities rapidly expanded.869 By 1958, Eisenhower was calling
for a comprehensive system of unified command under the direct authority of the
Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which had taken on new responsibilities.870 New legislation created a general
862. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
863. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1965) [hereinafter Lyndon B. Johnson,
Inaugural Address], in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 20, at 310.
864. Id.
865. Id. at 312.
866. Id.
867. See BENJAMIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN
AMERICANS’ POLICY PREFERENCES 202 (1992) (charting high public support for NATO, military aid, and U.S.
troops in Europe between 1948 and 1956).
868. See National Security Act Amendments of 1949, ch. 412, 63 Stat. 578 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 408, 412) (renaming the NME the Department of Defense, adding a Deputy Secretary and the Chair of the Joint
Chiefs, and converting the special assistants to the title Assistant Secretary of Defense).
869. See supra note 686–703 and accompanying text; Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1956, 102 CONG. REC.
7449; see also President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization
Plan 1 of 1956 (May 16, 1956), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid"10489#axzz1lzvXa1RO.
870. Reorganization Plan 6 of 1953, 67 Stat. 638; see also President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message
to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 6 of 1953 Concerning the Department of Defense (Apr. 30,
1953), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid"9831#axzz1lzvXa1RO.
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counsel and six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense (“ASDs”).871 Eisen-
hower gave the ASDs the authority to give orders to the military departments with
written authorization from the Secretary of Defense.872 Under the Department of
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, responsibilities of the ASDs for research and
engineering transferred to a new Director of Defense Research and Engineering.873
The creation of the Air Force introduced another major entity into the mix, and
later statutory amendments expanded the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the
Commandant of the Marine Corps.874
The structure of the NSC rapidly expanded. By mid-1952, for instance, the
Psychological Strategy Board (“PSB”) had become the largest component of the
NSC, with a staff of 130 and a budget twice that of the rest of the NSC.875
Although the PSB eventually folded,876 it set an important precedent for the
NSC—namely, its use as a direct instrument of the presidency.877 The PSB laid the
standard for an even more ambitious Operations Coordinating Board, which
Eisenhower used to great effect.878 In 1953, NSC 162/2 replaced NSC 68, in the
process not only reaffirming containment and deterrence, but also elevating the
importance of nuclear weapons and calling for a greater role for covert action, a
policy further cemented in NSC 5412.879 The CIA, for its part, soon incorporated
not only intelligence coordination and analysis, but also intelligence gathering and
covert operations.880 Driving the entire process was the threat of totalitarianism
generally. In 1959, Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of Washington explained,
“The central issue of our time is this: Can a free society so organize its human and
material resources to outperform totalitarianism?”881 The answer seemed to be a
871. Id.
872. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, 72 Stat. 514; see also STUART,
supra note 13, at 227.
873. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, 72 Stat. 514; see also Def.
Research & Eng’g, A History of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, DEPARTMENT OF
DEF., http://www.dod.mil/ddre/ddre_history.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
874. Douglas-Mansfield Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-416, 61 Stat. 502.
875. STUART, supra note 13, at 240. Key documents in the development of psychological warfare include
1948’s NSC 10/2 (authorizing a comprehensive program of clandestine warfare against the Soviet Union,
including, inter alia, psychological warfare) and 1950’s NSC 59/1: FOREIGN INFORMATION PROGRAM AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLANNING (establishing federal organization of psychological warfare operations).
876. STUART, supra note 13, at 240.
877. Id.
878. Id.
879. BROWN, supra note 826, at 22–23.
880. Expansion began with Walter Bedell Smith’s stewardship in 1950. STUART, supra note 13, at 265. As DCI,
Smith developed the CIA’s own independent research and analysis functions. Id. at 265–66. He created the Office
of Research and Reports (“ORR”), which generated its own intelligence. Id. at 266. Cueing off the Dulles-Jackson-
Correa Report, the CIA began incorporating economic intelligence regarding the U.S.S.R., and drawing on new
science and technology. Id. at 263. As the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence grew in size, it acquired more
influence. In a major coup, the CIA took over U-2 reconnaissance aircraft—considered “as much a victory for the
covert side of the CIA as it was for the analytical side.” Id. at 267–68.
881. Id. at 252.
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combination of organizing, reorganizing, and re-reorganizing the national security
bureaucracy, expanding authorities, and giving ever more money to the cause.
In this structure, the military gained special status—and funding. In 1949,
Congress made approximately twenty percent more in defense appropriations than
the previous year.882 The Korean War erupted in mid-1950.883 Although active
hostilities ended within three years,884 by that time, the Cold War had taken hold.
Congress initially seemed somewhat hesitant about funding the many initiatives
encapsulated by NSC 68. But its reluctance proved short lived. Korea appeared to
be the beginning of concerted Soviet action, and Congress opened its purse in
response.885 Secretary of State Dean Acheson later reflected, “Korea saved us.”886
Following Korea, defense outlays over the next ten years were three times
higher than those that marked the late 1940s. From 1947 to 1950, the real annual
military spending never went above $60 billion.887 In sharp contrast, after 1952, it
never went below $143 billion—and often was considerably higher (for example,
from 1956 to 1965, the average of military appropriations was $168 billion).888
Between 1960 and 1962, spending increased another eleven percent.889 The
Vietnam War further drove appropriations after 1965.890
Between 1972 and 1976, public and congressional frustration about spending
and presidential discretion came to the surface—as reflected by diminished
appropriations, the introduction of the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the
adoption of the National Emergencies Act of 1976.891 But after 1978, both the
Carter and Reagan Administrations again focused on military outlays.892 Between
882. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at
1114 (1975).
883. See Overview of Korean War Battles/Offensives, THE KOREAN WAR, http://www.korean-war.com/TimeLine/
KoreanWarOverview.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
884. See id.
885. See WALTER ISAACSON & EVAN THOMAS, THE WISE MEN: SIX FRIENDS AND THE WORLD THEY MADE 513
(1986) (describing how the North Korean attack of South Korea led Congress to triple the defense and
international security budget).
886. See id.; see also MARTIN WALKER, THE COLD WAR: A HISTORY 77 (1995).
887. Robert Higgs, The Cold War Economy: Opportunity Costs, Ideology, and the Politics of Crisis, 31
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 283, 286–88 (1994), http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/eb/alston/econ8534/SectionXII/
Higgs,_The_Cold_War_Economy.pdf.
888. Id. at 289.
889. Id.
890. Id.
891. See id. at 289–90 (“The bulk of the military entrenchment during the period 1972 to 1976 reflected public
and congressional revulsion against defense costs and presidential discretion, as evidenced by passage of the War
Powers Resolution in 1973 and the National Emergencies Act in 1976 . . . .”).
892. See id. at 290 (describing the Carter and Reagan Administrations’ focus on military outlays after 1978 as
“obvious”).
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1978 and 1980, funding increased by $15.7 billion (10.4%), and between 1980 and
1987, by $84.4 billion (50.7%).893
To sustain the primacy of national security as a concern, a significant amount of
apprehension about the threats faced had to be present. It was Lasswell who
recognized that crises “strengthen[] the plausibility of the military way of think-
ing.”894 Consistency in framing the problems generates more support for military
solutions, and as the military gains control, emphasis turns to armaments: “The
professional strategist thinks of all the contingencies connected with the use of
weapons in war. The result is to emphasize in the minds of all who are exposed to
his thinking the most extreme possibilities and the importance of physical
weapons.”895 Central to this chain was the continuing sense of crisis. Otherwise, as
Professor Samuel Huntington observed in 1961, “The longer a given level of
military force is apparently adequate for deterrence, the greater is the temptation to
assume that a slightly lower level might be equally adequate.”896
The ideological climate and the presentation of the threat in moral terms—good
versus evil—went some way towards sustaining the emphasis on the military.897
Episodic crises also played a role, such as North Korea crossing the 38th parallel
and the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan.898 At other times, the military
infrastructure directed the public’s attention to “gaps” and the attendant dangers
thereby created.899 The historical record has proven less than kind to such
assertions: The 175 Soviet divisions, for instance, that were widely considered the
strength of the Red threat following World War II, in fact suffered from lack of
equipment and soldiers.900 The “bomber gap” in the mid-1950s, “missile gap”
between 1958 and 1961, and the subsequent “anti-missile gap” and “first-strike
missile gap” all turned out to be false alarms.901 The public account of the Gulf of
Tonkin turned out to be mistaken—despite the use of the incident as a basis to go to
war.902 Other gaps, from thermonuclear megatonnage to antisubmarine capabili-
ties, became instrumental in generating congressional support for military appro-
893. Id. at 290 (outlays expressed in 1982 dollars). Thus, over the nine-year period from 1978 to 1980, annual
military appropriations increased by a total of more than $100 billion. Id. In total, over the entire Cold War period
(1948 to 1989), military purchases hit $7051 billion—approximately $16.4 trillion in 2011 dollars. Id. at 291
(outlays expressed in 1982 dollars).
894. LASSWELL, supra note 612, at 26.
895. Id. at 27.
896. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE COMMON DEFENSE: STRATEGIC PROGRAMS IN NATIONAL POLITICS 205 (1961).
897. See Higgs, supra note 887, at 300–01.
898. Id. at 301.
899. Id. (citing HUNTINGTON, supra note 896, at 428–29).
900. EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ, UNCOMMON DEFENSE AND CONGRESS, 1945–1963, at 77 (1966); see also ISAACSON
& THOMAS, supra note 885, at 503.
901. Higgs, supra note 887, at 301.
902. See id. (“[T]he American people received an almost wholly fictitious account of an incident in the Gulf of
Tonkin in 1964, after which Congress gave its blessing to what soon became a major war.”).
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priations.903 The Committee on the Present Danger later announced that the 1970s
had been a “decade of neglect,” making the United States vulnerable to Russian
aggression.904 Professor Robert Higgs, evaluating the Cold War political economy
and various additional instances of false alarms, concluded that “the drumbeat
succession of such episodes helped to sustain an atmosphere of tension and
insecurity that fostered the maintenance of an enormous ongoing arms pro-
gram.”905 Writing in 1955, John Lord O’Brian dubbed the epoch, the “age of
anxiety.”906
In this mix, the National Security Act of 1947 played a special role. It created a
national security elite—specifically, the NSC, the NME (later the Department of
Defense), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DCI, the CIA, the Air Force, and others who
were not just given special powers, but who had a special hold on national security
information.907 Ted Galen Carpenter, a foreign policy analyst with the Cato
Institute, suggested in 1986 that the creation of the CIA did not just provide the
executive branch with a potent new foreign policy tool, “[i]t also set in motion a
cult of secrecy, a far more pervasive system of classifying information than had
ever existed previously, and a growing executive determination to withhold
sensitive information from the public and from Congress.”908
The projects financed in this secret world remained shielded from the legisla-
ture. The “Black Budget” grew from the Manhattan Project and eventually
expanded.909 By 1989, the Black Budget reached $36 billion per year.910 Blanket
appropriations masked hundreds of programs from congressional eyes—programs
that took on a disproportionate size within the executive branch.911 By 1991, for
instance, the Black Budget for less than one dozen secret Air Force programs alone
903. See id. at 301–02.
904. Id.
905. Id. at 302.
906. O’BRIAN, supra note 819, at 3.
907. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, 61 Stat. 495 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 401
(2006)).
908. Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 71: Global Interventionism and a New Imperial
Presidency, CATO INST. (1986), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa071.pdf.
909. TIM WEINER, BLANK CHECK: THE PENTAGON’S BLACK BUDGET 5 (1990).
910. Id. at 16.
911. See id. at 16–17. Weiner reported that most of Congress had no idea about the size and scope of the Black
Budget—including some members of the House Armed Services Committee. Id. (“This issue wasn’t being
debated openly. Discussing the workings of the black world on the floor of the Congress may be deemed
tantamount to an act of treason, and a member who does so runs the risk of being censured or expelled. The same
set of national-security laws that allowed the black budget’s existence silenced public debate on specific weapons
or specific dollars or specific snafus in the black budget. The Reagan administration wanted the laws toughened so
that a reporter or a public official who obtained information about a black program and published it could be
convicted of high treason. Upon conviction, such a traitor could be shot to death by a firing squad.”).
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came to $2.85 billion—approximately the same amount it cost to run the entire
State Department.912
Armed with a rapidly expanding bureaucracy, increasing secrecy, and huge
amounts of money, the strength of the executive branch also expanded. In 1960,
historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. coined the term “imperial presidency” to refer
to the power being wielded by the executive branch.913 His work stemmed from
concern that the executive branch in general, and the President in particular, had
exceeded constitutional limits.914
Although Schlesinger tied the growth of the imperial presidency to the New
Deal,915 the impact of the primacy of national security in the third epoch can
hardly be ignored. The CIA’s role in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Egypt (1954),
Laos (1959), and Cuba (1960 to 1961); the secret bombing of Laos (1964 to 1973);
military operations in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam; and the Iran-Contra
affair (1985 to 1986) reflected the primacy accorded to national security during the
third epoch, as well as the emphasis placed on containing the communist threat.
They all also pointed to a radically distended executive branch that was subject
only to minimal restrictions from Congress and the courts.
The executive branch was aware of its growing authority and influence—one
borne of congressional acquiescence. “[I]n this past third of a century,” President
Richard Nixon commented during his First Inaugural Address, “government has
passed more laws, spent more money, initiated more programs, than in all our
previous history.”916 Under his watchful eye, Henry Kissinger nearly trebled the
staff of the NSC, and later became both Secretary of State and National Security
Advisor at the same time.917 Kissinger continued both positions under President
Gerald R. Ford—a man with minimal foreign affairs experience.918
Ford pressed Congress to give the executive even more latitude. In 1975, he
informed a joint session of Congress that “[b]y] the Constitution and tradition, the
execution of foreign policy is the responsibility of the President.”919 He argued,
In recent years, under the stress of the Vietnam war, legislative restrictions on
the President’s ability to execute foreign policy and military decisions have
proliferated . . . . As President, I welcome the advice and cooperation of the
House and the Senate. But if our foreign policy is to be successful, we cannot
rigidly restrict in legislation the ability of the President to act. The conduct of
912. Id. at 8.
913. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
914. See id. at 103.
915. See id. at 324–25.
916. President Richard Nixon, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1969), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note
20, at 317.
917. Office of the Historian, History of the National Security Council, 1947–1997, supra note 701, at 12.
918. Id.
919. President Gerald R. Ford, State of the Union Address (Jan. 15, 1975), available at http://www.ford.
utexas.edu/library/speeches/750028.htm.
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negotiations is ill-suited to such limitations. Legislative restrictions, intended
for the best motives and purposes, can have the opposite result . . . .920
Congress gradually started to push back against the executive. The legislature
began to cut funding for operations in South Vietnam, Turkey, Latin America, and
elsewhere.921 Ford expressed his concern directly to Congress, again using the
language of crisis to pressure legislators: “In the conduct of foreign affairs,
Presidential initiative and ability to act swiftly in emergencies are essential to our
national interest.”922 Ford sought to shore up support for covert operations and the
intelligence agencies:
In a world where information is power, a vital element of our national security
lies in our intelligence services. They are essential to our Nation’s security in
peace as in war. Americans can be grateful for the important but largely unsung
contributions and achievements of the intelligence services of this Nation.923
To Ford, the Church Committee was harming U.S. interests.924 While the national
security system may need to be subject to congressional review, the public nature
of the hearings lay beyond the pale.925 It did a disservice to the nation and
undermined U.S. intelligence.926 “It ties our hands while our potential enemies
operate with secrecy, with skill, and with vast resources. Any investigation must be
conducted with maximum discretion and dispatch to avoid crippling a vital
national institution.”927 The CIA had been “of maximum importance” to Ford.928
The stakes could not be higher. “The national security budget that I have submitted
is the minimum the United States needs in this critical hour.”929
Under President Jimmy Carter, the National Security Advisor became the
principal source of U.S. foreign policy. With the State Department relegated to the
role of institutional memory (and operations coordinator), the National Security
Advisor assumed an enhanced role.930 Zbigniew Brzezinski, a formidable intellec-
tual, took control.931
President Ronald Reagan came to office vowing to reduce the size and influence
of the federal establishment “and to demand recognition of the distinction between
920. Id.
921. Cf. President Gerald R. Ford, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States
Foreign Policy (Apr. 10, 1975), available at http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/750179.htm (“United









930. Office of the Historian, History of the National Security Council, 1947–1997, supra note 701, at 3, 13.
931. Id.
1704 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1573
the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved to the States or
to the people.”932 Reagan emphasized that it was the states that created the federal
government; the federal government had not given birth to the states.933 Two
classes of issues emerged: general social and economic questions resided with the
states; the federal government, however, retained total control over national
security.934 Reagan further elaborated on this distinction in his Second Inaugural
Address by explaining that social and medical concerns lay firmly in the realm of
state and local government and, therefore, beyond the responsibilities of the
federal government.935 “Now,” he continued, “let me turn to a task which is the
primary responsibility of National Government—the safety and security of our
people.”936 Reagan’s understanding of federalism closely reflected national securi-
ty’s third epoch: national security was not just one of many responsibilities of the
federal government—it was the primary responsibility.
D. Balancing Risk: 1989–2012
During the third epoch, national security became the dominant national dis-
course. The priority accorded to the issue reflected the fact that the existence of the
State was a precondition to dialogue. Without the political institutions of govern-
ment, all other concerns would be moot. National security, moreover, was
non-negotiable: the resources required to realize national security simply had to be
found. The appeal to national security resonated with American history. At the time
of the Founding, and again, with the Civil War, protection of the Union became the
overriding aim. During the Cold War, it was thus consistent with the American
experience to set national security, grounded in the preservation of federal
institutions and the Constitution, as a priority.
With such a strong discourse, difficulty in generating attention for other issues
could be substantially lessened by folding them into the national security dialogue.
Public focus, institutional power, and mobilization of resources would follow. A
symbiotic relationship between national security and other concerns thus devel-
oped: to get attention, issues could locate themselves within a national security
framework, which, in turn, expanded national security and made the framework
even more powerful. With this in mind, it was perhaps inevitable that the national
security dialogue expanded, as soon as its primary object of containment—which
provided some limit on the object to which the State’s authorities and resources
were directed—no longer applied.




935. President Ronald Reagan, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 21, 1985), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 20, at 342.
936. Id.
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Glimmers of the broad, conceptual expansion of national security appeared
before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Writing in 1974, for instance, General Maxwell
Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested creating “an
expanded National Security Council charged with dealing with all forms of
security threats, military and nonmilitary, and having access to all elements of
government and to all relevant resources capable of contributing to this broad
task.”937 He criticized the NSC for failing to deal with environmental and other
threats—issues that could only belong to national security under an expanded
conceptualization of the term.938 A few years later, Lester Brown, the founder of
Worldwatch Institute, warned:
[T]hreats to security may now arise less from the relationship of nation to
nation and more from the relationship of man to nature. Dwindling reserves of
oil and deterioration of the Earth’s biological systems now threaten the security
of nations everywhere.939
He thus argued for a broader definition of security—one that also encompassed
energy and environmental policy.940
It was the end of the Cold War, though, that opened the gates to conceptualizing
a multitude of risks as threats to U.S. national security. The fall of the Soviet Union
meant that the policy of containment could no longer limit American designs. As
the former Soviet republics achieved independence, and East and West Germany
moved toward unification, the United States appeared unchallenged in its interna-
tional position. By the 1990s, the United States had moved to global engagement
on economic, military, and political matters. It had also created a massive domestic
bureaucracy and forged strong relationships with science and technology, in the
process funneling substantial resources to these institutions.
To what object, then, would the existing institutions, resources, and authorities
be directed? The defining feature of the fourth epoch quickly became national
security threats understood as anything that presented a potential harm to the
United States. Thus, as noted at the beginning of this Article, the May 2010 NSS
considered economic growth, armed conflict, climate change, pandemic disease,
terrorism, and organized crime as national security concerns.941 The Quadrennial
937. Maxwell D. Taylor, The Legitimate Claims of National Security, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 577, 593 (1974)
[hereinafter Taylor, Legitimate Claims].
938. See id. (“Hence, I would make a closing suggestion for dealing with this organizational deficiency. It is to
create an expanded National Security Council charged with dealing with all forms of security threats, military and
nonmilitary, and having access to all elements of government and to all relevant resources capable of contributing
to this broad task.”).
939. LESTER BROWN, WORLDWATCH PAPER NO. 14: REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY 6 (1977).
940. See id.
941. OBAMA NSS, supra note 1, at 2, 29–30.
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Defense Review (“QDR”), Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (“QICR”),
and other documents have followed suit.942
The intelligence community now considers a broad range of threats to fall
within national security.943 In one scenario called “October Surprise,” the commu-
nity anticipates a significant shift of power to corporations and megacities,
“allowing global ills (from climate change to international crime) to spiral out of
control.”944 Under this conception, local power presents a threat to the federal
government.945 Failure to move beyond “traditional geopolitical threats” to fund
the national security infrastructure adequately presents the greatest danger to
national security. The envisioned result is worth quoting at length:
[C]limate change causes health crises and environmental threats that challenge
weakened government and international institutions. Furthermore, porous
borders exacerbate health crises and facilitate the spread of international crime.
Threats to the U.S. national security environment include natural disasters that
cause significant physical destruction and threaten key infrastructure such as
power grids, financial systems, and water containment systems. Pandemics
threaten public safety, trigger widespread anxiety, and stretch resources.
Moreover, the growing social stratification and inequality that results from a
“growth at all costs” mentality drives antagonistic “have nots” to challenge
government authority and turn increasingly violent. Finally, government
spending on defense and intelligence is significantly decreased due to an
environment with few traditional geopolitical threats.946
The intelligence community flatly rejects traditional geopolitical considerations,
choosing instead to conceive threats to U.S. national security as potential risks,
which if manifest, would undermine the institution of the national government.947
This perspective is not unique to the Director of National Intelligence: every
federal agency tasked with intelligence collection was involved in drafting the
review.948 Based on the scenarios imagined, moreover, the Director of National
942. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
943. QICR, supra note 7, at 1 (according to the QICR, the intelligence community has relied heavily on NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025 (2008) [hereinafter NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, 2025]).
944. Id. at 6.
945. Id. at 13. (“[P]owerful, self-sustaining megacities displace national authority . . . . Governments create
city- and community-level intelligence agencies.”).
946. Id. at 14.
947. See id.
948. Id. at 2. The agencies include the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Energy
(Intelligence and Counterintelligence), the Department of Homeland Security (Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis), the Department of State (Intelligence and Research), the Department of the Treasury (Intelligence
and Analysis), the Drug Enforcement Administration (Intelligence), the FBI (National Security Branch), the
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, the National Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the United States Air Force, the United States Army, and the Department of Defense (Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy). Id.
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Intelligence issued a separate, classified QICR report to discuss potential impact
on the missions, operating principles, and capabilities (understood in terms of both
authorities and funding) the intelligence community would have to acquire “to
manage the range of uncertainties in the future.”949
The above documents represent some of the most important formal articulations
of U.S. national security. Yet, they are not exhaustive. A host of other reports
similarly adopt positions well beyond traditional national security concerns.950
Such calls echo outside of the executive branch in quasi-nongovernmental organi-
zations. The Project on National Security Reform (“PNSR”), for instance, funded
and supported by corporations, foundations, and Congress, and made up of
individuals drawn from private and public entities, has argued that the 1947
national security system is “dangerously out-dated, imbalanced and dysfunc-
tional.”951 In 2008, PNSR issued a statutorily required report to the President,
arguing that the Cold War-era concept of national security no longer applies: “In
our view, national security must be conceived as the capacity of the United States
to define, defend, and advance its interests and principles in the world.”952 For
PSNR, the objectives of U.S. national security policy now include, inter alia, the
ability “[t]o maintain security against massive societal disruption as a result of
949. Id. at 2.
950. See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING (White House ed., 2007);
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM (2003), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/60172.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW
REPORT: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR A SECURE HOMELAND (2010), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
qhsr_report.pdf; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY (2009), http://
www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf; QICR, supra note 7. Each agency, moreover, develops strategic plans,
which incorporate U.S. national security interests. See, e.g., CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, STRATEGIC INTENT
2007–2011 (2007); DEF. SCI. BD., 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY VECTORS (2006); DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2020 (2000); DEP’T OF STATE, STATE 2025 WORKING GROUP FINAL REPORT (2008);
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION STRATEGIC PLAN 2004–2009 (2004); NAT’L
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NGS STATEMENT OF STRATEGIC INTENT (2007); NAT’L RECONNAISSANCE
OFFICE, TRANSFORMING THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE ENTERPRISE (2008); NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, NSA/
CSS STRATEGIC PLAN (2006); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
STRATEGY (2007); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, VISION 2015 (2008); UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR
INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY (2008).
951. Welcome to PNSR: Leading the Way in National Security Reform, PROJECT ON NAT’L SEC. REFORM,
http://www.pnsr.org/index.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). Members of the coalition included: Norman Augustine,
Retired Chairman & CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation; Robert D. Blackwill, Council on Foreign Relations;
Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Former Commander in Chief of U.S. Pacific Command; General Wesley Clark, Former
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe; Leon Fuerth, Project on Forward Engagement, George Washington
University; Newt Gingrich, Former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; Jessica Tuchman Mathews,
President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Joseph S. Nye, Professor, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University; and Carlos Pascual, Vice President, Brookings Institution.
952. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1049, 122 Stat. 3
(requiring an independent, non-profit, non-partisan organization to study the national security interagency system
and to report); PROJECT ON NAT’L SEC. REFORM, FORGING A NEW SHIELD, at v (2008), http://pnsr.org/data/files/
pnsr_forging_a_new_shield_report.pdf.
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natural forces, including pandemics, natural disasters, and climate change.”953 The
report highlights the foundations of national power as integral to U.S. national
security interests: “[s]ound economic policy, energy security, robust physical and
human infrastructures including our health and education systems, especially in
the sciences and engineering.”954 These power-bases, the report claims, are as
essential to U.S. national security as are weapons and wealth.955
Such broad policy articulations are now finding root in law. By statutory
definition, as previously noted, “intelligence related to national security” has
expanded to include all threats “to the United States, its people, property, or
interests . . . .”956 Stripped of what minimal limitations had been set by the object
of national security in the third epoch—containment of the U.S.S.R. and the spread
of communist ideology—a broad range of risks to the country now fall within the
national security rubric.
Two critical aspects of this broad articulation of U.S. national security deserve
notice. First, it sidelines the function of intent by incorporating actor-less threats.
This approach sits uneasily in a domestic political structure built on adversarial
intent. Second, it sidesteps the likelihood that such risks will actually become
manifest; the mere fact that such threats could occur is sufficient to drive the
country to action. An infinite number of risks may therefore be placed within the
existing framework.
Climate change, drug trafficking, pandemic disease, and organized crime,
amongst other areas, have quickly become intimately linked to U.S. national
security. A brief examination of each area reveals three points of convergence.
First, each emerged during the Cold War and attempted to attach to the national
security framework but did not gather momentum until the war’s end, at which
time government institutions and resources became available. Second, reflecting
the power and focus of the national security dialogue, new developments in each
area led to a rapid expansion in the reach of the executive branch and, specifically,
in the federal national security infrastructure. Third, none of the areas identified
have an end point; instead, they merely reflect ongoing problems, suggesting the
indefinite expansion of executive authority generally and the national security
infrastructure in particular. The consequences are borne in the rapidly shifting
constitutional structure of the United States.
1. Climate Change
Maxwell Taylor’s call in 1974 to expand the NSC’s responsibilities was one of
many efforts to attach environmental concerns to the national security dialogue.957
953. Id. at 440.
954. Id. at 26.
955. Id.
956. See 50 U.S.C. § 401a(5) (2006).
957. See, e.g., Taylor, Legitimate Claims, supra note 937.
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Three principle arguments connected environmental matters generally, and climate
change specifically, to U.S. national security: First, that limited access to natural
resources would foment intra and interstate conflict and insecurity. Second, that
war and armaments contribute to environmental degradation. Third, that changes
in the environment pose an existential threat to the United States.
The first argument—that environmental scarcity might lead to conflict—was
certainly not a new one. In 1798, the English scholar Thomas Malthus argued “that
the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power of the earth to
produce subsistence for man.”958 The resulting imbalance between the need of
human beings for sustenance and the amount of food available would lead to
hunger, disease, and war.959 Concern about the impact of environmental factors in
driving countries to war continued: In 1948, environmentalist Fairfield Osborn
asked, “When will it be openly recognized that one of the principal cause[s] of the
aggressive attitudes of individual nations and of much of the present discord
among groups of nations is traceable to diminishing productive lands and to
increasing population pressures?”960 Professor Ted Robert Gurr of the University
of Maryland later suggested that environmental changes could harm economic
growth, underscore social tension, and lead to insurgencies.961
A variation on this theme anticipated that a country with environmental scarcity
would not only experience greater internal conflict, but would also adopt a more
aggressive posture internationally, thus presenting a threat to regional stability and,
ultimately, U.S. national security. In 1977, Dr. William Ophuls, a former member
of the U.S. Foreign Service, predicted that poor nations would confront richer
nations for a greater share of the world’s wealth, as global environmental damages
increased disparity between North and South.962 Three years later, Professor
Robert Heilbroner, a prominent economist, expressed similar concern.963
Environmentally created insecurity, however, would not just arise from military
aggression. Refugee flows, and associated immigration concerns related to environ-
mental disasters, could undermine a host country’s stability.964 Changing ethnic
constituencies, public health concerns, and management of the sheer number of
958. THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 13 (1st ed. 1798), http://www.esp.
org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf.
959. See id.
960. FAIRFIELD OSBORN, OUR PLUNDERED PLANET 200–01 (1948).
961. Ted Gurr, On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline, 29 INT’L. STUD. Q. 51–75
(1985) (suggesting environmental change may diminish economic vitality, underscore social tensions, and lead to
insurgencies).
962. WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY: A PROLOGUE TO A POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
STEADY STATE 214–17 (1977).
963. ROBERT HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 39, 95 (1980).
964. See generally JODI JACOBSON, WORLDWATCH PAPER NO. 86: ENVIRONMENTAL REFUGEES: A YARDSTICK OF
HABITABILITY (1988) (describing the volume of refugees displaced by past environmental disasters and identifying
potential threats of further displacement).
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individuals seeking refuge could bring an entirely different set of concerns—all of
which went to questions of national security.965
The second argument considered the impact of war, military operations, and
munitions on the environment—suggesting in the process a circular relationship
between the damage inflicted by the State and the resulting security threats. Like
the first argument, it was not a novel concern.966 Efforts to focus attention on the
matter continued throughout the third epoch: In 1976, for instance, Arthur Westing
considered the ecological consequences of the Second Indochina War.967 He
followed this in 1977 with a book that considered the impact of weapons of mass
destruction and their impact on the environment.968 Yet a third volume focused on
how warfare damaged the environment.969 Other scholars picked up this theme.970
The third argument began to draw out environmental concerns as an existential
threat: access to food, water, energy, and other resources; economic decline;
massive disruptions in services; and alteration in the balance of power between
States all threatened state sovereignty and, potentially, the United States’ exis-
tence. Accordingly, in 1988, Professor Paul R. Ehrlich, a prominent biologist at
Stanford University, and Anne Ehrlich, a research scientist in biological sciences,
issued a warning at Pugwash, an annual conference founded in 1957 with the aim
of bringing influential scholars together to reduce the danger of armed conflict.971
Their address was titled: The Environmental Dimensions of National Security, and
965. See id.
966. See, e.g., J.P. von Aarsten, Consequences of the War on Agriculture in the Netherlands, 37 INT’L. REV. OF
AGRIC. 55, 495–705 (1946).
967. See generally ARTHUR WESTING, ECOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (1976)
(exploring the environmental effects of warfare in Indochina).
968. See generally ARTHUR WESTING, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1977)
(evaluating the effect of weapons of mass destruction on the environment).
969. See generally ARTHUR WESTING, WARFARE IN A FRAGILE WORLD: MILITARY IMPACTS ON THE HUMAN
ENVIRONMENT (1980) (discussing the environmental damage caused by military action); ENVIRONMENTAL
HAZARDS OF WAR: RELEASING DANGEROUS FORCES IN AN INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1990)
(discussing the environmental impact of nuclear and chemical facilities, among others).
970. See, e.g., JONI SEAGER, EARTH FOLLIES: COMING TO FEMINIST TERMS WITH THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CRISIS (1993) (exploring the feminist perspective on the military’s effects on the environment); Michael Renner,
Assessing the Military’s War on the Environment, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1991: A WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE
REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 132–52 (Linda Starke ed., 1991) (discussing warfare’s
impact on the environment, particularly its toxicity to land, air, energy, and minerals); 1 WAR AND UNDERDEVELOP-
MENT: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT (Frances Stewart & Valpy Fitzgerald eds., 2000)
(analyzing the effect of violent conflict on the environment in the context of social costs). Like the first argument,
variations appeared. Some works, for instance, explored the role of violence in generating famine. See, e.g., Jon
Barnett, Climate Change, Insecurity and Justice, in FAIRNESS IN ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 115–29 (W. Neil
Adger et al. eds., 2006) (investigating how violent conflict leads to environmental instability and climate change);
Amartya Sen, War and Famines: On Divisions and Incentives, in ECONOMICS OF ARMS REDUCTION AND THE PEACE
PROCESS: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM PEACE ECONOMISTS AND PEACE SCIENCE 219–33 (Walter Isard & Charles H.
Anderton eds., 1992) (asking how warfare impacts famine-prone countries).
971. See Paul Ehrlich & Anne Ehrlich, The Environmental Dimensions of National Security, in GLOBAL
PROBLEMS AND COMMON SECURITY: ANNALS OF PUGWASH 1988, at 180–91 (J. Rotblat & V.I. Goldanskii eds.,
1988); PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1988).
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was followed by a publication of the same name.972 Worldwatch Institute similarly
announced in its State of the World 1988: “For four decades, security has been
defined largely in ideological terms . . . . The threat posed by continuing environ-
mental deterioration is no longer a hypothetical one.”973 One author in the study
noted, “Threats to human security are now seen much more in environmental and
economic terms and less in political ones.”974
These arguments culminated in calls to redefine the term “security,” expanding
its understanding beyond traditional geo-political concerns.975 Richard Ullman,
for instance, suggested that security must be understood to include any threat that
had the ability to quickly degrade the quality of life of the state’s inhabitants, or
that narrowed the choices available to people and organizations.976 Such a broad
conception of security could include environmental concerns and geopolitical
threats, as well as broader security issues.977
This entire discussion predates the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the wake of which
security studies went into free fall. The question was whether conventional
understandings of security were still relevant.978 Writing in Foreign Affairs,
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, former Director of the Office of Global Issues at the
NSC, suggested, “The 1990s will demand a redefinition of what constitutes
national security.”979 For Matthews, the 1970s were marked by an expanding
emphasis on economics, but “[g]lobal developments now suggest the need for
another analogous, broadening definition of national security to include resource,
environmental and demographic issues.”980 Her central concern stemmed from
challenges to State power: “Environmental strains that transcend national borders
are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national sover-
eignty.”981 Secretary of State James Baker, seeking funding from Congress,
similarly argued, “Traditional concepts of what constitutes a threat to national and
972. See Ehrlich & Ehrlich, supra note 971, at 180–91.
973. LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., STATE OF THE WORLD 1988, at 182 (1988).
974. Id.; see also Kurt M. Campbell & Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change in
Perspective, in CLIMATIC CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 5 (Kurt M. Campbell ed., 2008).
975. See, e.g., Arthur H. Westing, An Expanded Concept of International Security, in GLOBAL RESOURCES AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN STRATEGIC POLICY AND ACTION 183–200 (1986) (exploring
how the availability of natural resources impacts global security); Richard Ullman, Redefining Security, 8 INT’L
SEC. 129, 133, 143 (1983) (redefining a national security threat to include natural disasters and population
growth).
976. Ullman, supra note 975, at 133.
977. See id.
978. Jon Barnett et al., Introduction, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND HUMAN SECURITY 11 (Richard
Matthew et al. eds., 2010).
979. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1989, at 162.
980. Id. I disagree with Mathews’s assertion that the expansion of national security to include economics was a
product of the 1970s. As discussed at great length throughout this Article, the economic condition of the country
was of primary concern to the Founders and came to mark all three epochs that preceded the current age.
981. Id.
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global security need to be updated and extended to such divergent concerns as
environmental degradation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.”982 The potential
for State collapse became a clarion call: Robert Kaplan, writing in the Atlantic
Monthly, suggested, “It is time to understand ‘the environment’ for what it is: the
national-security issue of the early twenty-first century.”983
Calling for an expansion in traditional understandings of security, articles
linking environmental concerns to national security flooded the literature. For the
most part, the documents expounded upon the three major arguments that pre-
dated the fall of the Berlin Wall.984 New case studies highlighted the relationship
between environmental scarcity and violent conflict.985 Prominent think-tanks and
nongovernmental organizations picked up similar themes.986 Survival dedicated an
entire issue to nonmilitary aspects of national security, including articles on
982. The Future of Europe: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong. 107 (1990)
(statement of James Baker, III, U.S. Secretary of State), quoted in CLIMATIC CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 974, at 7.
983. Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1994, at 1, 8 (emphasis added).
984. See, e.g., JANET WELSH BROWN, IN THE U.S. INTEREST: RESOURCES, GROWTH, AND SECURITY IN THE
DEVELOPING WORLD (1990); 1 WAR AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONFLICT, supra note 970; Peter H. Gleick, Global Climatic Change and International Security, 1 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41 (1990); Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of
Acute Conflict, INT’L SEC., Fall 1991, at 76–116 (summarizing the arguments that justify treating environmental
degradation as a national security concern); Peter H. Gleick, The Implications of Global Climatic Changes for
International Security, CLIMATIC CHANGE, Oct. 1989, at 309–25 [hereinafter Gleick, Implications] (arguing that
countries will fight over diminished access to clean water); Norman Myers, Environment and Security, FOREIGN
POL’Y, Spring 1989, at 23–41 (suggesting that environmental pressure has a detrimental impact on national and
international security); Joyce R. Starr, Water Wars, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1991, at 17 (“As early as the
mid-1980s, U.S. government intelligence services estimated that there were at least 10 places in the world where
war could break out over dwindling shared water—the majority in the Middle East. Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Malta,
and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are sliding into the perilous zone where all available fresh surface and
groundwater supplies will be fully utilized. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia face similar prospects in 10 to
20 years.”); David Wirth, Climate Chaos, FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring 1989, at 3, 10 (arguing environmental changes
produce instabilities leading to war).
985. See, e.g., Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,
INT’L SEC., Summer 1994, at 5–40 (“[E]nvironmental scarcities are already contributing to violent conflicts in
many parts of the developing world. These conflicts are probably the early signs of an upsurge of violence in the
coming decades that will be induced or aggravated by scarcity. The violence will usually be sub-national,
persistent, and diffuse. Poor societies will be particularly affected since they are less able to buffer themselves
from environmental scarcities and the social crises they cause. These societies are, in fact, already suffering acute
hardship from shortages of water, forests, and especially fertile land.”); see also Peter Gizewski & Thomas F.
Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Pakistan, EPS, Apr. 1996; Philip
Howard & Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of Chiapas, Mexico,
EPS, June 1995; Kimberley Kelly & Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The
Case of Gaza, EPS, June 1995; Valerie Percival & Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental Scarcity and Violent
Conflict: The Case of Rwanda, EPS, June 1995; Valerie Percival & Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Environmental
Scarcity and Violent Conflict: The Case of South Africa, EPS, June 1995.
986. See, e.g., Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, U.N.
DOC. A/42/427 (May 20, 1987).
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demographic shifts, energy and resources, and climate and ecology.987 It was not
only environmental scientists sounding the toll: Articles appeared in the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, for instance, underscoring the concern about the relationship
between the environment and national security.988 The discussion spilled over into
the popular literature.989
Most relevant to the emphasis of this Article, such concerns soon echoed in the
political realm. In 1989, Al Gore noted that “the environment is becoming a matter
of national security—an issue that directly and imminently menaces the interests
of the state or the welfare of the people.”990 The following year Senator Sam Nunn,
Chair of the Armed Services Committee, explained:
[A] new and different threat to our national security is emerging—the destruc-
tion of our environment. The defense establishment has a clear stake in
countering this growing threat. I believe that one of our key national security
objectives must be to reverse the accelerating pace of environmental destruc-
tion around the globe.991
Importantly, there was very little pushback on this expanding concept of
national security.992 In part, this reflected the mutual interests of the various
interest groups involved: Security studies, broadly focused on Soviet-American
987. Hanns W. Maull, Energy and Resources: The Strategic Dimensions, 31 SURVIVAL 500 (1989); Neville
Brown, Climate, Ecology and International Security, 31 SURVIVAL 519 (1989); Sam C. Sarkesian, The
Demographic Component of Strategy, 31 SURVIVAL 549 (1989).
988. See, e.g., Peter H. Gleick, Ultimate Security: How Environmental Concerns Affect Global Political
Stability, 50 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCI. 55 (1994) (reviewing NORMAN MYERS, ULTIMATE SECURITY: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL BASIS OF POLITICAL STABILITY (1993)).
989. See, e.g., Eugene Linden, Greening of Geopolitics, TIME MAG. (Oct. 23, 1989), http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,958835,00.html (discussing friction between the Third World and the United States over
U.S. responsibilities with regard to global warming).
990. Al Gore, Earth’s Fate Is the No. 1 National Security Issue, WASH. POST, May 14, 1989, quoted in Kurt M.
Campbell & Christine Parthemore, National Security and Climate Change in Perspective, in CLIMATIC CATA-
CLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 974, at 5.
991. CLIMATIC CATACLYSM: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE,
supra note 974, at 6–7.
992. See, e.g., Gleick, Implications, supra note 984; see also Richard A. Matthew, In Defense of Environment
and Security Research, ENVTL. CHANGE & SEC. PROJECT REP., Summer 2002, at 109. But see RICHARD N. LEBOW,
NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: A DANGEROUS ILLUSION 508 (1988) (arguing for restricting security studies to
“anything that concerns the prevention of superpower nuclear war”); Marc A. Levy, Is the Environment a
National Security Issue?, INT’L SEC., Autumn 1995, at 35 (arguing against a national security framing and
suggesting that climate change, ozone depletion, and other ecological concerns are best addressed in environmen-
tal arena); Shira Yoffe, Basins at Risk: Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources (Oct.
12, 2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Oregon State University), available at http://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/
xmlui/handle/1957/9693 (creating a database of historical incidents of water-related cooperation and conflict
across all international river basins from 1948 to 1999 and finding that “international relations over shared
freshwater resources were overwhelmingly cooperative. Although conflicts over water occurred, violent conflict
was rare” and outweighed by agreements. Indicators, like climate, water stress, government type, power
relationships, showed no statistically significant association with international water conflict or cooperation.
Instead, “the tendency towards conflict was associated with rapid to extreme changes in physical or institutional
systems . . . .”).
1714 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1573
concerns, could turn to a new area. Environmentalists captured attention and
resources for their concerns. And the national security establishment could
continue to sustain its institutional strength, even as it branched out into new areas.
As a practical matter, the incorporation of climate change into the concept of
national security was not merely cosmetic. Real changes to institutions, institu-
tional relationships, and authorities followed.993 In this regard, climate change did
not merely represent a parallel interest to national security, for which alternative
framing could be adopted. Instead, it became embedded in the heart of the existing
national security framework—such as the country’s national security strategies,
the organization of the NSC, the authorities and programs initiated by the
intelligence community, and the like.
The existing framework, however, was created with a different object in mind; it
emphasized the State generally—and the national government in particular—as
the central player. It strongly favored military interests. It was primed to expand
executive authority. It involved layers of secrecy that diminished the ability of the
legislature and the people to conduct oversight. It entailed close relationships
between government and industry. Instead of changing the national security
structure, climate change became subsumed into the existing framework. One of
the best examples of this comes from the evolution of the NSS.
a. Origins of the NSS
In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act required the
President to report to Congress on the United States’ national security strategy.994
The concern at the time was not that the United States lacked a grand strategy—
containment of the former Soviet Union had acted in this role for the previous four
decades. Instead, the issue was whether the United States’ national security
strategy was sufficiently focused on specific objectives, whether it was coherent,
the degree to which it integrated different seats of power, and the anticipated time
horizon.995
Accordingly, the legislation required classified and unclassified annual reports
to be provided to Congress, with newly elected Presidents required to submit the
same within 150 days of taking office.996 Such reports must address five points:
(1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are
vital to the national security of the United States.
993. See JOSHUA W. BUSBY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY: AN
AGENDA FOR ACTION 22 (2007).
994. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-433, § 603, 100
Stat. 992 (amending National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-235, § 108, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. § 403(a))).
995. DON M. SNIDER, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: DOCUMENTING STRATEGIC VISION 2 (2d ed. 1995),
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub332.pdf.
996. See Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act § 603.
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(2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabili-
ties of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the
national security strategy of the United States.
(3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic,
military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to
protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives . . . .
(4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the
national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the
balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the
United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
(5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on
matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.997
In practice, these reports have often not been submitted on schedule, and in some
cases, were not submitted at all.998 Resultantly, in the twenty-five years that have
elapsed since Congress passed the legislation, only some fifteen such reports have
been issued: The Second Reagan Administration submitted two (in 1987 and
1988).999 The George H.W. Bush Administration provided three reports (in 1990,
1991, and 1993).1000 The Clinton Administration prepared seven (in 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, 1998, and 2000).1001 The George W. Bush Administration submitted
only two (in 2002 and 2006).1002 And the Obama Administration, to date, has only
submitted one (in 2010).1003 Despite the staccato nature of these documents, they
nonetheless provide insight into the changing nature of national security in the
fourth epoch.
The first NSS Report was issued by the Second Reagan Administration in
1987.1004 In the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Reagan Administration
had only a small amount of time in which to draft the strategy.1005 The final
document adopted language that basically reflected the thinking of the third
epoch.1006 Its two major sections focused on foreign policy and defense, mirroring
the Republican Party’s embrace of military instruments—almost to the exclusion
997. Id.
998. See generally SNIDER, supra note 995.
999. Id. at v.
1000. Id.
1001. See GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/index.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2012).
1002. See PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(2006) [hereinafter BUSH NSS 2006], http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/; PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter BUSH
NSS 2002], http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/USnss2002.pdf.
1003. OBAMA NSS, supra note 1.
1004. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 33 (1987)
[hereinafter REAGAN NSS].
1005. SNIDER, supra note 995, at 6–7.
1006. See REAGAN NSS, supra note 1004.
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of other sources of power.1007 U.S. policy continued to target the Soviet Union.1008
Merely halting the advance of communism or freezing the current political
boundaries would be insufficient.1009 The document took on an aggressive stance,
noting as one of its objectives, “to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet
control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of
Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.”1010 The NSC,
which had become the dominant policymaking body within the executive branch,
would provide the key to integrating the government’s approach; by 1987, it had
produced more than 250 classified national security decision directives, which
guided the Administration’s policies.1011 The NSS anticipated that the NSC would
take steps “to encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs
that promote economic development and the growth of humane, social, and
political orders in the Third World.”1012
In 1988, the Reagan Administration continued its emphasis on containment of
the U.S.S.R.1013 An integrated strategy would include economic, as well as
military, concerns.1014 The Administration began to focus on specific regions of the
world, for which an integrated strategy would be required.1015
The George H.W. Bush Administration came to power amidst a rapidly
changing geopolitical climate. An internal review of the national security infrastruc-
ture, friction over the nomination of John Tower as Secretary of Defense, and the
changing international environment delayed publication of the NSS.1016 When it
was finally released in 1990, the NSS embraced the changes in Eastern Europe, but
nonetheless presented a cautious approach to the future.1017
Global political change continued apace, which delayed the Bush Administra-
tion’s second NSS. War loomed in the Middle East as Iraq invaded Kuwait.1018
Between March 11, 1990 and December 25, 1991, all fifteen former republics of
the Soviet Union became independent.1019 The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and
1007. See id. at 9–34 (focusing on U.S. foreign policy and U.S. defense policy); see also SNIDER, supra note
995, at 7.
1008. See REAGAN NSS, supra note 1004, at 20 (including a section titled “Taking Advantage of U.S. Strengths
and Soviet Weaknesses”).
1009. See id. at 1.
1010. Id.
1011. SNIDER, supra note 995, at 7.
1012. REAGAN NSS, supra note 1004, at 5.





1017. Id. at 8.
1018. Id.
1019. Id.
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new treaties on armaments between the United States and Russia, again detracted
from the preparation of the NSS.1020
When it was finally published in 1991, the Bush Administration’s second NSS
again emphasized a military approach.1021 There was some innovation within this
broader framing (e.g., regional conflict would now become the organizing prin-
ciple for U.S. military capabilities, nuclear deterrence would have to evolve, and
focus on non-proliferation and arms control would need to intensify).1022 But
military might still trumped other considerations.1023 Consistent with previous
articulations, economic strength was also considered integral to U.S. national
security.1024
The final NSS of the Bush Administration was released in January 1993—
immediately prior to Clinton taking office.1025 The document essentially high-
lighted the accomplishments of the past twelve years of Republican stewardship
and laid down markers on which Clinton’s future record would be judged.1026 The
content itself closely reflected the strategies of the third epoch, emphasizing
collective engagement and democratic peace.1027
b. The NSS in the Fourth Epoch
Just how diffuse national security goals would become in the fourth epoch was
almost immediately seen in the Clinton Administration—the first post-Cold War
presidency. President Clinton acknowledged, “The world is no longer divided into
two hostile camps.”1028 What, then, would provide the focus for U.S. national
security?
The interests of the third epoch lingered. In June 1994, eighteen months into the
Clinton Administration, the executive branch laid out its first strategy: “engage-
ment and enlargement,” which echoed the goals of previous administrations.1029
Subsequent documents sustained this focus; according to the 1995 NSS, for
instance, the Administration’s central goals were “to sustain our security with
military forces that are ready to fight,” “to bolster America’s economic revitaliza-
1020. See id. at 8–9.
1021. See id.
1022. See id.
1023. Id. at 9.
1024. Id.
1025. Id. Although the report had been prepared from early 1992, various summits and the 1992 election had
delayed completion. Id.
1026. See id.; see also Security Through Strength: Legacy and Mandate, in NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF
THE UNITED STATES 13–20 (1993).
1027. See SNIDER, supra note 995, at 9–10.
1028. President William J. Clinton, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1997), in 2 INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 173 (Applewood ed. 2009) [hereinafter 2 INAUGURAL ADDRESSES].
1029. SNIDER, supra note 995, at 10.
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tion,” and “to promote democracy abroad.”1030 The document invoked the demo-
cratic peace theory that had been so influential in the third epoch, stating that “our
national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democra-
cies and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our inter-
ests.”1031
But the Clinton Administration also went considerably beyond the concepts that
marked the third age. The preface to the 1995 NSS explained that the end of the
Cold War had fundamentally changed U.S. security imperatives:
The central security challenge of the past half century—the threat of commu-
nist expansion—is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse. Ethnic
conflict is spreading and rogue states pose a serious danger to regional stability
in many corners of the globe. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
represents a major challenge to our security. Large scale environmental
degradation, exacerbated by rapid population growth, threatens to undermine
political stability in many countries and regions.1032
Ethnic conflict, rogue states, and environmental degradation constituted new
threats to national security. Nonetheless, the same historical and ideological
framework from the third epoch—protecting the United States as a domestic
entity, conceived by the Founders and enshrined in the Constitution—still applied
during this “new era”: “[T]he same idea that was under attack three times this
Century—first by imperialism and then by fascism and communism—remains
under attack today, but on many fronts at once.”1033
The national security infrastructure adopted by the Clinton Administration
reflected the diverse nature of threats that were rapidly being folded into national
security, which made it more difficult for the executive agencies to reach
agreement on the NSS. Colonel Don Snider, who had helped prepare the 1988 NSS
as a member of the NSC, lamented that the (resulting) unwieldy structure brought
so many different parties to the table that it made integration difficult.1034
1030. THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AND ENLARGEMENT, at i. (1995),
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-95.pdf.
1031. Id. at 2.
1032. Id. at i (emphasis added).
1033. Id. at 1–2.
1034. SNIDER, supra note 995, at 11 (“The Clinton administration has created a national security structure
within the Executive branch that allows each major point of view on national security an institutional power base
just short of the President, and with no other office capable of integrating them. The important points of view,
particularly relevant to crisis management, but also applicable to formulating strategy for a [National Security
Strategy Report], and their organizational bases are: the military options for security and stability in the
Department of Defense; bilateral relations and transnational issues with a regional focus, in the Department of
State and on the White House staff; considerations of economic security, particularly as they influence the
domestic economy, in the National Economic Council supported by very strong Treasury and Commerce
Departments, and the US Trade Representative; and, issues of environmental security, in the Office of the Vice
President. When working as the National Security Council, opinions of cabinet-level representatives of this
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Unwieldy or not, the structure would have to evolve to take account of new
risks: “We have identified a new security agenda that addresses contemporary
threats such as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
terrorism, and international crime.”1035 Nonproliferation; weapons of mass destruc-
tion; trafficking in drugs, arms, and human beings; cybersecurity; and climate
change all presented challenges.1036
Our new security agenda recognizes that in a global age, threats to America do
not simply come from determined enemies and deadly weapons. Our efforts to
curb global warming through the Kyoto protocol are vital to protect America
from a future of rising sea levels and economic disruption.1037
By folding these new concerns directly into the national security strategy, the
Clinton Administration began a process of re-tooling the existing system to
address the emergent issues.
Despite its overriding focus on matters of national security—or perhaps, in
some sense, because of it—the first George W. Bush Administration only submit-
ted one NSS.1038 The very first line of that document put another nail in the coffin
of the third epoch: “The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty
and totalitarianism,” it began, “ended with a decisive victory for the forces of
freedom.”1039 The United States had emerged from the Cold War as a powerful
country: “Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military
strength and great economic and political influence.”1040 The object of U.S.
national security was nothing less than world peace.1041
In a world that is safe, people will be able to make their own lives better. We
will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the
peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the
peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.1042
Terrorism, in a post-9/11 environment, figured largely in the calculation.1043
Also emphasized were matters relating to the environment.1044 The United States
structure can only be melded together by the President himself, not by the National Security Advisor or the White
House Chief of Staff.”).
1035. THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR A GLOBAL AGE (2000) [hereinafter CLINTON
NSS], http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/strategy/nss-0012.pdf.
1036. See SNIDER, supra note 995, at 13 (discussing some of the concerns faced by the Clinton Administra-
tion).
1037. CLINTON NSS, supra note 1035, at iii.
1038. See BUSH NSS 2002, supra note 1002.




1043. See id. at 19.
1044. Id.
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would incorporate environmental concerns directly into its trade negotiations.1045
The document explained: “Economic growth should be accompanied by global
efforts to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations associated with this growth,
containing them at a level that prevents dangerous human interference with the
global climate.”1046 The goal would be to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions
by eighteen percent over the next decade.1047 To accomplish this aim, the country
would remain committed to the basic United Nations Framework Convention for
international cooperation, obtain agreements with key industries to cut greenhouse
gas emission, develop standards for measuring and registering reductions, promote
renewable energy production as well as nuclear power, increase spending on
research into new conservation technologies, and help developing countries to
head off emissions.1048 Shared health and environmental threats would provide a
further basis for bilateral negotiations.1049
In 2006, the National Security Strategy took on a different overtone: “My fellow
Americans, America is at war,” it began.1050 The document continued, “This is a
wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the
rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder.”1051
Militant Islamic radicalism had replaced communism as the primary concern.1052
But unlike the third epoch, when all portions of the national security infrastructure
had pointed to the primary object, other issues persisted: Energy security and clean
development mattered. These issues linked, in turn, to reducing poverty and
diminishing pollution.1053 The United States was therefore working “with other
major nations on the most effective measures to protect the environment.”1054 With
China, the United States would “work to increase our cooperation to combat
disease pandemics and reverse environmental degradation.”1055 Environmental
damage, regardless of the presence or intent of any actors involved, presented a
national security threat:
Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic
mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis . . .
may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even
overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response. These
challenges are not traditional national security concerns, such as the conflict of
1045. Id.
1046. Id. at 20.
1047. Id.
1048. Id.
1049. See, e.g., id. at 27–28 (discussing relations with China).
1050. BUSH NSS 2006, supra note 1002.
1051. Id.
1052. Id. at 36.
1053. Id. at 26–27.
1054. Id. at 36.
1055. Id. at 41.
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arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can threaten national secu-
rity.1056
Like the NSS, the Bush Administration’s National Defense Strategy (“NDS”)
reflected the new threat.1057 The NDS introduced new categorizations of global
security challenges: “traditional,” “irregular,” “catastrophic,” and “disruptive.”1058
The 2008 NDS provides an expanded definition of potential security challenges,
including space and cyber threats, natural disasters, pandemic diseases, and
competition for resources.1059
The Obama Administration expanded further upon the vision set by the
preceding administrations. The one and only NSS issued to date calls “for a
comprehensive range of national actions” based on “a broad conception of what
constitutes our national security.”1060 Almost every element of domestic and
foreign policy plays some role. The document emphasizes the importance of
greater economic strength, deficit reduction, better education, clean energy,
scientific advances, and the development of new technologies, weapons systems,
armed conflict, and diplomatic activity.1061
In this mix, the environment plays a key role: “Dependence upon fossil fuels,”
the strategy states, “constrains our options and pollutes our environment. Climate
change and pandemic disease threaten the security of regions and the health and
safety of the American people. Failing states,” in turn, “breed conflict and
endanger regional and global security.”1062 Global warming and climate variation
could result in unprecedented levels of chaos. “The danger from climate change,”
the NSS asserts, “is real, urgent, and severe. The change wrought by a warming
planet will lead to new conflicts over refugees and resources; new suffering from
drought and famine; catastrophic natural disasters; and the degradation of land
across the globe.”1063 To respond to this threat, the United States would have to
develop clean energy, encourage sustainable development, negotiate reductions in
emissions, and focus on science and technology.1064 U.S. interests in the Arctic
region almost entirely revolved around similar environmental concerns.1065
1056. Id. at 47.
1057. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY 7 (2008), http://www.defense.gov/news/
2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf. In a departure from prior practice, the Administration issued the
NDS separately from the 2006 QDR, stating that the NDS was based on the QDR, which was, in turn,
benchmarked against the 2002 NSS. Id. at 1.
1058. Id. at 4, 7$8, 13, 21.
1059. Id. at 8.
1060. OBAMA NSS, supra note 1, at 51.
1061. See id. at 1–6.
1062. Id. at 8.
1063. Id. at 47.
1064. Id. at i.
1065. Id. at 50 (“Arctic Interests: The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental interests in
the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national security needs, protect the environment, responsibly
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c. Expansion of the Traditional Framing
Critically, the expansion of the national security discourse to include non-
traditional threats was not merely a surface change. It influenced federal law and
policy and gave rise to new institutions, institutional relationships, and authorities.
Equally important is the fact that climate change and other nontraditional threats
were not relegated to a parallel sphere. Instead, concern about climate change,
pandemic disease, terrorism, crime, and other issues was adhered directly to the
existing national security infrastructure, resulting in its further expansion. The
NSC, for instance, became tasked with looking at global climate change, with a
subgroup developed specifically to focus on this area.1066 The CIA introduced new
initiatives focused on gathering and analyzing information about shifting natural
resources.1067 In 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends
2025, in which increased scarcity and global competition for resources are
predicted to undermine U.S. security.1068
Along with these shifts, the military assumed a new role. The Bush Administra-
tion explained:
Preparing for and managing [environmental destruction, whether caused by
human behavior or cataclysmic mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes,
earthquakes, or tsunamis] requires the full exercise of national power, up to
and including traditional security instruments. For example, the U.S. military
provided critical logistical support in the response to the Southeast Asian
tsunami and the South Asian earthquake until U.N. and civilian humanitarian
responders could relieve the military of these vital duties.1069
To manage these threats, the military would have to expand and be given access to
even more resources.
The specific arguments for a stronger military role have come to be articulated
in three principal ways, which demonstrate how the initial environmental dialogue
has translated into the national security infrastructure: the relationship between
limited access to natural resources and conflict, the changing nature of the military
manage resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific research, and strengthen international
cooperation on a wide range of issues.”).
1066. See Arija Flowers, National Security in the 21st Century: How the National Secuity Council Can Solve
the President’s Climate Change Problem, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 50, 53–54 (2011).
1067. See Press Release, Cent. Intelligence Agency, CIA Opens Center on Climate Change and National
Security (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/center-on-climate-
change-and-national-security.html.
1068. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, 2025, supra note 943, at xi; see also National Security Implications of
Global Change: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on Energy Independence and Global Warning and the
Subcomm. on Intelligence, Community Management, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 13
(2008) (statement of T. Fingar, Chairman, National Intelligence Council).
1069. BUSH NSS 2006, supra note 1002, at 47.
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mission and its capabilities, and the role of environmental changes in undermining
nuclear and conventional arms control. Each deserves brief discussion.
The first argument relates to the relationship between environmental degrada-
tion and violence. This divides into various sub-concerns, including the concern
that increasing scarcity of natural resources elsewhere may result in intrastate
violence and potential state collapse.1070 A variation on this sub-concern posits that
scarcity of resources may foment conflict between states, leading to regional
instability.1071 This sub-concern, which received early attention from the NSC,
logically flowed from efforts to gain a better understanding of regions where
democratic states might be encouraged to resist communist encroachment.1072
Following the Cold War, attention turned to other potential generators of instabil-
ity—such as access to energy, food, and water.1073 In 1994, the CIA began funding
the Political Instability Task Force, a panel of scholars that focused on the question
of political crises around the world.1074 The project grew from the work of
Professor Ted Robert Gurr and generated five major reports on regional instability
from 1955 to 2005.1075
The second argument relates to how climate change could affect the military’s
mission and its capabilities.1076 As articulated by the U.S. Army War College, the
chief concern here is that climate change will influence where, when, why, and
how the U.S. military operates.1077 Navigation of the seas and territorial claims
1070. See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, ENVIRONMENT, SCARCITY, AND VIOLENCE 3 (1999).
1071. See id. at 133$35. An additional variation has since emerged with regard to aggressive steps that might
be taken against the United States itself. Taken to an extreme, the argument anticipates complete chaos in the
international environment, with significant implications for U.S. national security. See The Implications of Global
Climatic Changes for International Security: Hearing on Energy as a Weapon Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec.,
Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Dr. Peter H. Gleick, President of the
Pacific Institute).
1072. See Flowers, supra note 1066, at 53.
1073. Cf. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, 2025, supra note 943, at vi (“The international system—as con-
structed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging
powers, a globalizing economy . . . [and] growing energy, food, and water constraints . . . .”).
1074. See Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955–Most Recent Year, POL. INSTABILITY TASK FORCE
(Jan. 19, 2010), http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/.
1075. Id.
1076. See ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI, PACIFIC INST., ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/.
1077. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
1–2 (2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/memo/national-security-implications (“First, mili-
tary facilities and personnel will be directly impacted: Sea level rise and taller storm surges will encroach on
important coastal installations around the world. Increasing land area under drought will affect how and where
U.S. forces acquire and transport water to support operations. Weather conditions will become more extreme in
places where the local climate already presents serious operational challenges. Second, climate change portends a
rise in the frequency of natural disasters. U.S. Navy ships provided critical logistical assistance in the aftermaths
of Hurricane Katrina and the 2004 Indonesian tsunami, and calls for such assistance are likely to increase, both at
home and abroad. Third, climate change will create new theaters of operation. For instance, the opening of the
Arctic, which is rapidly losing sea ice, will force the U.S. military to deploy significant assets to this newly
accessible, resource-rich area, where Russia’s military is already established and well equipped.”).
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present a particular concern. Russia’s decision to claim ownership of some 1.2
million square kilometers of the Arctic, for instance, came to epitomize this new
era—as did the Canadian response.1078 (The Canadian Prime Minister almost
immediately stated that he intended to increase the country’s military presence in
the Arctic—a decision with additional military implications in light of the
navigability of the Northwest Passage.1079) Further affecting the military’s mission
and capabilities is the potential for mass migrations and the spread of disease—and
what role the military would play in such circumstances.1080
The third argument for a stronger military role relates to how environmental
factors might undermine arms control.1081 A report commissioned by the Office of
Net Assessment at the Department of Defense suggests that in a world of
diminished resources, “warfare would define human life.”1082 The globe would
become a world of warring states, within which armaments would rapidly spread:
“[N]uclear arms proliferation,” one study suggests, “is inevitable . . . China, India,
Pakistan, Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, France, and Germany will all have
nuclear weapons capability, as will Israel, Iran, Egypt, and North Korea.”1083 In
part because of the proliferation of arms and the increased firepower available,
disruption and conflict could become “endemic features of life.”1084 The United
Nations and other nongovernmental organizations will be affected.1085
Doomsday predictions like these made some, but not tremendous, headway—
until 2005. On August 29 of that year, Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast of the
United States.1086 In addition to widespread devastation of businesses and homes
throughout the southern United States, the levee system outside New Orleans
1078. See CANWEST NEWS SERV., Canada Draws Line in the Ice over Arctic Seabed, CANADA.COM (June 30,
2007), http://www.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id"a3822b19-7c35-41ae-86f8-bcd882b2df8b&k"
88331 (“‘Canada’s sovereignty over the lands and waters of the Canadian Arctic is long-standing, well-
established and based on historic title,’ the Department of Foreign Affairs [said] . . . in response to reports that
Russian scientists have amassed fresh geological evidence supporting their country’s claim to about 1.2 million
square kilometers of the Arctic seafloor—and the potential oil riches that lie below.”).
1079. See, e.g., KURT M. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES: THE FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2007) [hereinafter THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES].
1080. Id.
1081. ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI ET AL., ENVTL. CHANGE & SEC. PROJECT, FIRE & WATER: AN EXAMINATION OF
THE TECHNOLOGIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN ARMS CONTROL AND TRANSBOUNDARY WATER-RESOURCES
AGREEMENTS (2002), available at www.pacinst.org/reports/fire_and_water/fire_and_water.doc.
1082. PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY 17 (2003), http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD"ADA469325&
Location"U2&doc"GetTRDoc.pdf.
1083. Id. at 19.
1084. Id. at 22.
1085. See, e.g., NIGEL PURVIS & JOSHUA BUSBY, ENVTL. CHANGE & SEC. PROJECT, THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE UN SYSTEM (2004).
1086. NAT’L WEATHER SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SERVICE ASSESSMENT: HURRICANE KATRINA AUGUST
23–31, 2005, at 6 (2006), http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf (“At 6:10 a.m. Central
Daylight Time (CDT) August 29, the center of Katrina made landfall in Plaquemines Parish, LA . . . as a Category
3 hurricane . . . .”).
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failed.1087 Submerged, New Orleans became marked by civil unrest, some looting,
and a perceived breakdown of local government.1088 The military had to be
brought in to help restore order.1089
The incident proved pivotal in backing claims as to the civil, military, and
political implications of climate change. Not only was specialized equipment
necessary, but the incident also raised the ultimate question of the federal
government’s political legitimacy. The Bush Administration appeared slow to
respond, dramatically undermining its status. Environmental writers almost imme-
diately began citing Katrina as a demonstration of why climate change should be
considered as a threat to national security.1090 The resource allocation carrot could
hardly be overlooked: “The sooner the national governments recognize climate
change as the national security issue that it is,” one writer opined, “the faster it will
receive the intellectual, financial, and diplomatic resources it merits.”1091 Ignored
in this analysis was the corresponding power and institutional growth that would
have to accompany further expansion of the national security infrastructure.
The defense community responded to growing climate concerns. In 2005, the
Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (“DTRA”) Advanced
Systems and Concepts Office commissioned a study based on the premise “that
there is a need for an integrated, multi-disciplinary academic commitment to
countering new and emerging security threats.”1092 The initiative anticipated the
need to generate new thinking on how the military could respond to global climate
change.1093 Two years later, the U.S. Army War College sponsored a conference
titled: The National Security Implications of Global Climate Change.1094 By 2007,
military and non-military reports within the national security community began
highlighting the severe national security challenges posed by climate change and,
correspondingly, the need for an enhanced role for the military. One of the most
1087. See id. at 7–8 (“Four levee breaches occurred around New Orleans on August 29: two along the London
Avenue Canal, one along the 17th Street Canal, and one along the Industrial Canal . . . . The floodwaters from the
Industrial Canal levee breach submerged much of the Lower Ninth Ward and areas nearby . . . . The 17th Street
Canal breach resulted in a slow-rising flood over a larger area. Several levees around New Orleans were
overtopped adding to the flooding problems. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) indicates
that the breaches and overtopped levees flooded approximately 80 percent of the city to varying depths . . . .”).
1088. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 109-377 (2006).
1089. See id.
1090. See, e.g., J.R. McNeill, Can History Help Us with Global Warming?, in THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES,
supra note 1079, at 29.
1091. Julianne Smith et al., The Race to Replace Kyoto by 2012, in THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES, supra note
1079, at 100.
1092. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL CONFLICT STUDIES
INSTITUTE CONCEPT, at ii (2005), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dtra/nat_confl_studies_inst.pdf. DTRA
was founded in 1998 to integrate and focus the capabilities of the Department of Defense to counter the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. Id. at i.
1093. See id.
1094. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1077.
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prominent reports was signed by eleven military leaders from the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and Marines, whose credibility was firmly grounded in their long experience
in national security.1095 “Global climate change,” the final report argues, “presents
a new and very different type of national security challenge.”1096 The language
directly ties climate change to U.S. national security—and military—interests:
The nature and pace of climate changes being observed today and the
consequences projected by the consensus scientific opinion are grave and pose
equally grave implications for our national security. Moving beyond the
arguments of cause and effect, it is important that the U.S. military begin
planning to address these potentially devastating effects. The consequences of
climate change can affect the organization, training, equipping, and planning
of the military services. The U.S. military has a clear obligation to determine
the potential impacts of climate change on its ability to execute its missions in
support of national security objectives.1097
In other words, “Projected climate change poses a serious threat to America’s
national security.”1098 In addition to natural and humanitarian disasters on a
completely unprecedented scale: “The consequences will likely foster political
instability where societal demands exceed the capacity of governments to cope.”1099
The members of the study recommended that the United States fully integrate
the consequences of climate change into the country’s national security and
national defense strategies.1100 This meant the intelligence community should
begin incorporating the consequences of climate change into its national intelli-
gence estimate.1101 The NSS should directly address the question, with specific
guidance to military planners “to assess risks to current and future missions caused
by projected climate change.”1102 The next Quadrennial Defense Review (“QDR”)
should look at the capabilities of the U.S. military and respond to any potential
consequences; specifically, “preparedness for natural disasters from extreme
1095. See CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2007), http://
biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/SecurityandClimate_Final.pdf. The eleven military signatories were: General
Gordon R. Sullivan, Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Frank “Skip” Bowman, Former Director, Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program; Lt. General Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., Former Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and
Programs, U.S. Air Force; Vice Admiral Paul G. Gafney, II; General Paul J. Kern, Former Commanding General,
U.S. Army Material Command; Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces
Europe, and Allied Forces, Southern Europe; Admiral Donald L. Pilling, Former Vice Chief of Naval Operations;
Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command; Vice Admiral Richard H.
Truly, Former NASA Administrator, and Shuttle Astronaut; General Charles F. Wald; General Anthony C. Zinni,
Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command. Id.
1096. Id.
1097. Id.
1098. Id. at 6.
1099. Id.
1100. See id.
1101. Id. at 7.
1102. Id.
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weather events, pandemic disease events, and other related missions.”1103 The
group recommended that the Department of Defense (“DOD”) enhance its
operational capability by accelerating business processes and innovative technolo-
gies, which could, in turn, improve U.S. combat power through energy effi-
ciency.1104 And the group called for the DOD to conduct an assessment of the
impact of global warming on its worldwide military installations.1105
Although many members of the study were retired from active duty or no longer
held positions within the defense infrastructure, their call for an expanded military
role was echoed by those serving in office.1106 In July 2008, Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates highlighted concern that “over the next twenty years and more
certain pressures—population, resource, energy, climate, economic, and environ-
mental—could combine with rapid cultural, social, and technological change to
produce new sources of deprivation, rage, and instability.”1107 Simultaneously, he
noted the military’s growing role in civil society in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
growing concern about the “creeping ‘militarization’” of U.S. foreign policy:
“This,” he concluded, “is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.”1108 But in the
event of contingency situations or natural disasters, the U.S. military was likely to
be on the front line of defense.1109 Like Gates, Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy, Michele Flournoy, underscored the threat posed by climate change.1110
Outlining DOD’s approach to the QDR, Flournoy focused on five threats:
globalization, climate change, the coming youth bulge in the Mideast, increasing
competition for natural resources, and the spread of destabilizing technologies.1111
Congress largely supported the expansion of national security to include climate
change. In January 2009, former Senator John Warner of Virginia—who had
served as a marine in Korea, then served as both Undersecretary and Secretary of
the Navy, and who in 2007 co-sponsored the first carbon cap-and-trade bill to leave
committee—spoke to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.1112 He explained:
Leading military, intelligence, and security experts have publicly spoken out
that if left unchecked, global warming could increase instability and lead to
conflict in already fragile regions of the world. If we ignore these facts, we do
1103. Id. at 7–8.
1104. Id.
1105. Id. at 8.
1106. See id. at i; see also supra note 1095 (providing a list of the positions of the military signatories at the
time of publication).
1107. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Speech Delivered to the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign (July
15, 2008), available at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid"1262.
1108. Id.
1109. See id.
1110. See Miche`le Flournoy, Dep’t of Def., Rebalancing the Force: Major Issues for QDR 2010 (Apr. 29,
2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/transcripts_flournoy_20090429.html.
1111. Id.
1112. See Climate Change and Global Security: Challenges, Threats and Diplomatic Opportunities: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 9–10 (2009) (statement of former Sen. John Warner).
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so at the peril of our national security and increase the risk to those in uniform
who serve our Nation. It is for this reason that I firmly believe the United States
must take a leadership role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Other
nations are moving ahead and the United States must join and step to the
forefront.1113
Framed as a national security concern, climate change could afford no opposition.
Congress would undermine U.S. national security by not acting in this realm. To
this end, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, like the Senate Armed Services
Committee, would have to take appropriate steps.
Calls to expand and reorient military capabilities in light of global warming
arise not only from military and civilian personnel within the defense establish-
ment. In 2007, yet another study came to a similar conclusion.1114 Participating in
the study’s discussions were scientists, scholars, and civilian political leaders, such
as Leon Fuerth (former National Security Advisor to Vice President Al Gore), John
Podesta (former Chief of Staff for President Bill Clinton), and James Woolsey
(former Director of the CIA).1115 The report paints a rather dire picture:
The United States can expect that climate change will exacerbate already
existing north-south tensions, dramatically increase global migration both
inside and between nations (including into the United States), spur more
serious public health problems, heighten interstate tension and possibly con-
flict over resources, challenge the institutions of global governance, cause
potentially destabilizing domestic political and social repercussions, and stir
unpredictable shifts in the global balance of power, particularly where China is
concerned. The state of humanity could be altered in ways that create strong
moral dilemmas for those charged with wielding national power, and also in
ways that may either erode or enhance America’s place in the world.1116
To the study’s participants, current definitions of “national security” appeared
“woefully inadequate to convey the ways in which State authorities might break
down in a worst case climate change scenario.”1117 Disease, uncontrolled migra-
tion, crop failure, loss of access to clean water, and other concerns are likely to
overwhelm the traditional instruments of national security—specifically, the
military—as well as other elements of State power and authority.1118
The study considered three scenarios: expected, severe, and catastrophic climate
change.1119 It found that for even the first scenario—an expected increase of
1113. Id.
1114. See Kurt M. Campbell & Richard Weitz, Conclusion: Summary and Implications of Global Climate
Change, in THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1079, at 103.
1115. See id.
1116. Id.
1117. See Executive Summary, in THE AGE OF CONSEQUENCES, supra note 1079, at 9.
1118. Id. at 10.
1119. See id. at 6.
2011] THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1729
average global temperature by 1.3 degrees Celsius by 2040—substantial national
security implications existed (e.g., heightened internal and cross-border tensions
caused by large-scale migrations; conflict sparked by resource scarcity; increased
disease with economic consequences; and geopolitical reordering).1120 With re-
spect to severe climate change—understood as an average global temperature
increase of 2.6 degrees Celsius—the study found more severe consequences: It
predicted pandemic disease and significant stresses on internal state cohesion,
including in the United States, both as a result of a dramatic rise in migration
and changes in agricultural patterns and water availability . . . . Armed conflict
between nations over resources, such as the Nile and its tributaries, is likely
and nuclear war is possible. The social consequences range from increased
religious fervor to outright chaos.1121
In the catastrophic scenario—an average global temperature increase of 5.6
degrees Celsius by 2100—the group found “strong and surprising intersections
between the two great security threats of the day—global climate change and
international terrorism waged by Islamist extremists.”1122 For the group, global
warming, although couched as one pressing national security concern among
many, clearly stood as the most important.1123
In this dialogue, the catastrophic nature of climate change has been touted as
justification for considering environmental degradation as a national security
threat. Perhaps one of the most salient examples comes from the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists.1124 In January 2007, the same year as the two above-mentioned
1120. Id.
1121. Id. at 7.
1122. Id.
1123. Id. at 10 (“In the coming decade the United States faces an ominous set of challenges for this and the
next generation of foreign policy and national security practitioners. These include reversing the decline in
America’s global standing, rebuilding the nation’s armed forces, finding a responsible way out from Iraq while
maintaining American influence in the wider region, persevering in Afghanistan, working toward greater energy
security, re-conceptualizing the struggle against violent extremists, restoring public trust in all manner of
government functions, preparing to cope with either naturally occurring or manmade pathogens, and quelling the
fear that threatens to cripple our foreign policy—just to name a few. Regrettably, to this already daunting list we
absolutely must add dealing responsibly with global climate change. Our group found that, left unaddressed,
climate change may come to represent as great or a greater foreign policy and national security challenge than any
problem from the preceding list.”).
1124. See About Us, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCI., http://thebulletin.org/content/about-us/purpose (last visited
Oct. 20, 2011). Established in 1945 by scientists and engineers who worked on the Manhattan Project, the
publication sought to warn the public about the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Id. Two years after its founding,
the Bulletin began displaying a clock on its cover, with the idea of conveying the countdown to total annihilation.
See id. The decision to move the minute hand reflects the decision of the Board of Directors, in consultation with
the Board of Sponsors, which currently includes some eighteen Nobel Laureates. Id.
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reports, the Bulletin moved the minute hand of its doomsday clock two minutes
closer to midnight.1125 The grounds on which it did so related to the environment:
The dangers posed by climate change are nearly as dire as those posed by
nuclear weapons. The effects may be less dramatic in the short term than the
destruction that could be wrought by nuclear explosions, but over the next
three to four decades climate change could cause irremediable harm to the
habitats upon which human societies depend for survival.1126
The Bulletin continued,
Global warming poses a dire threat to human civilization that is second only to
nuclear weapons. Through flooding and desertification, climate change threat-
ens the habitats and agricultural resources that societies depend upon for
survival. As such, climate change is also likely to contribute to mass migra-
tions and even to wars over arable land, water, and other natural resources.1127
Stephen Hawking, a world-famous professor of mathematics at the University of
Cambridge and a member of the Bulletin’s Board of Sponsors, explained,
As scientists, we understand the dangers of nuclear weapons and their
devastating effects, and we are learning how human activities and technologies
are affecting climate systems in ways that may forever change life on Earth. As
citizens of the world, we have a duty to alert the public to the unnecessary risks
that we live with every day, and to the perils we foresee if governments and
societies do not take action now to render nuclear weapons obsolete and to
prevent further climate change.1128
The Bulletin’s decision to include climate change in its calculation of the most
pressing issues facing not only the United States, but also humanity, reflects an
approach to security that looks at the potential manifestation of the threat, devoid
of any individual actor’s intent. This is security as human security, on a massive
scale. Like nuclear weapons, such threats undermine state sovereignty, and require
a central, militarized response.
It would be inappropriate to end this brief discussion of the securitization of
climate change without noting that there is something circular—self-perpetuating—
about the military being seen as the solution. Even as the U.S. Army War College
pointed to the national security system “as a driver of solutions,” it recognized that
the military was a major part of the problem—the DOD is “the nation’s single
1125. “Doomsday Clock” Moves Two Minutes Closer to Midnight, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCI. (Jan. 17, 2007),
http://thebulletin.org/content/media-center/announcements/2007/01/17/doomsday-clock-moves-two-minutes-
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largest emitter of carbon dioxide.”1129 If this statement is accurate, it is more than a
little ironic that the United States’ solution to climate change is to increase the
might of the institution that contributes so significantly to the problem, in the
process ensuring the protection of its institutional interests.
2. Biodefense
Like climate change, concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, and biological weapons specifically, predates the end of the Cold
War.1130 Over the past two decades, however, the conversation about biological
weapons has shifted from one focused on their development, acquisition, and use
to one of “biodefense,” which pairs the threats posed by naturally occurring
pandemic disease and biologically engineered weapons. Both concerns have, in
turn, become folded into the national security framework.1131
The origins of the biodefense concern are rooted in manmade weapons. The end
of the Cold War heralded concern that rogue states, or non-state actors would gain
access to biological agents.1132 Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete
Dominici quickly expanded the Cooperative Threat Reduction (“CTR”) program
to restrict the flow of information and materials from the former Soviet repub-
lics.1133 The model to be adopted was one of traditional national security: the
Pentagon would assume lead responsibility for protecting the country from the
proliferation of weapons.1134
Despite the advances made by CTR, isolated incidents indicated that non-state
actors were beginning to develop an interest in biological agents. In 1995, for
instance, Aum Shinrikyo—a Japanese religious group—unsettled policymakers
when it released sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo subway, killing twelve people.1135 A
few years later, Larry Wayne Harris, an American citizen, obtained plague and
1129. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 1077, at 2.
1130. Concern marked the potential use of biological agents by non-state actors. In 1984, for instance, the
Rajneesh cult in Oregon unsettled policymakers when it contaminated local salad bars with Salmonella
typhimurium, causing 751 people to become ill. Gillian Flaccus, Oregon Town Never Recovered from Scare,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2001.
1131. For a discussion of the history of U.S. quarantine law in this context, see Laura K. Donohue, Biodefense
and Constitutional Constraints, NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
1132. See, e.g., BUSH NSS 2002, supra note 1002, at 13 (“With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation . . . . [N]ew deadly challenges
have emerged from rogue states and terrorists . . . . [T]he nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their
determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world’s strongest states, and the greater
likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today’s security environment more
complex and dangerous.”).
1133. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, 110 Stat. 2714
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2006)).
1134. Id.
1135. Jonathan Tucker, Introduction, in TOXIC TERROR: ASSESSING TERRORIST USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGI-
CAL WEAPONS 1 (Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2000) [hereinafter TOXIC TERROR].
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anthrax bacterium for the purpose of disseminating the biological agents on U.S.
soil.1136
These incidents represented a broader trend. Before 1997, the FBI conducted
approximately a dozen annual investigations into efforts by domestic entities to
develop, obtain, or use weapons of mass destruction; in 1997, the FBI initiated
more than seventy such investigations.1137 In 1998, it opened more than 180
cases.1138 While a significant number of these turned out to be hoaxes, there were
enough cases of actual attempts to raise concern.1139 By January 1999, the
Monterey Institute for International Studies had recorded a total of more than 400
similar instances in which non-state actors had tried to obtain or use weapons of
mass destruction.1140 Al Qaeda’s stated intent of developing similar weapons, in
conjunction with the anthrax mailings in autumn of 2001, augmented concern.1141
In conjunction with growing concern about the proliferation of biological
weapons, the threat posed by naturally occurring diseases received increasing
attention. Three outbreaks accelerated the conversation. The first, known as
influenza subtype H5N1 (“Bird Flu”), erupted in Hong Kong in 1997.1142 Al-
though H5N1 only killed six people in the Hong Kong outbreak, the virus has since
been able to spread, becoming both epizootic and panzootic, with mutations
dramatically increasing the patterns of mortality.1143 The disease has been com-
pared to the Spanish flu, also avian in origin, which swept the globe between 1918
and 1919.1144 More than 1 billion worldwide fell ill from the 1918 outbreak, with
between 50 and 100 million people dying from the disease or related condi-
1136. Jessica Eve Stern, Larry Wayne Harris, in TOXIC TERROR, supra note 1135, at 227–46. While
investigators later realized Harris obtained only a harmless anthrax strain, as Stern concludes, Harris posed a real
and substantial threat to American national security. Id.
1137. Judy Parker-Tursman, FBI Briefed on District’s Terror Curbs, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 5, 1999,
at A14; Tim Weiner, Reno Says U.S. May Stockpile Medicine for Terrorist Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1998, at
A14.
1138. Parker-Tursman, supra note 1137.
1139. See Weiner, supra note 1137.
1140. Monterey WMD Terrorism Database, CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUD., http://wmddb.miis.edu/
(last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (password protected).
1141. See Homeland Sec. Sec’y Michael Chertoff, Remarks at the Stanford Constitutional Law Center’s Germ
Warfare, Contagious Disease, and the Constitution Conference (Apr. 11, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xnews/speeches/sp_1208283625146.shtm; Science and Security in the Post-9/11 Environment: Bioterrorism, AM.
ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI. (Aug. 2004), http://www.aaas.org/spp/post911/agents/.
1142. See generally Hong Kong, 1997, BIRD FLU: A VIRUS OF OUR OWN HATCHING, http://birdflubook.com/
a.php?id"15 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011).
1143. At its first outbreak in 1997, most deaths occurred amongst patients older than age thirteen, but by 2006,
the fatality rate for children younger than fifteen had reached eighty-nine percent. See Writing Comm. of the
World Health Org., Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Infection in Humans, 353 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1374, 1378 (2005),
available at http://content.nejm.org/cgi/content/full/353/13/1374. There appear to be a handful of questionable
cases in which the virus may have been transmitted between people (mother and child, and patient to nurse, but
unique situations). See id.
1144. See Higher Human Learning, BIRD FLU: A VIRUS OF OUR OWN HATCHING, http://birdflubook.com/
a.php?id"15 (last visited Dec. 30, 2011) (“H5N1 and the virus of 1918 both shared a proclivity for the lungs, but
H5N1 doesn’t always stop there.”).
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tions.1145 What has caused alarm is that the mortality rate of recent avian flu
outbreaks—almost sixty percent—is substantially higher than the Spanish flu,
which had a mortality rate of about five percent.1146
The second disease outbreak that spurred biodefense efforts—the 2003 outbreak
of severe acute respiratory syndrome (“SARS”) in southern China—reflected a
similar lack of human agency in its creation and a correspondingly high level of
mortality.1147 Aided by a small group of accidental “superspreaders,” the disease
became global within days of its first appearance.1148 Approximately 8000 people
in twenty-nine different countries contracted the disease, 800 of whom died.1149
The third incident stemmed from a June 2009 outbreak of another influenza
subtype, known as H1N1 (“Swine Flu”).1150 Although the pandemic proved less
devastating than initially predicted, the discussion surrounding the disease raised
significant alarm about the potential impact of naturally occurring diseases.1151
As with climate change, the threat of pandemic disease became incorporated
into the existing national security infrastructure. In 2000, the National Intelligence
Council released an estimate focused on the threat of global infectious disease and
its implications for the United States.1152 The DTRA’s Advanced Systems and
Concepts Office, founded to concentrate on the threat of weapons of mass
destruction, considered, as an aspect of its national security program, the large-
scale containment of individuals infected with highly contagious disease in a large
1145. See generally THE 1918–1919 PANDEMIC OF INFLUENZA: THE URBAN IMPACT IN THE WESTERN WORLD
(Fred R. van Hartesveldt ed., 1992) (estimates at least 40 million); NIALL JOHNSON, BRITAIN AND THE 1918–19
INFLUENZA PANDEMIC 103 (2007) (estimating up to 100 million).
1146. Compare JOHNSON, supra note 1145, at 103 (describing the mortality rate of the Spanish flu), with
Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Reported to WHO, 2003–2011,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/EN_GIP_
LatestCumulativeNumberH5N1cases.pdf (describing the mortality rate of the recent avian flu outbreak). As of
October 10, 2011, the World Health Organization reported 332 deaths out of 566 cases of H5N1 in humans. Id.
1147. Cf. ANGIE A. WELBORN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31333, FEDERAL AND STATE ISOLATION AND
QUARANTINE AUTHORITY 1 (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL31333.pdf (discussing disease outbreaks and
their mortality rates).
1148. See Kristen Philipkoski, Superspreaders May Hold SARS Clue, WIRED (May 21, 2003), http://www.
wired.com/medtech/health/news/2003/05/58907?currentPage"all.
1149. Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (2003), available at http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html.
1150. Graeme T. Laurie & Kathryn G. Hunter, Mapping, Assessing and Improving Legal Preparedness for
Pandemic Flu in the United Kingdom, 10 MED. L. INT’L 101, 103 (2009).
1151. Compare Report: Swine Flu Could Cause up to 90,000 U.S. Deaths, CNN HEALTH (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-08-24/health/us.swine.flu.projections_1_swine-flu-h1n1-seasonal-flu?_s"PM:
HEALTH, with CDC Estimates of 2009 H1N1 Influenza Cases, Hospitalizations and Deaths in the United States,
April–November 14, 2009, FLU.GOV, http://www.flu.gov/individualfamily/about/h1n1/estimates_2009_h1n1.
html#Background (last visited Dec. 30, 2011) (estimating between 8870 and 18,300 deaths occurred in the United
States from the H1N1 outbreak).
1152. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE GLOBAL INFECTIOUS DISEASE
THREAT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (NIE NO. 99-17D) (2000) [hereinafter NAT’L INTELLIGENCE
COUNCIL, INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE], http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/infectiousdisease/infectious
diseases.pdf.
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metropolitan area.1153 The military elite began calling for the QDR to address U.S.
military capabilities with regard to pandemic disease.1154 The Bush Administration
expressly included pandemic disease in its NDS.1155 In its NSS, the Obama
Administration similarly highlighted the importance of responding to pandemic
disease—as a national security concern.1156 According to the Obama Administra-
tion’s NSS, disease outbreaks “can quickly evolve into a multinational health crisis
that causes millions to suffer, as well as spark major disruptions to travel and
trade.”1157
Mimicking climate change, the biodefense discourse carried with it actual
changes to institutional design, institutional relationships, and authorities. Many of
these alterations linked the threat posed by both engineered weapons and naturally
occurring outbreaks. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness
and Response Act of 2002, for instance, addressed both bioengineered weapons
and naturally occurring outbreaks within a national security rubric.1158 The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”), whose primary mission is to prevent further attacks within the United
States, to reduce the domestic vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and to assist in
recovery from the same.1159 DHS, however, continues to view its role in consider-
ably more expansive terms. Its website states that “[i]n the event of a terrorist
attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency, the Department of Home-
land Security will . . . assume[] primary responsibility for ensuring that emergency
response professionals are prepared . . . .”1160 DHS, through its National Response
Plan underscored the dual role to be played by the Department: to help “in the
important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the
United States; reducing the vulnerability to all natural and man-made hazards; and
minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that
occurs.”1161 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 suggested that the
traditional public health approach could no longer form the basis for the State’s
response to the threat.1162 Health care providers and public health officials were to
be considered part of the national security infrastructure—on the very front lines of
1153. See DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 1092, at 31.
1154. See CNA CORP., supra note 1095, at 7–8.
1155. See BUSH NSS 2002, supra note 1002, at 23.
1156. OBAMA NSS, supra note 1, at 49.
1157. Id. at 49.
1158. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 294 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 18, 21, 29, 28, 42, 47 U.S.C.).
1159. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2003).
1160. Preparedness, Response & Recovery, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/
prepresprecovery.shtm (last visited Apr. 26, 2012).
1161. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
NRP_Brochure.pdf.
1162. See THE WHITE HOUSE, BIODEFENSE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) [hereinafter BIODEFENSE FOR THE
21ST CENTURY], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html.
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defense.1163 A new biodefense program would therefore combine and strengthen
the federal government’s ability to respond to both biological weapons and
naturally occurring disease.1164
DHS and the White House, when presenting the 2007 National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza, explained that the federal government intended to link the
two concerns: “We at DHS are focused on multi-use institutions that we can put
into place for whatever emergencies arise.”1165 The association between pandemic
disease and biological weapons was not an accident; the very reason that the
government released the pandemic design was to redefine public health as a
national security priority.1166 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
proposing broader authorities for itself, explained: “Stopping an outbreak—
whether it is naturally occurring or intentionally caused—requires the use of the
most rapid and effective public health tools available.”1167 Myriad further ex-
amples present themselves.
Like the climate change dialogue, the folding of public health into the national
security structure has resulted in an expanded role for traditional national security
institutions and, in particular, for the armed forces. To some extent, looking to the
military as a key player derives from the biological weapons component of the
threat. The military has sophisticated ways to identify agents and to respond to
protect individuals who might be exposed.1168 It may have access to a broader
range of vaccines, antibiotics, and prophylactic measures than civilian agencies. It
has knowledge about shielding devices and familiarity with how to protect
individuals before and after exposure.1169 As with climate change, the involvement
of the military also stems from institutional capabilities, should the potential threat
become manifest. The military may be the only institution with the necessary
technology, resources, manpower, and command and control devices to organize
response to a debilitating crisis on a massive scale.
Accordingly, even as it enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress
explained that the military could be used in the event of any national emergency,
1163. Id.
1164. See id.
1165. Dr. Jeff Runge, DHS C. Med. Officer on Pandemic Preparedness, Press Briefing on National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan: One Year Summary (July 17, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-13.html; see also Dr. Venkayya, Special Ass’t to the
President for Biodefense, Press Briefing on National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan: One
Year Summary (July 17, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/
20070717-13.html.
1166. Venkayya, supra note 1165.
1167. Proposed Rules, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (Nov. 30, 2005).
1168. The Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, for instance, is
highly trained in responding to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incidents. See
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, MARINES, http://www.marines.mil/unit/cbirf/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
1169. Id.
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including natural disasters.1170 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10
considers the armed forces to be essential to the country’s ability to defend itself
against disease.1171 Following Hurricane Katrina, Congress explicitly granted the
authority to the military to respond in the event of pandemic disease.1172 The
Defense Authorization Act of 2007 renamed the Insurrection Act as “Enforcement
of the Laws to Restore Public Order.”1173 The new language gave the President the
ability to make use of the armed forces in the event of “natural disaster, epidemic,
or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or other
condition”—without any contact or collaboration with state officials.1174 The new
measure quickly earned the wrath of state governors and, eventually, was re-
pealed.1175 But the incident illustrated a shift in the view of the military’s role in
responding to pandemic disease. Now, use of title 32 troops and title 10 forces to
respond to naturally occurring outbreaks of disease enjoys broad support.1176
At some level, the confluence of pandemic disease and biological weapons
makes sense: both entail viral or bacteriological threats. Similar institutions would
likely be the first to become aware of the existence of the threat—regardless of
whether manufactured or naturally occurring. At the onset, it may be impossible to
tell the difference. Moreover, such diseases may require the same response and
may be equally devastating.
But the collapse of these two areas within the national security and military
infrastructure drains attention and resources away from civilian institutions, which
have a broader perspective on the evolution of public health. The relationship
between these institutions and the public is completely different than that which
1170. See PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 4 (2002), http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/book.pdf.
1171. See BIODEFENSE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 1162 (“[T]he Department of Defense will continue
to ensure that . . . our troops and our critical domestic and overseas installations are effectively protected against
[biological] threats.”).
1172. See John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, ch. 15, 120 Stat. 2083, 2405
(2006).
1173. Id.
1174. Id. at 2404 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 333) (emphasis added).
1175. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3, 325.
1176. See, e.g., STEVE BOWMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33095, HURRICANE KATRINA: DOD
DISASTER RESPONSE 1 (2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33095.pdf (stating that in regard to natural
disasters “the role of the National Guard is critical in the maintenance of civil order, the provision of logistical
support, and the coordination of rescue and relief effort.”); Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Grapes of Wrath and the
Speckled Monster, Part III: Epidemics, Natural Disasters and Biological Terrorism—The Federal Response, 10
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 429, 462 (2006) (“The suggestion to use the military in a national emergency is not
merely academic, as in the immediate aftermath of Katrina, Americans saw the breakdown of civilian leadership,
especially by the Department of Homeland Security, charged with the primary responsibility of responding to ‘a
terrorist attack, natural disaster or other large-scale emergency,’ and by FEMA, the lead agency under the
Department of Homeland Security. Only the military offered a wide range of worthwhile assistance, including
proper search and rescue measures; recovering the bodies of those killed in the storm or afterward; immediately
attempting to bolster and secure the levees; providing for and delivering food, shelter, and water; and restoring
law and order.”) (internal footnotes omitted).
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persists with respect to the highly secretive, non-transparent, coercive entities that
mark the national security domain.
3. Drugs
The climate change dialogue was initially driven largely by liberal, progressive
forces eager to generate attention on what was perceived as a pressing concern.
The collapse between pandemic disease and biological weapons, and the refram-
ing of both within the national security dialogue, can be seen as led by national
security institutions themselves: entities previously concerned with the contain-
ment of communism generally, and the U.S.S.R. in particular, turned to prolifera-
tion and, from that, to pandemic disease. In contrast, the incorporation of drugs and
then crime into the national security infrastructure can be seen largely as a function
of the conservative movement. Together these examples demonstrate a remarkable
confluence that has generated an ever-expanding view of the field.
Like climate change and biological weapons, concern about drug trafficking
predates the start of the fourth epoch. Between 1930 and 1970, the federal
government introduced a range of provisions aimed at preventing drug abuse on an
ad hoc basis.1177 It was not until the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 that
Congress brought the disparate provisions under one umbrella.1178 Administrative
efforts to attack the drug problem swiftly followed. The 1970s, for instance,
witnessed the formation of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Preven-
tion,1179 the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse,1180 the Strategy Council
on Drug Abuse,1181 a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control,1182
and the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.1183 Emphasis was on
reducing the demand for drugs and ensuring the existence and operation of
adequate treatment programs; on both fronts, the federal government sought to
lead the way.1184 President Nixon declared “all-out global war on the drug
menace.”1185 Considering drug abuse to be “one of the most vicious and corrosive
forces attacking the foundations of American society,” Nixon asserted, “We must
fight it with all the resources at our command.”1186 This required a “unified
1177. David Shull, Drugs as a National Security Issue, in NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 493 (John Norton Moore &
Robert F. Turner eds., 2d ed. 2005).
1178. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236.
1179. See Exec. Order No. 11,599, 36 Fed. Reg. 11,793 (June 17, 1971).
1180. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act § 601.
1181. See Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, § 302, 86 Stat. 65.
1182. See Memorandum from President Richard Nixon to William P. Rogers, Sec’y of State (Sept. 7, 1971),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid"3139.
1183. See Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, § 201, 86 Stat. 65.
1184. Shull, supra note 1177, at 496.
1185. Richard Nixon, Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973 Establishing the
Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 28, 1973), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid"4159#axzz1bneBG92h.
1186. Id.
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command” and allocation of significant resources to the effort. In 1969, the federal
government spent $36 million fighting drugs; by 1974, it was spending $257
million per year, an amount still considered deficient.1187
In the 1980s, the government’s approach to the subject matter shifted: it became
more punitive, with a growing emphasis on law enforcement and interdiction.1188
Users themselves became the problem, and the criminal law—not social welfare
programs—became the solution.1189 With this shift came the question of resources.
During the third epoch, national security had achieved preeminence among other
concerns, and the nation’s resources were allocated accordingly. The military had
grown to a point where the armed forces could assist law enforcement.1190 Thus,
when President Reagan declared war on drugs in 1982,1191 Congress was ready to
pass new legislation, allowing the military to support law enforcement in the war
by providing training, intelligence, and equipment.1192 With this new framing,
drugs quickly became enveloped into the national security infrastructure.
In 1986, Reagan issued a new national security decision directive entitled
Narcotics and National Security.1193 Expanding global narcotics regimes threat-
ened U.S. national security.1194 The framework in which that threat was presented
was consistent with the framework of the third epoch—containment of the threat
posed by communism to democratic states:
Of primary concern are those nations with a flourishing narcotics industry,
where a combination of international criminal trafficking organizations, rural
insurgents, and urban terrorists can undermine the stability of the local
government; corrupt efforts to curb drug crop production, processing, and
distribution; and distort public perception of the narcotics issue in such a way
that it becomes part of an anti-U.S. or anti-Western debate.
1187. Id.
1188. Shull, supra note 1177, at 496.
1189. Id.
1190. See Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials: Hearing on DOD and Military Serv.
Cooperation with and Assistance to Civilian Agency Before Subcomm. on Crime, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong. (1983) (statement of Ronald F. Lauve, Senior Associate Director, General Government Division).
1191. See Andrew Glass, Reagan Declares ‘War on Drugs,’ October 14, 1982, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43552.html (recounting Reagan’s declaration that illicit drugs were a
threat to national security and acknowledging that President Nixon popularized the term “war on drugs” in 1971).
1192. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-86, Title IX, 95 Stat. 1115 (1981). The
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 had apparently limited the military’s ability to assist law enforcement, prompting the
new language from Congress. See Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006).
1193. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 221: NARCOTICS AND NATIONAL
SECURITY (1986), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-221.htm (redacted declassified docu-
ment).
1194. See id. at 1.
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While these problems are endemic to most nations plagued by narcotics,
their effects are particularly insidious for the democratic states of the Western
Hemisphere.1195
For Reagan, the narcotics trade (or narco-trafficking) threatened “the integrity of
democratic governments by corrupting political and judicial institutions.”1196 Drug
organizations, moreover, had taken over foreign media outlets, reducing the ability
of friendly regimes to publicly cooperate with the United States in its counter-
narcotics operations.1197 Reagan recognized the links between drug trafficking,
illicit arms sales, and terrorism, even as he also noted that several nations
themselves were involved in the drug trade.1198 Of paramount importance was the
threat posed to democracy.1199 The DOD, CIA, State Department, and others were
to immediately incorporate counter-narcotics into their purview.1200
The tumultuous events that marked the ending of the Cold War in 1989 ushered
in a new opportunity. The drug war, like climate change, stood poised and ready to
take advantage of the new environment. President George H.W. Bush announced
on September 6, 1989 that he was significantly escalating the war on drugs.1201
Restricting the flow of cocaine into the United States had become a “major foreign
policy objective.”1202
The rationale of the third epoch continued to dominate, but it expanded. The
question was not merely one of preventing drugs from flowing into the United
States. Bush evinced concern that the drug trade could potentially destabilize
friendly governments.1203 “[I]t is,” he suggested, “imperative for our own well-
being and the development of democratic and economically stable governments
around the world that this problem be dealt with aggressively.”1204 The United
States would focus on the Western Hemisphere and, in particular, the Andean drug
cartels; initial emphasis on Colombia could later be expanded to Peru and
1195. Id.
1196. Id. at 2.
1197. Id.
1198. Id.
1199. Id. (“Policy. The international drug trade threatens the national security of the United States by
potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is therefore the policy of the United States, in cooperation with other
nations, to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics, reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to
use drug trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of individual governments to confront
and defeat this threat.”).
1200. Id. at 3–5.
1201. President George H.W. Bush, Address on National Drug Control Strategy (Sept. 6, 1989), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/06/us/text-of-president-s-speech-on-national-drug-control-strategy.html?
pagewanted"all&src"pm.
1202. PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH, NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 13: COCAINE TRAFFICKING (1989),
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd13.pdf.
1203. PRESIDENT GEORGE H.W. BUSH, NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 18: INTERNATIONAL COUNTERNARCOTICS
STRATEGY 1 (1989), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/pdfs/nsd/nsd18.pdf.
1204. Id.
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Bolivia.1205 The DOD, the CIA, and the State Department would work in parallel
with the White House to ensure progress on this front.1206
The war was not limited to military—or paramilitary—operations. Law enforce-
ment continued to play a role. Bush sent a request to Congress for an additional
$1.5 billion that would be used to enlarge the criminal justice system to address the
flow of drugs inside the United States.1207 But the framing clearly involved the
broader threat to U.S. interests: “Drugs,” the National Drug Control Strategy
declared, “are a major threat to our national security.”1208
Like the environmental discourse, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the war
on drugs became enveloped in the national security conceptualization. A slew of
academic articles challenged traditional concepts of security and considered the
application of the national security framework to narco-trafficking.1209 The mili-
tary had already been involved in a support capacity. The question was one of U.S.
national security—in response to which the existing infrastructure and substantial
resources could be directed. By 1993, the federal government was spending some
$12 billion per year.1210 President Clinton explained, “[T]he United States consid-
ers the operations of international criminal narcotics syndicates as a national
security threat requiring an extraordinary and coordinated response by civilian and
military agencies involved in national security . . . .”1211 Like his predecessor,
Clinton focused on Andean drug trafficking.1212 The United States would seek to
destroy organizations engaged in narco-trafficking.1213 Domestically, emphasis
would again be placed on drug treatment.1214
1205. Id. at 3.
1206. See id. The DEA’s Operation Snowcap (run from 1987 to the mid-1990s) similarly focused on the source
of supply in Central and South America. CURT A. KLUN, WAR ON DRUGS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 35 YEARS OF
FIGHTING ASYMMETRIC THREATS 45 (2010). Note that operations conducted under this program were conducted in
Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, and
Mexico. Id. at 46.
1207. Bush, supra note 1201.
1208. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2 (1989), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/
119466.pdf.
1209. See e.g., Michael J. Dziedzic, The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security, 31 SURVIVAL 533
(1989) (issuing his article in November 1989, the same month as the Wall’s fall).
1210. STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE
AGAINST DRUGS, at xvi (1993).
1211. Exec. Order No. 12,880, 58 Fed. Reg. 60,989 (Nov. 16, 1993), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,008, 61
Fed. Reg. 28,721 (June 3, 1996) (shifting the responsibility of chairing an interagency working group in
international counternarcotics policy to the Office of National Drug Control Police, rather than the Department of
State).
1212. THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE NO. 14: COUNTER-NARCOTICS “ANDEAN STRAT-
EGY” (1993).
1213. H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE
DRUG WAR, H. R. Doc. No. 104-486, at 44 (1996) (summarizing testimony by Thomas A. Constantine,
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who stressed that it is imperative that the United States
“destroy some of these [drug trafficking cartels] rather than merely disrupt them”).
1214. Id.
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Two years after announcing his policy with regard to Central and South
America, Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive No. 44: Heroin Control
Policy (“PDD-44”), apparently couching his Administration’s heroin strategy in a
rubric comprised of diplomacy, international law, and law enforcement.1215 The
Administration described the directive’s major tenets, which included, inter alia,
implementing and coordinating international law enforcement efforts, focusing on
regions linked to the U.S. market, and using diplomatic and public channels to
focus international awareness on the growing heroin threat.1216 Jane Becker, the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary at the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs labeled “international heroin control” as a “major
foreign policy objective.”1217 According to Becker, PDD-44 directed the Bureau
to: “Work through diplomatic and public channels to boost international awareness
of the growing heroin threat . . . [and] [b]ring law enforcement efforts to bear
against the principal organizations that are involved in heroin production, process-
ing, distribution, and transit.”1218
Despite the continued focus on narco-trafficking, the suggested movement
towards treatment and rehabilitation immediately raised hackles in Congress. The
Republican-controlled legislature demanded that Anthony Lake, the National
Security Advisor, come before it “to discuss the status of the drug war.”1219 Of
great concern was “restoring the drug war’s effectiveness and re-elevating drugs as
a national security issue.”1220 Clinton went on to include drugs in his NSS.1221
Emphasis centered on the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.1222 Through-
out this time, the military maintained various powers that allowed it to interact
with local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations in the domestic
counter-narcotics effort.1223 By October 2010, the drug war had become firmly
1215. THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE NO. 44: HEROIN CONTROL POLICY (1995).
1216. See generally Questions for the Record: Joint Hearing on Interdiction Before the H. Comm. on
Transportation & Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Maritime Transportation, and S. Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, 104th Cong. (1996), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/
j960912q.htm.
1217. Jane E. Becker, Principal Deputy Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Int’l Narcotics & L. Enforcement Aff., Address
in [Bangkok,] Thailand (Nov. 6, 1995), available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/
becker_110695.html.
1218. Id.
1219. H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM & OVERSIGHT, supra note 1213, at 67.
1220. Id.
1221. See CLINTON NSS, supra note 1035, at 11.
1222. Id.
1223. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 124 (2006) (designating DOD as the lead agency for detecting and monitoring the
transit of illegal drugs into the United States); § 371 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (authorizing DOD to share
information obtained during training or operations with law enforcement officials); § 372 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)
(empowering DOD to provide equipment to local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations); § 373 (2006)
(authorizing DOD to provide training and advice to law enforcement officials); § 374 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)
(giving DOD the authority to maintain and operate equipment to be used by law enforcement agencies); § 375
(2006) (restricting direct military participation in search, seizure, and arrest operations conducted by law
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enmeshed in the national security infrastructure.1224
4. Crime
Like climate change, biodefense, and the drug war, the war on crime predates
the end of the Cold War. Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s war on organized
crime was followed by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s war on “crime and
disorder.”1225 Johnson appointed the President’s Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice, with the aim of creating a bipartisan
approach to the problem of rising crime.1226 In his 1968 State of the Union
Address, Johnson urged Congress to “help the cities and the States in their war on
crime to the full extent of its resources and its constitutional authority.”1227
Richard Nixon subsequently proceeded to conduct a war between “peace forces”
and the “criminal forces,” or the enemy within, as emphasis shifted to eliminating
crime by incapacitating those engaged in it.1228
To some extent, labeling criminal law reform as “war” merely reflected the
dominance of the national security discourse during the third epoch. States were
tasked with developing “battle plans” for reducing crime as a precursor for federal
funding.1229 Sure enough, within a few years of proclaiming a war on crime, the
issue sat atop the domestic agenda.1230 But due to the dominance of the primary
national security aim—namely Soviet containment—the movement against crime
initially gathered only limited momentum. The National Crime Commission of
1967 and its successor, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (“LEAA”)
Commission on Standards and Goals of 1973, produced few results.1231 The
failure of these bodies led Gerald Caplan, of the National Institute on Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, to point out that in the decade since the war on
crime had begun, the United States had become subject to more crime than
enforcement, unless otherwise authorized by statute); 32 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (providing for DOD to grant
funding requests from state governors where the funds are to be used for counter-narcotics activities).
1224. See, e.g., KLUN, supra note 1206, at 3 (“The United States[] [has a] thirty-plus year history in fighting a
war on drugs [offering researchers] unique insight in addressing . . . non-traditional [national security] threats.”).
1225. See RONALD L. GOLDFARB, PERFECT VILLAINS, IMPERFECT HEROES: ROBERT F. KENNEDY’S WAR AGAINST
ORGANIZED CRIME (1996).
1226. See, e.g., James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1972,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/crimewar.htm.
1227. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 17, 1968), available at http://www.
lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680117.asp.
1228. See RICHARD NIXON, TOWARD FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1968), reprinted in 114 Cong. Rec. 12936 (May 13,
1968).
1229. See, e.g., John F.X. Irving, New Directions in the War on Crime, 1 CRIM. JUST. Q. 40, 41 (1973).
1230. See Gerald M. Caplan, Criminology, Criminal Justice, and the War on Crime, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 3, 4
(1976).
1231. See id. at 7$8.
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anywhere else in the world and significantly more than it had suffered in 1964.1232
Following the Cold War, however, crime was folded directly into the national
security infrastructure. Transnational and organized crime generated substantial
notice. This led to significant alterations in the criminal justice system as a whole
because, while the target may have been criminal syndicates, the primacy of
national security reverberated through every level of government. Opposition to
new proposals roughly translated into being “soft” on crime—a label uncomfort-
ably close to being pro-criminal, and therefore, a position no politically elected
representative could adopt. This war on crime shared one of the chief characteris-
tics of the more traditional approaches to national security: The burden of
persuasion shifted to those resisting new measures to demonstrate that the new
measures’ introduction would not lead to greater security or would not lead to
more crime. Either would be a very difficult case to make.
a. The War on Crime
New measures rapidly proliferated within the national security rhetoric.1233 As
one commentator later noted,
The war on crime has been fought on many fronts, and with many weapons.
Most dramatically, it has brought us the resurgence of capital punishment as a
measure for the permanent incapacitation of violent predators. Less dramati-
cally, but more pervasively, Draconian laws combating the plague of violent
recidivism have pursued a similar strategy of incapacitation.1234
In 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, introduced in the
wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, limited habeas corpus for ordinary crime.1235
Scholars considered this stance to have been largely driven by a war mentality with
regard to crime—one with many different, substantive impacts on the practice of
criminal law.1236 “The right to counsel,” one practicing attorney concluded, “is
being altered, warped, or limited, depending upon one’s perspective.”1237 The
attorney, Albert Krieger, continued: “The question that the practicing criminal
defense lawyer must ask is whether the independence that has been the rod and the
staff of the advocate has been, and continues to be, eroded by our times, our
1232. See id. at 3 (“[W]e have more crime than any other place in the world, more this year than last, and
much, much more than we had in 1964 when Senator Goldwater became the first presidential candidate to argue
that the federal government must do something about crime in the streets.”).
1233. See generally BARRY BUZAN ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1998).
1234. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 832 (2001).
1235. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
1236. See, e.g., Albert J. Krieger, Friendly Fire and the Casualties of the War on Crime, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
49, 50 (1996).
1237. Id.
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troubles, our fears.”1238 Myriad dangers, ranging from conspiracy and money
laundering charges to obstruction of justice charges, awaited the criminal defense
attorney in a system marked by steadily expanding powers, lowered standards, and
few to withstand the tide.1239
Other scholars followed suit, arguing that the war on crime had eroded many of
the most basic protections in the criminal law system:
As representatives of both political parties compete to show which is the
toughest on crime, the criminal justice systems in the United States have
become so result-oriented that little attention is paid to the fairness and
reliability of the process which leads to those results.1240
A key problem among those associated with shifting due process standards was the
war’s impact on equal justice for individuals from non-white ethnic backgrounds
or living at lower socio-economic standards.1241 The reach of these changes into
society was substantial: approximately one-third of all African-American men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty found themselves under supervision.1242
Professor Stephen Bright estimated that by the turn of the century, half of all black
men would be in prison, probation, jail, or on parole.1243
In terms of sheer numbers, it would be hard overestimate the war on crime’s
impact on society. In 1970, the prison and jail population registered approximately
300,000 inmates.1244 By 2001, more than 2,000,000 were held in facilities, with
another 4,000,000 under some form of penal control including parole and proba-
tion—some three percent of all American adults.1245 By 2008, scholars, writing
about the pyrrhic war of the preceding three decades, noted that “the society-
altering impact of this war reaches far beyond flat numbers.”1246 They suggested
that a fundamental transformation had occurred:
The war’s impact has been most devastating on those individuals swept up
by . . . incarceration . . . but it is not confined to them. This impact has instead
extended to how society views governance, reshaping not only a wide range of
social institutions but also the way we conceive of ourselves. The very concept
of policing has changed, as has the place of crime in electoral politics;
1238. Id. at 51.
1239. See id. at 51–52.
1240. Stephen B. Bright, Essay, Casualties of the War on Crime: Fairness, Reliability, and the Credibility of




1244. Dubber, supra note 1234, at 832.
1245. Id.
1246. AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY, AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 1 (Mary Louise Frampton
et al. eds., 2008).
2011] THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 1745
increasingly, too, schooling, public health, and social welfare overlap with the
criminal justice system.1247
Myriad examples of ways in which crime became central to the national security
infrastructure present themselves. The military, the intelligence community, the
NSC, and other traditional instruments are now directed towards crime: DTRA’s
Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, for instance, has begun to consider
assisting law enforcement through developing high-technology crime-fighting as
one of its central aims.1248 DOD, through the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (“DARPA”), holds meetings and organizes workshops to discuss technol-
ogy research, development, and “deployment” that could help to reduce crime.1249
The juxtaposition of the military focus and the expanded emphasis on criminal
matters is striking. DTRA explained,
As a mission-driven organization tasked with integrating and focusing capabili-
ties to address threats to national security, the Department of Defense has a
vested interest in improving the functional performance of the national
security enterprise in order to respond to the challenges imposed by threats
today and in the future.1250
In this conception, the key stakeholders include “state and local law enforcement
agencies.”1251
DTRA is not alone in its attention to organized crime as an element of national
security. By the time George W. Bush took office in 2001, the NSC included
policy-coordinating committees focused not only on drug control, infectious
disease, and biodefense, but also on organized crime.1252
The Obama Administration has also focused on crime, suggesting that global
criminal networks “foment insecurity abroad and bring people and goods across
our own borders that threaten our people.”1253 For the Obama Administration,
homeland security, synonymous with national security, is grounded in ordinary
law enforcement and, as such, focuses on both individual criminals and criminal
organizations.1254 The issue further implicates U.S. foreign policy, which will
henceforward be based in part on “an aggressive and affirmative development
agenda and commensurate resources” that would strengthen regional partners and
1247. Id.
1248. Matthew Linkie, Note, The Defense Threat Reduction Agency: A Note on the United States’Approach to
the Threat of Chemical and Biological Warfare, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 531, 542$43 (2000).
1249. DEF. THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, supra note 1092, at A-165, A-166.
1250. Id. at 20.
1251. Id.
1252. ALAN G. WHITTAKER ET AL., THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY PROCESS: THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL AND INTERAGENCY SYSTEM 18 (2011), http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/outreach/publications/nspp/docs/icaf-nsc-
policy-process-report-08-2011.pdf.
1253. OBAMA NSS, supra note 1, at 8.
1254. Id. at 15.
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help the United States to counter global criminal networks.1255 Because crime is
classified as one of many threats with no borders (along with climate change and
pandemic disease), such international cooperation is vital to U.S. success.1256
b. The “Muddy Waters” Problem
The strongest argument put forward for including organized crime in the
national security infrastructure relates to what I consider a “muddy waters”
problem: i.e., terrorism, drugs, and crime are not always easily distinguished and,
in fact, often reflect different aspects of the same phenomenon. One aspect of this
is illustrated by the expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(“FISA”) to the criminal realm.1257
The entire purpose of enacting FISA was to preserve a distinction between
criminal law and national security concerns.1258 Following the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, however, that wall was deliberately removed.1259 This brought with it
broader application of FISA—one, which was determined in 2002 to be legitimate,
even where the primary aim of the investigation in question was criminal in
nature.1260
The nexus between terrorism, foreign intelligence, and criminal activity simi-
larly reflected in the phenomenon of narco-terrorists. Drug Enforcement Agency
Administrator William Asa Hutchinson explained to Congress that this intersec-
tion undermines U.S. national security.1261 Hutchinson defined the class of
narco-terrorism as one “in which terrorist groups, or associated individuals,
participate directly or indirectly in the cultivation, manufacture, transportation, or
distribution of controlled substances and the monies derived from these activi-
ties.”1262 He cited as examples: Cocaine trafficked by the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), opium production in Afghanistan (overseen by the
Taliban), the methamphetamine and heroin trafficking efforts of the United Wa
State Army in Burma, trafficking conducted by the Kurdistan Workers Party
(“PKK”) in southeastern Turkey, and Sendero Luminoso’s “revolutionary tax” on
1255. Id.
1256. Id. at 40.
1257. Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
1258. See S. Rep. No. 95-604(I), at 2 (1977) (setting forth the purpose of FISA).
1259. See David S. Kris, The Rise and Fall of the FISA Wall, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 487, 488 (2006) (“The
FISA wall [between criminal law and national security concerns] resisted all efforts to tear it down . . . until [the
Department of Justice] in 2002 took an unprecedented appeal to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review . . . .”).
1260. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 728 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (concluding that FISA never established a
dichotomy between criminal law and national security concerns); see also Kris, supra note 1259, at 513
(describing broader application of FISA).
1261. DEA Congressional Testimony Executive Summary Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, and
Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/
dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct031302.html (testimony of DEA Administrator William Asa Hutchinson).
1262. Id.
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coca farmers in Peru.1263 Hutchinson’s recognition of the links between different
threats, and the subsequent issues raised for States, reflects in the international
environment. Since 1998, when the United Nations (in a special session of the
General Assembly) adopted a political declaration expressing concern about the
growing links between drugs, crime, and terrorism, international instruments have
recognized the link between drug production/trafficking and terrorism.1264
One of the reasons terrorism, drugs, and crime are considered within the
national security realm is because of the challenge each poses to state sovereignty.
Each can essentially create an alternative form of coercive power, which operates
outside legal and political structures. Organizations can use the massive assets
generated from illegal drug trafficking to infiltrate the political structures. Where
unsuccessful, violence can be used in place of economic inducements, in the
process rendering legal structures obsolete.
FARC, for instance, is believed to earn between $500 and $600 million per year
from illegal drug trafficking.1265 The group controls a significant portion of the
worldwide market: according to the U.S. Department of Justice, FARC supplies
more than fifty percent of the global cocaine supply.1266 At its height, according to
U.S. Southern Command, FARC boasted 17,500 fighters who carried out a
systemic campaign of violence and intimidation.1267 The Colombian Minister of
Justice, Guillermo Plazas Alcid, underscored the challenge posed to state sover-
eignty.1268 For Alcid,
Illicit drug traffic menaced the health and well-being of individuals, spread
corruption, abetted criminal conspiracy and subverted public order. It threat-
ened the sovereignty and security of States and disrupted the economic social
and cultural structure of society. In particular circumstances, it generated or
supported other serious forms of organized crime.1269
1263. Id.
1264. U.N. GAOR, 20th Special Sess., 7th plen. mtg. at 7–72, (June 8–10, 1998), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/
report_1999-01-01_1.pdf. Special attention should be directed to section 10 expressing concern about the link
between illicit drug production, trafficking and terrorist groups and section 11 linking illicit drug production and
illicit trafficking in drugs and arms. Id. at 4.
1265. Stephanie Hanson, FARC, ELN: Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerrillas, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 19,
2009), http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272.
1266. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, United States Charges 50 Leaders of Narco-Terrorist FARC in Colombia
with Supplying More than Half of the World’s Cocaine (Mar. 22, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/March/
06_crm_163.html.
1267. JIM STAVRIDIS, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND: 2008 POSTURE STATEMENT 15 (2008), http://armed-services.
senate.gov/statemnt/2008/March/Stavridis%2003-06-08.pdf.
1268. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT 206, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XI.1 (2008),
http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf.
1269. Comm. on the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, U.N. Doc. E/CN.7/590, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/
Drug%20Convention/Commentary_on_the_united_nations_convention_1988_E.pdf. Note that although the UN
World Drug Report attributes the quoted text to Alcid, the original Commentary simply lays out the rationale as
one of various considerations leading to the creation of the Convention. Compare id., with U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS
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So not only is there a link between terrorism, drugs, and crime, but in some
situations, the presence of such activities gives rise to other forms of criminal
activity. The attendant power held by individuals outside of the state structure
threatens state sovereignty.
Increasingly, the types of weapons and equipment employed by such criminal
organizations replicates the type of devices used by the State. In November 2006,
for instance, the U.S. Coast Guard seized its first semi-submersible vessel ninety
miles off the Pacific coast of Costa Rica.1270 Labeled “Bigfoot-1,” rumors about
the existence of vessels like it had circulated for years, but none had been
captured.1271 By 2007, more than forty such sea craft had been spotted, with three
times that number identified the following year.1272 The forty- to eighty-foot
vessels, built by Columbian drug cartels, are capable of carrying up to four people
and between four to twelve metric tons of cocaine.1273 “What worries me,”
reflected Admiral Jim Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, “is if you
can move that much cocaine, what else can you put in that semi-submersible. Can
you put a weapon of mass destruction in it?”1274
Drug cartels are not the only non-state actors to try to acquire such vessels.
Police recently discovered the next generation of fully submersible vessels in
Ecuador, apparently linked to FARC.1275 The 100-foot long, air-conditioned craft
& CRIME, 2008 WORLD DRUG REPORT 206, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XI.1 (2008), http://www.unodc.org/
documents/wdr/WDR_2008/WDR_2008_eng_web.pdf.
1270. See David Adams, Smugglers Ride Low, Slow, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.tampabay.com/news/world/article451245.ece; David Kushner, Drug-Sub Culture, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Apr. 23, 2009, at 30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/magazine/26drugs-t.html.
1271. Adams, supra note 1270; Kushner, supra note 1270; see also Narco Submarines, Torpedoes and
Semi-Submersibles, COVERT SHORES NAVAL WARFARE BLOG: OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 21, 2011, 8:06
PM), http://covertshores.blogspot.com/2010/06/narco-submarines-torpedoes-and-semi.html (noting that while
“narco-subs” were widely reported within the United States military, none had ever been caught before November
2006).
1272. Adams, supra note 1270; see also CBP Aircraft, Interagency Coordination Thwart Semi-Submersible,
THE MARITIME EXEC. (July 30, 2009), http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/2009-07-30-cbp-aircraft-
interagency-coordination-thwart-semi-submersible (reporting U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office of Air
and Marine P-3 aircraft contributed to the disruption of approximately 105,000 pounds of cocaine during the
previous twelve months by their efforts to identify and interdict semi-submersible drug vessels); CBP Aircraft,
Interagency Coordination Thwart Submarine Like Semi-Submersible, IMPERIAL VALLEY NEWS (July 28, 2009),
http://imperialvalleynews.com/index.php?option"com_content&task"view&id"6434&Itemid"2 (noting same).
1273. See JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE, JOINT INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE SOUTH FACT SHEET (2008),
http://media.mcclatchydc.com/smedia/2008/07/18/17/Hall-SPSS-factsheet.source.prod_affiliate.91.pdf.
1274. Id.
1275. See Sylvia Longmire, Border Security Narco Wars Today: Creativity in a Bad Cause, HSTODAY.US (Mar.
15, 2011), http://www.hstoday.us/focused-topics/border-security/single-article-page/narco-wars-today-creativity-
in-a-bad-cause.html (“The sophisticated vessel . . . had a conning tower, periscope and air conditioning sys-
tem . . . . This was the first seizure of a . . . fully operational submarine built to facilitate trans-oceanic drug
trafficking.”); P-3 Subhunters Using ASW Gear to Find Narco-Subs?, DEFENSETECH (Jan. 14, 2011), http://
defensetech.org/2011/01/14/p-3-subhunters-pressed-into-service-to-find-narco-subs/ (“[P]olice and soldiers dis-
covered a 100-foot long, air-conditioned sub estimated to be able to carry 10 tons of cargo . . . . Rumor has it these
vessels are designed and built with serious help from the leftist Colombian rebel group known as the FARC.”).
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could carry up to 10 tons of cargo.1276 The Sea Tigers, a unit within the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”), appears also to have developed at least three
semi-submersibles in Sri Lanka.1277 The State Department lists both FARC and the
LTTE as foreign terrorist organizations.1278
Like the groups themselves, these vessels straddle the intersection of criminal
law, anti-drug statutes, and national security. They represent a world where the
lines are increasingly blurred. And they show the tension between a national
security system based on intent-analysis—where the institutional and legal frame-
work is determined by the individual engaged in illegal activity—and one
increasingly based on the act itself, including its risks and consequences.
The result of the shift to a risk-based approach has been the steady expansion of
the national security infrastructure. The Navy, for example, is rumored to be using
P-3s (anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft) and anti-submarine
warfare against civilian targets off shore.1279 U.S. Southern Command explains,
“Illegal activities associated with illicit trafficking . . . [represent] a significant
threat to security and stability in the Western Hemisphere.”1280
Transnational crime falls firmly within the Joint Interagency Task Force’s
purview. Technically, its role is to support law enforcement agencies, who
undertake the actual interdictions—boarding, search, seizures and arrests.1281 But
how ought the military respond when a submarine enters U.S. waters? The
traditional mode of engagement is for the military to identify the actor and/or the
actor’s intent.1282 Thus, if a bomber enters U.S. airspace, the convention is to try to
contact the aircraft, either via the airwaves or by sending up planes to intercept it.
But with a submarine, even if it could be sighted from the air, how do you know
who controls it without getting it to the surface? Should the sub be treated as a
civilian vessel or as a potential state actor?
Even if law enforcement agencies do take over, are they really still law
enforcement agencies? Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) Office of Air and
1276. P-3 Subhunters Using ASW Gear to Find Narco-Subs?, supra note 1275.
1277. Walter Jayawardhana, Tamil Tigers Are Developing a Submarine for Terrorism, LANKA PAGE (Mar. 30,
2007), http://lankapage.wordpress.com/2007/03/30/tamil-tigers-are-developing-a-submarine-for-terrorism/.
1278. Press Release, Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
1279. See P-3 Subhunters Using ASW Gear to Find Narco-Subs?, supra note 1275 (“It sounds like [the
semi-submersibles and fully submersibles used by criminal organizations] are capable of staying underwater long
enough to warrant the use of P-3 subhunters to find them.”).
1280. Counter-Illicit Trafficking, U.S. S. COMMAND, http://www.southcom.mil/ourmissions/Pages/Counter-
Illicit%20Trafficking.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2011).
1281. Id.
1282. See ALAN COLE ET AL., RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 4 (2009), http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/7b0d0f70-
bb07-48f2-af0a-7474e92d0bb0/San-Remo-ROE-Handbook.
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Marine has tactical teams that use Blackhawk helicopters.1283 The agency has
deployed predator drones along the southern border1284—where significantly
weaker Fourth Amendment protections apply.1285 Similarly less constrained by
Fourth Amendment considerations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
officers may carry more sizeable weapons than typical police forces. Does it make
sense to think about CBP, ICE, or DHS as a law enforcement organization at
all—when they actually appear to be rapidly morphing into interior paramilitary
institutions?
The muddy waters problem extends beyond the terrorism-drugs-crime nexus to
include environmental concerns and biodefense. In 2000, for instance, the Na-
tional Intelligence Council issued a paper linking environmental changes to
pandemic disease.1286 Eco-terrorism further blurs the distinction; it involves “the
violent destruction of property perpetrated by the radical fringes of environmental
groups in the name of saving the environment from further human encroachment
and destruction.”1287 Groups such as Earth First! thus cross lines that might
otherwise mark the federal response.1288
What these categories—climate change, biodefense, drugs, and crime—
demonstrate is that U.S. national security, in expanding beyond the interests of the
third epoch, is now confronting an intricate relationship between potential threats.
This relationship makes it difficult to draw bureaucratic lines and to prioritize
different areas. In some ways, it represents a Weberian bureaucracy run amok:
While professionalization and specialization has occurred, and hierarchies have
been established, jurisdictional areas are not clearly defined. The result is a
constant state of friction between administrative agencies. The problem is that the
placement of the bureaucracy within the national security framework demands
ever greater resources and authorities, with significant constitutional conse-
quences.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
As the fourth epoch has taken hold, there have been few efforts to limit the
expansion of national security. Part of the reason for this is that the question has
1283. See Amy Guckeen, Black Hawk Helicopter Helps Reinforce Borders, ARMY.MIL (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.army.mil/article/65930/Black_Hawk_Helicopter_Helps_Reinforce_Borders/ (discussing the CBP’s
acquisition of the helicopters).
1284. See William Booth, More Predator Drones Fly U.S.-Mexico Border, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/more-predator-drones-fly-us-mexico-border/2011/12/01/gIQANSZz8O_
story.html.
1285. See generally United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
1286. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, supra note 1152, at 33–65.
1287. ELIZABETH L. CHALECKI, PAC. INST. FOR STUD. IN DEV., ENV’T, & SEC., A NEW VIGILANCE: IDENTIFYING
AND REDUCING THE RISKS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TERRORISM 4–6 (2001), http://www.pacinst.org/reports/
environment_and_terrorism/environmental_terrorism_final.pdf.
1288. See About Earth First!, EARTH FIRST!, http://www.earthfirst.org/about.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
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changed. No longer is the country asking what needs to be done to limit the spread
of totalitarian ideologies—already an extremely broad question. Instead, the most
important question now driving U.S. national security is what potential threats
does the United States face? This question eliminates intent from the equation. It
sidesteps the likelihood of such risks actually occurring. The mere fact that such
threats might become manifest is sufficient to drive the country to action. Making
the question even more expansive is the fact that these threats have no end. They
are really just persistent problems, requiring a continual effort to counter their
impact on the United States.
Thus stripped of limits, an infinite number of risks may be placed in the national
security framework. Climate change could destabilize countries and entire regions,
sending refugees flooding across U.S. borders, threatening the provision of
domestic services. Pandemic influenza could cause massive social disruption.
Drug trafficking and criminal syndicates could undermine governmental struc-
tures. Myriad further concerns present themselves: damage to information infra-
structure through cyber attacks, for instance, could bring government, commerce,
and education to a halt. Contamination of water supplies or the release of noxious
substances into the air could cause widespread devastation, for which the national
government lacks the resources necessary to respond effectively. The list contin-
ues.
But why now? Such concerns have existed for decades. Why is it that we are
now experiencing the broadening of national security to include so many different
risks? This Article suggests that the answer lies in history and a deeper understand-
ing of the evolution of U.S. national security.
The first epoch was shaped by powerful forces: foremost, the protection of the
Union; following that, international independence and economic growth. During
the second epoch the federal government adopted a more aggressive role at home
and overseas, looking to shape the environment and head off challenges to its
sovereignty. The third epoch brought with it the primacy of the national security
dialogue over competing concerns. A rapidly expanding infrastructure, attended by
secrecy, and a close relationship with industry, provided the engine of growth. The
opportunity to use this infrastructure to drive other concerns was not lost on those
with different interests. It was not until the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, that
institutional attention could be focused on nonconventional threats. From that
point forward, interests began competing for attention by adhering to the existing
national security infrastructure.
The evolution of national security in this manner carries with it constitutional
and legal concerns. These are rooted in the underlying grafting of potential risks to
the national security infrastructure. The national security system was created
solely to protect federal institutions. Its object, then, is preservation of the State
itself. Broader concepts of security do not change this object. Nor do they alter the
fabric of the discussion. National security still points towards the federal govern-
ment. It is synonymous with State security and, as such, it is a very different animal
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from individual security or environmental security. National security, moreover,
involves extraordinary measures, hypertrophic executive power, secrecy, and
minimal restrictions on resources. It suggests that there ought to be no opponents—
that, to oppose the policies lacks moral or political credibility. By crafting issues as
national security, the impression is conveyed that they are both urgent and
existential and, therefore, should be discussed outside the ordinary course of
political debate and scrutiny. Expanding the realm of national security changes the
relationship of citizens to the State. It does this by inserting secret functions of
government, such as intelligence collection and analysis, and military capabilities
and authorities, into a range of social relations.
The national security interests of the Founders centered on protection of the
Union, the constitutional structure of the state, and the national government as the
institutional representation of the people as sovereign. But it is not now the
protection of the people’s sovereignty that is the primary aim of federal activity.
Instead, it is the federal government’s sovereignty, which, through secret mecha-
nisms and a greatly enlarged administrative capacity, is being secured as against
the people. The resulting constitutional implications make the fourth epoch
fundamentally different from those that preceded it.
At some point, the effort to attach issues to national security is simply blatant
opportunism. Thus, Senator Barbara Mikulski of Maryland, a member of the
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, recently considered counter-
feit prescription drugs entering the United States.1289 During the Senate hearing,
she asked, “[A]re we moving with [a] sense of urgency? Has this been escalated to
a homeland security issue? Is this the top of anyone’s agenda?”1290 The underlying
assumption is that as soon as the issue becomes couched as a security concern, it
rockets to the top of the political agenda. “For any of us who value safety and
efficacy,” Mikulski added, “this has to be elevated to a national security, homeland
security and criminal level.”1291
From the inside, such blatant opportunism may appear harmless. In light of
limited bandwidth, the way to get attention is to make an issue appear larger than
perhaps it really is. But the effects of these provisions are not harmless. They carry
significant structural implications.
As a constitutional matter, the shift to the national security discourse diminishes
the role that Congress performs through its oversight function. The number of
committees responsible for “national security” has rapidly proliferated to include
1289. See Securing the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain: Hearing Before the S. Health, Educ., Labor and
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nearly every Senate and House committee.1292 This means that no single commit-
tee has a complete picture of national security. Nor is any single committee held
responsible, to the electorate, for such oversight. Overlapping responsibilities
allow legislators to take credit for keeping the country safe, and apportion blame
for any failures. For those committees given authority to oversee discreet execu-
tive actions, strong political pressures demand that the legislators not hamstring
the executive branch on issues of security.1293
Even where the executive acts outside the law, congressional oversight is
limited. The National Security Agency’s illegal wiretapping serves as a clear
example. Despite the Bush Administration’s disregard for legislative restrictions
on the wiretapping of U.S. citizens,1294 Congress retroactively legalized the
Administration’s actions on grounds that it involved sensitive issues.1295 National
security, for that matter, entails a significant amount of secrecy, such that Congress
may not even be aware of what is happening. When Congress is aware of executive
actions, legislators may be prevented from bringing certain information to light via
classification, which is itself an executive decision.
Congress’s ability to act with regard to authorization, at the outset, is similarly
narrow. The burden rests on those opposing national security measures to demon-
strate that failing to enact such measures will not undermine the country’s
safety—a nearly impossible burden of proof. For those measures with a significant
impact on civil rights, there may be an effort to include a sunset provision,
essentially providing an expiration date. But temporary powers rarely turn out to
be so limited; instead, they become a baseline on which further authorities are
1292. See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1662 (2006).
1293. For example, “the NSA’s program of eavesdropping on telephone conversations . . . falls within the
jurisdiction of at least the House and Senate Armed Services, Intelligence, and Judiciary Committees.” Id. at
1663.
1294. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16,
2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted"all (“President Bush secretly
authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search
for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spy-
ing . . . .”).
1295. See Charlie Savage & James Risen, Federal Judge Finds N.S.A. Wiretaps Were Illegal, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/us/01nsa.html (“The 2005 disclosure of the existence of [Bush’s
authorization of illegal wiretapping] set off a national debate over the limits of executive power and the balance
between national security and civil liberties. The arguments continued over the next three years, as Congress
sought to forge a new legal framework for domestic surveillance . . . . Congress overhauled the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to bring federal statutes into closer alignment with what the Bush administration had
been secretly doing. The legislation essentially legalized certain aspects of the program.”).
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built.1296 Similar concerns accompany the legislature’s ability to withstand the
drive to expansion via appropriations.
The judiciary, in turn, is unsuited for playing a stronger role in the area of
national security. The political question doctrine, which permeates foreign affairs,
becomes all the more ubiquitous with the expansion of national security and the
increasingly blurred lines between the different risks faced by the country. Claims
to judicial institutional incompetence, often pushed by an executive branch eager
to protect its interests, find sympathetic ears in a judiciary loath to make
determinations on matters involving the security of the United States. Judges, who
lack bureaucratic support, resources, information, and training in the area, are
reluctant to second-guess the executive branch. The state secrets doctrine further
restricts private citizens’ ability to gain access to the executive’s actions, as
exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act specifically carve out national
security matters.1297
The executive branch’s continued expansion of its national security portfolio is
concerning in light of the political nature of such structures. Shortly before he died
in 1954, Justice Robert Jackson, having served as Attorney General during the
great expansion of the FBI’s purview into national security in the third epoch,
wrote:
I cannot say that our country could have no central police without becoming
totalitarian, but I can say with great conviction that it cannot become totalitar-
ian without a centralized national police . . . . All that is necessary is to have a
national police competent to investigate all manner of offenses, and then, in the
parlance of the streets, it will have enough on enough people, even if it does
not elect to prosecute them, so that it will find no opposition to its policies.
Even those who are supposed to supervise it are likely to fear it. I believe that
the safeguard of our liberty lies in limiting any national policing or investiga-
tive organization, first of all to a small number of strictly federal offenses, and
second to nonpolitical ones. The fact that we may have confidence in the
administration of a federal investigative agency under its existing head does
not mean that it may not revert again to the days when the Department of
Justice was headed by men to whom the investigative power was a weapon to
be used for their own purposes.1298
If national security is understood as any potential threat to the United States, then it
necessarily includes political threats. Together with rapid expansions in power,
considerable resources, and minimal checks on the exercise of such authorities, the
equation should give one pause.
1296. See generally DONOHUE, supra note 590.
1297. See Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, supra note 47, at 168 (discussing application and effects of
the state secrets doctrine).
1298. ROBERT HOUGHWOUT JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 70–71
(1955).
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One excuse often given for the rapid expansion of the national security state is
that the country is facing a new era in which new rules apply.1299 Even this
assertion, however, is not new. Throughout the third epoch, for instance, a running
theme in inaugural addresses was the novelty of the circumstances in which each
new administration found itself. In 1949, Truman suggested the uniqueness of each
period in U.S. history, and that the challenges his Administration faced were thus
unprecedented.1300 Eisenhower noted that the “time of tempest” had swept the
continents of the earth.1301 The new era pitted freedom against slavery, lightness
against dark.1302 For Kennedy, the world was very different from the Founding.1303
“The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to
abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life.”1304 For LBJ, the
present was distinguished by “rapid and fantastic change.”1305 George H.W. Bush
made similar claims, as did Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and, now, Barack
Obama.1306
Reasonable minds may differ on whether the threats faced by the country today
are any greater than those that existed in previous decades. Perhaps less controver-
sial, however, is the observation that the basic understanding of what constitutes a
national security threat has changed. So have executive institutions, relationships,
and authorities—with constitutional implications. In 1928, Justice Brandeis re-
marked, “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men
of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.”1307 In developing a deeper
understanding of the evolution of conceptions of U.S. national security, perhaps
stronger resistance to such encroachments may ensue.
1299. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 1293, at 1656 (describing the newly formed National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks and its call for extensive reorganization of the Executive and Legislative branches after 9/11).
1300. Truman, Inaugural Address, supra note 719, at 286.
1301. Eisenhower, First Inaugural Address, supra note 535, at 294, 296.
1302. Id.
1303. See President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note
20, at 306.
1304. Id.
1305. Lyndon B. Johnson, Inaugural Address, supra note 863, at 310.
1306. See President George H.W. Bush, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1989), in 2 INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra
note 1028 (“A new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on.”); President Bill
Clinton, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 23, 1993), in 2 INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1028 (“Thomas Jefferson
believed that to preserve the very foundations of our nation, we would need dramatic change from time to time.
Well, my fellow citizens, this is our time. Let us embrace it.”); President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural
Address (Jan. 20, 2005), in 2 INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1028 (“Now it is the urgent requirement of our
nation’s security, and the calling of our time.”); President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), in 2
INAUGURAL ADDRESSES, supra note 1028 (“But our time of standing pat, of protecting narrow interests and putting
off unpleasant decisions—that time has surely passed.”).
1307. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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